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MILTON AND THE DOCTRINE OF SYMPATHY;
DEONTOLOGY AND AMBIANCE
INTRODUCTION
The sympathetic impulse has engaged man throughout 
the ages. This intuitive awareness of a harmonious unity in 
the existential world is "as old as the mind of man, and 
doubtless as permanent."”' Cognizant of an elemental symbio­
sis, man seems to have instinctively perceived a relationship 
among himself, his environment, and a materia prima. Such 
intuitive reality is a "motif of primitive myth and saga, 
surviving in classical mythology and speculative philos­
o p h y . B y  and large, the idea of sympathy nucleates man's 
evolving systems of ecclesiastical and civil polity. Al­
though in the modern age the sympathetic impulse has been 
checked by the inimical forces of scientism, it remains a 
living idea. A.Z. Butler notes its recent appearance "in 
the conclusions of the analytical psychologists of Vienna 
and Zurich— notably in the imagery and symbolism of 
Dr. Jung's 'Collective Unconscious.'"^ Sympathy, then, as a 
transcendental vision of the oneness of things is common to 
all ages. More or less instinctive in its manifestations,
1
2it is elemental to man’s spirituality, his sense of com­
munity and of selfhood.
Poets, philosophers, and scientists alike have exer­
cised themselves in the quest for a precise delineation of 
this bond uniting created things and the Creator. Litera­
ture, by its very nature, has always been compatible with 
the idea of sympathy; but literature can hardly be divorced 
from its philosophical and scientific backgrounds. Holding 
almost undisputed sway over the mind of humanity in all 
times and places, the idea of world cohesion based on sym­
pathy declined in emphasis in the Western world only with 
the triumph of the modern scientific spirit.^ Accordingly, 
literature and philosophy reflect a spiritual cleavage be­
tween man and man and man and nature— ultimately, an aliena­
tion from the primal source of his being. Thus man's per­
ception of the essence and extent of his relatedness to 
himself, his God, and his world is the key to his sense of 
responsibility.
As a true Christian humanist, John Milton had a 
large vision of life in its relatedness: the sympathetic im­
pulse is pervasive in his life and art. The idea of sympa­
thy, it seems, made appeals both conscious and unconscious 
to the personal and subliminal in Milton. On the elementary 
level, Milton was more than a little exercised by the notion 
of climatic influence which inheres in a real or supposed 
affinity between man and nature. Hi's works contain numerous
3references to the potentially adverse effect of England's 
climate on his genius and that of his fellow countrymen. 
Phrases like "frozen North" and England's "cold climate"^ 
usually occur to indicate the poet's anxiety both about his 
destined fame and about his responsibility to overcome any 
obstacle which might frustrate this end. Milton, in the 
History of Britain, cites the northern climate as a cause of 
the intellectual shortcomings of his countrymen: "For the
sunn, which we want, ripens witts as well as fruits."^ Per­
haps the poet also had in mind the essential unity of things 
when he, reflecting on his mission to write the eternal work 
through the aid of the "instinct of nature," expresses the 
concern that possibly something "advers in our climat, or 
the fate of the age"^ might prevent him. But Milton had 
earlier testified to the relationship and responsibility be­
tween the Creator and the created in "Naturam non Pati 
Senium" when in opposition to the hylozoistic fallacy he as­
serted that the earth shall not die because the spirit of 
God was in created matter. Such too may be taken as a 
statement of implicit faith in the moral base of the uni­
verse. One last bit of evidence for Milton's more than usual 
concern for universal affinities needs to be cited here. 
Discussing the attraction of like for like in Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce. Milton considers possible causes:
". . . But what might be the cause, whether each ones alotted 
Genius or proper Starre, or whether the sup email influence
of Schemes and angular aspects or this elementall Crasis . . , 
whether all these jointly or singly meeting friendly, or 
unfriendly in either party."®
Allegorical and eclectic, Milton expresses this 
vision of oneness in many forms; but he never allows the 
form to take precedence over the substance. Milton's whole 
life, I suggest, was devoted, among other things, to _an 
examination, a refinement, and an application of the doc­
trine of sympathy and its extensions in his ceaseless en­
deavor to "present [his] true account." Thus the concept of 
sympathy is inextricably bound to his religion, his deon­
tology, and his ambiance. It is the animating principle 
of his concepts of right reason and its adjuncts of Chris­
tian liberty and the law of nature, of his peculiar use of 
the ideas of the chain of being, the harmony of the spheres, 
patterns of hierarchy in the microcosm, the geocosm, and the 
macrocosm. Furthermore, I suggest that the sympathetic im­
pulse underlies Milton's monistic views, especially as they 
influence his notions on God and the creation.
Many shaping influences contributed to Milton's 
world view. Since Marvell's adulatory lines on Paradise 
Lost first noted the richness of Milton's eclecticism, 
numerous books and articles have appeared ostensibly chart­
ing the labyrinthine paths of Milton's sources and ideas.
The volume and scope of such works testify to the acuity of 
this early critical review. Of Milton's use of "fable and
5old song," Marvell declared:
Thou hast not miss'd one thought that
could be fit,
And all that was improper dost omit.
That Majesty which through thy Work
doth Reign 
Draws the Devout, deterring the Profane.
And things divine thou treatst of in
such state 
As them preserves, and Thee inviolate.°
But, of course, the study of Milton's ideas has since spanned 
his entire canon, resulting in a fuller appreciation of the 
genius of the poet. Such studies have noted the regular re­
currence of certain themes throughout Milton's wo r k s , a n d  
more recently the permanence or universality of the poet's 
prevailing motifs.
The redirection of criticism towards the timeless­
ness of Milton's ideas probably received its greatest impetus 
from such catalytic studies as E.M.W. Tillyard's Milton 
(1930), Douglas Bush's Paradise Lost in Our Time (19*+5)? and 
Frank Kermode's The Living Milton (1960). More and more 
readers have come to realize that in Milton, though much is 
lost to the present age, much abides. Hence the increase in 
popularity of Milton's works during the last decades. Per­
haps this renewed interest in Milton is also a result of the 
redirection of man's bisocial nature toward relatedness as a 
process of living. This symptom is reflected in the recent 
ecumenical movement as well as in the political implications 
of the shrinking world thrust upon this age by its prodi­
gious scientific strides.
6Though there have been a number of perceptive 
studies appearing in the past decade or so on related ideas, 
no major study has been devoted to the examination of the 
doctrine of sympathy in Milton’s canon. Some commentators 
have, however, had something to say in passing about this 
recurrent idea. Roland Frye, in God, Man, and Satan, dis­
cusses the importance of maintaining the right relationship 
between the created and the Creator. Focusing on Paradise 
Lost, he sees the repudiation of the foreordained relation­
ship of man to man and of man to God as the cause of the 
1 1Fall. This study will work more extensively with this 
idea as it is reflected throughout Milton's ambiance.
Michael Fixler's Milton and the Kingdoms of God is a study 
of the interrelationship of Milton's poetic, prophetic, and 
political visions. Fixler sees the "visionary ideal of 
Puritanism" as the unifying element of all Milton's en­
d e a v o r s . This study aims to show that the more compre­
hensive and inclusive concept of sympathy is the unifying 
element which best accounts for Milton's recurrent ideas and 
endeavors. It aims to point up a difference merely of em­
phasis, not of kind, in the young Milton as distinguished 
from the Milton of the middle and final years. Walter Clyde 
Curry in Milton's Ontology, Cosmogony, and Physics discusses 
significant background concepts found in Milton's works, but 
he does not explicitly note the idea of sympathy. However, 
his concept of theopantism bears sharp resemblance to the
7major premises underlying the doctrine of sympathy.
Some other notable commentators have been more ex­
plicit in their reference to the idea of sympathy in Milton's 
works. Both Douglas Bush, in John Milton, and Rosemund Tuve, 
in Images and Themes in Five Poems by Milton, indicate the 
importance of the idea of sympathy in Milton's early poems 
by asserting the anachronism of the term "pathetic fallacy" 
in Milton's cosmology. Miss Tuve further notes, regarding 
the validity of such a concept of sympathy in its traditional 
poetic frame of reference, that the idea of "harmony among 
creatures is by no means necessarily pagan even when its 
terms are so; the point around which the matter turns is 
whether the metaphors which express it are believed or not.
. . . Such language neither denies a hierarchy among crea­
tures nor a special tie between man and d i v i n i t y . j . B .  
Broadbent expresses a similar view in Some Graver Subject 
when he states that Milton's world view turns on the 
"pantheism" which is "a wonderful realization of the ideal 
communion of all things and all persons 'in God.' It im­
plies in human relations reverence for the body because it 
is the stuff of God, and sympathy with all affections be­
cause they are the products of divine vitality acting in the 
divine substance.Broadbent would seem to overstate his 
case by labeling Milton's world view pantheistic; for in his 
works, as we shall see later, Milton stressed unity with the 
Creator because of His divine substance in all, but not
8identity. In this connection Douglas Bush comments; "To 
Milton, God and nature are one but this does not mean a 
pantheistic confusion of creation with the C r e a t o r . T h e  
use of such a term as pantheism to describe Milton's cos­
mology is surely inexact, for it implies a confusion of 
progenitor and progeny.
George Whiting devotes considerable attention to the 
concept of sympathy in his book, Milton's Literary Milieu, 
by placing Milton's view of sympathy in perspective with the 
views of his predecessors and contemporaries. Whiting also 
shows that Milton's ideas are basically those current in his 
age; therefore, to assert that the poet consciously borrowed 
verbatim from any of his predecessors or contemporaries is a 
mistake.
A.Z. Butler in his essay, "The Pathetic Fallacy in 
Paradise Lost," concludes with Bush, Tuve, and others that 
the "mise-en-scene," the rich use of "sensuous image and in­
forming symbol" all preclude the relevance of such a term as 
"pathetic fallacy" in the world of Paradise Lost.'*^  Butler 
also makes the crucial point that Milton, by depicting the 
"animate and inanimate kinds as sharing through a primal 
sympathy in the emotional life of man," makes sympathy the 
"detonating mechanism through which the central issue of the 
poem— the Fall, its cause, and total consequence— is given 
startling and dramatic realization.Butler does not 
elaborate upon his observation.
9The concept of sympathy, I suggest, Is seminal to 
Milton's poetics and moral idealism. Its function in the 
poet's life and art has not been sufficiently appraised.
The aim of this study, then, is to supply a treatment de­
voted exclusively to a delineation of Milton's doctrine of 
sympathy and of his literary use of that doctrine. Since 
Milton embraced the vatic image of the poet, one can hardly 
divorce his life from his art--nor would he countenance the 
separation. To Milton, the essence of life is its unity, of 
mind, spirit and body, or of man and his work. Thus the 
pervasive symbol used to embody this idea in his works is the 
poem— its harmony, symmetry and proportion shaped according 
to a plan and a purpose. Manifestations of the idea of 
sympathy and its attendant doctrines, I suggest, appealed to 
this impulse for unity in Milton's psychology. Thus, as I 
see it, he made this doctrine the seminal element of his 
deontology and ambiance.
Milton's doctrine of sympathy is eclectic and de­
velopmental, deriving some of its character from antiquity, 
the Middle Ages, and from his own age's peculiar interpreta­
tion of the available tradition as well as its contributions 
to it. Milton's literary use of sympathy involves four va­
rieties; divine, human, cosmic, and infernal. Paradise 
Lost is the classicus locus for Milton's use of these four 
varieties of this natural bond of things. For convenience 
I have further classified Milton's use of sympathy according
10
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to mode: elementarlstic, holistic, and symbolistic.
These categories overlap many times; but the classification 
is based on emphasis or predominance of the salient char­
acteristics of a given mode. The main value of such cate­
gories for this study is to suggest a kind of evolutionary 
tendency in Milton's use of the doctrine of sympathy.
Elementarlstic sympathy is postulated on the belief 
in a sentient cosmos emanating from a world-soul, or materia 
prima, or God. Such a concept of sympathy is not necessarily 
religious or systematically philosophical: it may range from 
the most primitive belief in occult influence, animism, or 
correspondence to enlightened pantheism and the highest ex­
pression of immanence. The so-called "pathetic fallacy" is 
a popular manifestation of elementarlstic sympathy, though 
in Milton's cosmology, as has been noted, the pathos is not 
a fallacy. The affinity between certain things is held to 
be so real that they "are similarly affected by the same in­
fluence, affect or influence one another in some occult 
way. . . ." ( OED). Fellow-feeling, "the fact or capacity of 
entering in or sharing the feelings of another " ( OED)^ is a 
sociological concept and a natural aspect of this vision of 
unity among things. Its implications are infinite. The 
idea that all creation is interrelated, that each shares in 
the substance, nature, or essence of the other is pivotal 
to the elementarlstic mode of the sympathetic impulse in any 
of its forms.
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Holistic sympathy implies a concept embracing the 
whole scheme of things. It takes the shape of a cosmology 
based on the deep-rooted desire of man to find an all- 
comprehending conception into which he can fit all the parts. 
The Greeks' answer to this enigma was the scala naturae, 
later called the Great Chain of Being. Inherent within this 
cosmology and germane to it is the concept of the World- 
Soul, a divine life-force, or some kind of permeating spirit 
which unites all the parts. Such a union is equated with the 
sympathetic bond of nature, an idea which itself is common 
to Greek, Roman, and Christian Weltanschauungen. Other re­
lated and systematic concepts, such as that of the world- 
harmony or the Pythagorean musica mundi. the notion of the 
micro-macrocosm, and of course, hierarchical structuring in 
the soul, society and the cosmos, are all informed by the 
belief in a primal unity of the whole universe. This unity 
inheres in a pre-established and unalterable principle of 
harmony and order."'9 Milton’s doctrine of right reason, 
Christian liberty, harmony of the spheres, and the law of 
nature all have orientations in a holistic attitude towards 
sympathy. Indeed, as I see it, such a concept of sympathy 
is the informing principle of Milton's ethical consciousness 
and his rich and distinctive iconography. This mode of 
sympathy in Milton’s cosmology is evident throughout his 
canon. Ascendant in emphasis, it becomes increasingly more 
axiomatic in the polemic prose and reaches its climax in
12
Paradise Lost.
Symbolistic sympathy inheres in conceiving ana­
logical rather than real identification or unity among the 
parts: parts are seen as corresponding to or symbolic of one 
another in part or in totality. "The symbolistic interpre­
tation looks for a higher reality very much different from
on pi
the immediate experience." H.F. Dunbar distinguishes 
three kinds of symbols: the arbitrary or extrinsic symbol 
which denotes more or less superficial relations of con­
tiguity or convention; the descriptive or intrinsic symbol 
based on some similarity; and insight symbols which denote 
those "which open a view on deeper and more essential 
things, an underlying reality of greater dignity, the funda­
mentals of being itself."^2 Symbolistic sympathy is highly 
significant to Milton’s peculiar art. He drew his symbols 
from all kinds of empirical knowledge, including nature, 
medicine, science, the Scriptures. Milton's belief in the 
unity of truth, a fact so evident in his love for the clas­
sical world, is depicted in his use of préfiguration. The 
symbolic relation between certain kinds of objects is indi­
cated as that of a tvpus. Christ, for example, is a second 
Adam, Mary a second Eve. Auerbach's comment on this tradi­
tion in biblical exegesis is enlightening here:
A figurai schema permits both its poles— the figure 
and the fulfillment— to retain the characteristics of 
concrete historical reality, in contradistinction to 
what obtains with symbolic and allegorical personi­
fications so that the figure and fulfillment— although
13
the one 'signifies' the other— have a significance 
which is not incompatible with their being real. An 
event taken as a figure preserves its literal and 
historical meaning. 3^
It is, I think, in the area of this use of symbolistic sym­
pathy that Milton shows his greatest genius.
In Milton's use of the concept of sympathy he was a 
child of his age; and his age, in turn, was an heir of the 
Middle Ages and of antiquity. That Milton used the avail­
able tradition is a critical commonplace; that he made this 
tradition conform to his own experience and the assimilated 
experience of his age is also widely acknowledged.That 
he also anticipated the best of the tradition which extends 
through Shaftesbury, James Thomson, Hume, Smith and the 
nineteenth century exponents of deontology is an important 
proposition which needs some investigation.
An examination of the developmental use of the doc­
trine of sympathy in Milton reveals the progression of the 
"hermeneutic c i r c l e . " S u c h  a movement begins with a 
preliminary hypothesis, arrives from there at a certain in­
terpretation of facts, and on the basis of such an under­
standing, turns back towards its origin to correct and en­
large the first assumptions. By repeating itself, this 
movement unfolds not as a circle but as a spiral.
Milton's deontology and ambiance, I suggest, unfold in the 
manner of the hermeneutic circle.
From the inception of Milton's dedication of himself 
and his talent to a serious purpose in life, he seems to
1^
have had a temperamental bias for perceiving a cosmic, human, 
and divine relatedness. In addition to evidence already 
cited, his earliest Psalmody and imitative pieces express 
infused rapture for the beneficence of God as revealed by 
his handiwork. From his vast realms of learning, Milton 
anchored his predilection in both secular and sacred doc­
trines: Neoplatonism, Hebraism, and Christianity were the
dominant streams of influence. To these he added his own 
individuality.The early poems "On the Morning of 
Christ's Nativity," "At a Solemn Musick," down through Comus 
reveal Milton's early idealistic concept of sympathy. With 
Comus, the spiral widens to include speculation on the 
notion of self-sufficiency. He tests it in the figure of 
the virtuous Lady; but the self is found insufficient with­
out the aid of grace in the form of Sabrina. However, the 
great crisis comes in Lvcidas. In this poem, I suggest, is 
a turning in Milton's angle of vision: there is a shift in 
emphasis in his doctrine of sympathy. For the first time the 
bond of man to his fellows emerges as a serious theme.
Ancient or classical concepts' of man's bonds with nature are 
weighed and found wanting. Like Job, Milton wrestles with 
his faith; he reexamines his belief in humanistic self- 
sufficiency. Never again is the latter a dominant principle 
in his thought. The spiral ascends as the poet-priest turns 
now to his responsibility to his fellow-man, increasingly 
aware of the need for fitness, but also of the limitations
15
placed on performance by external circumstances. The poet, 
in this first phase, examines the qualities needed to make 
of himself "a true poem," in preparation for his destined 
task to write the great poem.
Unsullied but more fully aware of his destiny and 
his duty to his Maker, to humanity and to himself, Milton 
is thrust into the second major phase of his life and lit­
erary experience both by the need and the occasion. In the 
eddies of political and religious dissent, he tested his 
new faith and moral idealism. Milton had no bark rigged for 
such troubled waters. Such worthiness comes only with ex­
perience and maturity. Thus I can not wholly agree with 
Fixler's assertion that "until Lvcidas [Milton] expressed no
real awareness that evil in life does not simply respond to
PRphilosophy and poetry." Rather it would seem that until 
Lvcidas, Milton based his morality on the sufficiency'of the 
individual with little or no awareness of the limitations of 
that view posed by the extenuations of society and the vul­
nerability of the individual. Comus. however, offers an 
enlightening exception. Indeed until Lvcidas, Milton's 
idealism had not been tested by harsh realism. But Milton's 
idealism is grounded in the doctrines of Christianity as 
exemplified in the life of the Son; it is the moral design 
for all the sons of God. In this phase, then, Milton moved 
from the individualistic to the group-centered position: he 
moved from self-regeneration to a regeneration of his country
16
and, implicitly, then explicitly, the world. I suggest that 
here Milton's goal is to make of the world a true poem by 
eliminating its brokenness caused by sin. The idealism of 
his youth is reexamined, indeed questioned. He is disil­
lusioned with people and their institutions. The world, he 
decides, must wait for God's own destined time to become the 
true poem. Only God knows that time, Milton concludes.
From this abysmal state Milton emerges with a mature faith 
motivated neither by unrestrained optimism nor by re­
forming zeal, but one anchored in the submission of self and 
social duty to the will of God. Thus he repeats his basic 
premise as the spiral unfolds in its supernal heights.
The major poems. Paradise Lost. Paradise Regain'd 
and Samson Agonistes reveal Milton's enlightened Weltan­
schauung . They are indeed a world of one in three poems.
In these works, Milton presents his summation and sentence 
on the sympathetic bond of nature. Relationship and re­
sponsibility coalesce in a mature view founded on God and 
the soul of the individual man. Morality and poetry find a 
happy union. All varieties of sympathy are depicted in 
Paradise Lost ; divine, human, cosmic, and infernal. Sym­
pathy becomes the essential unifying device, actuating the 
cause and consequences of the major events. The various 
modes of sympathy— elementaris tic, holistic, and sym­
bolistic— are masterfully portrayed, informing ambiance and 
deontology’. In Paradise Lost also, Milton begins the final
17
break with himanlstlc self-sufficiency. In Paradise 
Regain'd and Sams on Agonistes, Milton refines on themes 
already included in Paradise Lost; the pattern for gaining 
the "Kingdom within" as exemplified in the human-divine 
figure, Christ, and as in the mere mortal, Samson. Here the 
poet dispels all doubt as to his final evaluation of the 
intermingling streams of sympathy. No longer the aggressive 
reformer, he is one reconciled and submissive to the will of 
God, for therein lie true virtue and peace. Thus Milton's 
final position is, in a sense, his original one— but his 
original position examined, refined and enlarged by experi­
ence and maturity of insight. Both his ethical outlook and 
its ambiance reflect this progression.
A cursory survey of ancient, medieval, and Renais­
sance philosophy will serve as background for and explana­
tion of the core ideas in Milton's doctrine of sympathy. 
Ancient and medieval poets will be cited in passing to sug­
gest the evolutionary tendency of the idea of sympathy; con­
temporaneous poets such as Donne, Herbert, and Henry Vaughan 
will illuminate both a comparison and a contrast with the 
Miltonic use of sympathy.
The poems of Milton that will be discussed are those 
which have been mentioned with references to a few short 
poems from his "Imitational Pieces" and "Elegiac Verses," 
"Epitaphium Damonis" and his "Prolusions." Other minor 
poems such as "The Passion," and "Naturam non Pati senium"
18
will be mentioned in passing. Major emphasis in this study 
will be placed first on the minor poems: "On the Morning of 
Christ's Nativity," 0omus, and Lycidas as they reflect a 
progression in Milton's treatment of sympathy. Secondly, 
representative examples from Milton's prose will be examined 
for the deontological significance of sympathy in the re­
ligious, domestic, and political areas. The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce will contribute the most direct state­
ment on the doctrine of sympathy and its importance in 
Milton's deontology; and other selections, such as Of Refor­
mation. The Reason of Church Government. Areopaeitica. 
Tetrachordon, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, and The 
Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth 
will be used to support the major philosophical presupposi­
tions which informed Milton's polemics. Finally, Milton's 
major poems Paradise Lost, Paradise Regain'd, and Samson 
Agonistes will illustrate a culmination and summation of the 
poetLs use of belles-lettres and philosophy to exemplify his 
doctrine of sympathy.
CHAPTER I
THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
Sympathy is the greatest of all operations of nature.
. . . The state of peace or war which exists between 
the various departments of Nature, the hatred or 
friendships which are maintained by objects dumb and 
destitute of sense. . . .  To these states known to 
the Greeks by the respective appellations of 'sympathia’ 
and 'antipathia,' we are indebted for the first prin­
ciples of all things.
Pliny, Naturall Historié
The notion of sympathy has enjoyed wide subscription 
throughout the ages, evolving elementaristically, holisti- 
cally and symbolistically, according to the mode in which it 
differentiated itself. Perusal of commentaries on sympathy 
suggests its chequered career. Occurring in one form or 
another, it exists as a principle of medicine, as a magic 
communication between kindred souls or objects, and in the 
ethical context as a broad base for the benevolent instincts 
of fellow-feeling and compassion. "As a semi-scientific de­
scription of the mutual affinity between similar objects or 
individuals, sympathy explained not only such pharmaceutical 
theories as those of Paracelsus and Sir Kenelm Digby but 
such diversified phenomena as sympathetic inks and the 
Aeolian harp."^
19
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Milton’s treatment of sympathy per se is not ex­
tensive. It receives its fullest characterization in the 
divorce tracts and Paradise Lost. However, I suggest, the 
concept of sympathy is the underlying assumption of his 
basic tenets, the animating principle of his deontology, in­
dividual and communal, religious, domestic, and political. 
This theory can be tested by an analogy from the field of 
medicine known as the syndrome, a state in which the diag­
nosis of a particular condition is relatively certain to 
exist if specific symptoms occur concurrently. Thus since 
Milton’s general ideational ambiance presents clear-cut pat­
terns which depend upon the idea of sympathy for their mean- , 
ing, the presence of one is taken as a sign of the other.
In Milton’s poetry and prose the following concepts are 
crucial: affinity between certain things, occult influence, 
the notions of microcosmus, the great chain of being, 
hierarchical structuring, harmony and order, and Milton’s 
own peculiar use of the law of nature and right reason.
Each of these inheres in the central belief in the unity of 
existence, the relatedness of all created things to the 
Creator. Since these concepts are present throughout 
Milton’s works, differing primarily in degree, but seldom in 
kind, and since they are also characteristic of the age, 
Milton’s so-called heresies are many times made more defen­
sible or explicable if one is cognizant of his philosophical 
presuppositions.
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I further adduce Milton’s fondness for certain words 
and phrases in his literary vocabulary which indicate the 
sympathetic impulse even when the term itself is not'men­
tioned: charm, incorporate, unity, harmony, mutual, nature,
the bond of amity, fellowship, links, fit, adamantine, ac­
cord, consent, join, music, connatural, relation, marriage, 
correspondence— each of which is peculiarly enriched by 
Milton’s large vision of oneness in the human and divine 
spheres.
Since all of man’s most lasting systems that aim to 
explain his natural and elemental relationships evolve from 
a premise of common primal source, sympathy is the operative 
principle which is assumed in all relatedness. The Oxford 
English Dictionary gives the following definitions of sym­
pathy:
A real or supposed affinity between certain things, by 
virtue of which they are similarly or correspondingly 
affected by the same influence, affect or influence one 
another in some occult way, or tend towards each other; 
a relation between two bodily parts or between two ' 
persons such that disorder, or any condition of the one 
induces a corresponding condition in the other; the 
quality or state of being affected by the condition of 
another with a feeling similar or corresponding to 
that of another; the fact or capacity of entering into 
or sharing the feelings of another or other; a fellow- 
feeling; also a feeling or frame of mind evoked by and 
responsive to some external influence; community of 
feeling and harmony of disposition. • ^
(OED. X, 368-369)j
Milton’s doctrine of sympathy involves any manifestation of
this active instinctual force postulated on a common primal
source that renders one’s conscious or unconscious
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awareness of relationship to himself and his kind, to his 
source and all other aspects of the created world. Such a 
relationship takes many forms; affinity, identification, and 
unity are its major ones. In Milton's deontology, relation­
ship to the common source is the highest good; other rela­
tionships follow proportionately. The closer the relation­
ship, the greater the responsibility. Milton's doctrine of 
sympathy is a heritage of his age; but his peculiar use of 
the concept enhances it and brings it to its highest level 
of significance both as image and principle. To understand 
Milton's place in the tradition, we look now at a brief his­
torical account of relevant origins and accretions of the 
idea of sympathy.
The exploration of the bond among created things and 
a primal source goes back in Western thought at least as far 
as Thales (6^ +0-5^ 8 B.C.), the so-called Father of Science. 
Aristotle and Diogenes Laertius give some idea of its 
elementaristic inception in the explicit concerns of Thales 
regarding the influences among matter. Probably reflecting 
the culture of his times, Thales concluded, on the basis of 
his observation of the influence of the magnetic (magnesian) 
stone on iron, that "all things are full of gods" and that 
apparently inanimate things "can be alive." As the magnetic 
stone, or lodestone, must possess "soul" in order to move 
iron, so the soul is intermingled throughout the whole uni­
verse. The attractive powers of amber also became a
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theoretical and empirical basis for the ancient world's be­
lief in the divine interpenetration of the universe.^
Twenty centuries later Gilbert found Thales' view 
not entirely absurd*.". . . for the lodestone is incited, 
directed and orbitally moved by this force, which is all in 
all . . , and seems very like a s o u l . T h e  particular 
force that caused magnetism was indefinable, beyond rational 
understanding; yet it was "commonly cited as an occult 
f o r c e . A s  such it was used both literally and figura­
tively in conjunction with the idea of sympathy. Gilbert, 
for example, speaks of "a sympathy between attractor and atr- 
tracted object, as . . .  in Fracastoro's proposal that hairs 
and twigs move toward amber and toward diamond because they 
contain some principle, perhaps air, in common to the at­
tractor.
In the ancient world the quality of attraction pos­
sessed by the magnet was also used in reference to human 
affairs. Far back into antiquity one finds myths and tales 
of love centered in the commonly held beliefs on magnetism. 
Perhaps the most imaginative one is the myth of the statue 
of Mars constructed of iron and that of Venus, of lodestone. 
Inspired by the amorous breath of Venus, the statue of Mars 
leaped into her arms.& Such a myth, then, points up vividly 
the power credited to magnetic attraction and, implicitly, 
to love and sympathy. Also it is an early manifestation of 
the symbolistic mode in that it is analogical.
2k
Empedocles ('+90-^30 B.C.), building upon Thales' 
foundation, sought further to explain the cause of magnetic 
attraction. Iron, he reasoned, had pores from which emanate 
^effluvia; but these pores are usually filled with air and 
unable to send out these emanations. When the lodestone is 
brought near the iron, the emanations from the lodestone 
drive out the pores of the iron, thus enabling the emana­
tions of the iron to come out and seek the pores of the 
lodestone, which are so constituted that they receive them 
avidly." Empedocles' theories on the imperishability of 
matter and of the living force behind all motion are also 
implicatory; for he suggests two components of this force: 
"friendship, or the force of concentration, and discord, or 
the force of separation. These forces are highly sugges­
tive of the sympathies and antipathies later enunciated by 
Pliny, for example. • “
Plato (*+27-3^7 B.C.) added little or nothing to the 
theories on magnetism. But in his "Ion Dialogues, he refers 
to 'a power resembling that which acts on the stone called 
by Euripides the magnet. For this stone does not only at­
tract iron rings, but imparts to those rings the power of 
doing that very thing which itself does, enabling them to 
attract other rings of iron.'"^® From this observation 
Plato conceives what may be said to anticipate the chain of 
being. Of the long series of rings depending chain-like one 
from the other, he says, '"from that stone at the head of
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11them is derived the virtue which operates in them all.'" 
Later St. Augustine (35*+-'+30) made a similar observation 
of the iron rings attracted and suspended by the stone and 
the virtue which bound them together by "invisible links.
Such developments are holistic not only in orientation but 
also in implication.
That lodestone can be used for medicinal purposes was 
another popular belief. It was believed that "a piece of 
lodestone held in the hands would alleviate the pains of 
gout,"13 This practice bears close resemblance to that of 
the sympathetic cures of Paracelsus and Sir Kenelm Digby of 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, respectively. 
Furthermore, Roller notes that "through the first eleven 
centuries of our era the lodestone is known principally 
through medical uses, uses in magic, and as an example of 
occult powers, in the West."1^ Where philosophers could not 
explain magnetic attraction by the theory of "soul" in mat­
ter or by mechanical theories, they fell back "upon the uni­
versal 'law' of sympathies and antipathies. If sympathy 
between two things was strong enough, they came together; if 
the antipathy was pronounced, they stayed apart."1^ The con­
cept of magnetism, then, is indubitably an accretion of the 
elementary concept of sympathy. Iconography and contextual 
reference are employed interchangeably since one is taken as 
a sign of the other.
As the virtue binds together a series of rings by
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invisible links, so the central premise of the doctrine of 
sympathy is postulated on the chain of being linked together 
by the infused spirit of the Creator. Whiting credits the 
origin of the chain image to Aristotle, the latter having 
mentioned the concept in his commentary on the scala 
naturae.^  ^  Through this concept, Aristotle fused the idea 
of continuity with the Platonistic doctrine of the "necessary 
'fullness' of the w o r l d . Platonistic fullness rests 
on the notion of a common primal source, the "Absolute
Being," from which the "being and attributes of all other
1 8things are derivative." Aristotle's system is delineated 
in his De Anima where he suggested a "hierarchical arrange­
ment of all organisms according to the 'powers of soul' 
possessed by them. "^9 Thus emerged the holistic conception 
of the universe "as a 'Great Chain of Being' composed of an 
immense but seldom rigorously applied logic of the principle 
of continuity— of an infinite number of links ranging in 
hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of creature . . .
'through every possible' grade up to the ens uerfectissimum—  
. . . the highest possible kind of creature." Each of the 
links in the chain has one quality which differentiates it 
from the creature precedent and subsequent to it in the 
chain. Such a conception was essential to the Neoplatonic 
cosmology and was credited by many scientists and philoso­
phers and "indeed most educated men through the Middle Ages 
and down to the late eighteenth century," according to
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A.O. Lovejoy.20
Thus the "chain of being" is pivotal in the holistic 
mode of sympathy, for the chain is posited on the view that 
the created world is a kind of emanation of the virtues 
alive in God, as it came to be understood in the Christian- 
Platonic syncretism of the Renaissance world view. Its ap­
pearance in the ambiance of a writer is taken as a sign of 
the sympathetic impulse. Milton, like Bruno and Paracelsus, 
believed in that "golden chain" which links all parts of the 
universe,21 however varied they may seem to be. The idea in 
Bruno and Paracelsus becomes pantheism; but to Milton it is 
sympathy, the evidence of the divinity flowing throughout 
all creation uniting its parts in natural and harmonious 
bonds. The relationship between the Graeco-Roman World-Soul 
and Judaeo-Christian sympathetic immanence is summed up in a 
statement by Origen: " . . .  the world-soul, or God, holds 
the different created minds together as the soul within us 
holds together the different parts of our body." It was a 
Neo-Platonic adaptation of a paganistic concept to Christian 
use. Such a view, as this study aims to show, is the ani­
mating principle in Milton's view of right reason and in his 
perception of the law of nature and Christian liberty— in 
fine, the lifeblood of his deontology and ambiance.
Milton's Weitanschauung is holistic, by and large, 
the Renaissance heritage from the preceding ages. Evident in 
all of his works, his view is most explicitly delineated and
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portrayed in Paradise Lost. There are, in the world of 
Paradise Lost, certain "links" between heaven and earth. By 
right use of "created things" in accordance with the prin­
ciple of sympathetic bonds, one establishes these links and 
effects in an ultimate unity of earthly things with the 
heavenly virtues. Adam in Paradise Lost, Book V, 511-12, 
succinctly states this notion: "In contemplation of created
things, / By steps we ascend to God. " His world is the 
product of an immanent-transcendent Deity. It is monistic 
and thus generally follows ex Deo theoretical patterns. In 
structure it is hierarchical, depends upon proper relation­
ship among its parts. Dynamic, it allows ascension by 
merit.
Whiting, in his perceptive study of Milton’s milieu, 
has already observed that Milton shared most of the "pre­
dominantly orthodox beliefs with Danaeus, Du Bartas,
Purchas, [Henry] More, and Raleigh," but that the poet of 
Paradise Lost asserts his own individuality in "substance 
as well as style. In his emphasis upon a divine life force, 
an existing chaos, the virtue of matter, and the interrela­
tionship of all life (including the soul of man), Milton
ph.
agrees most intimately with Mercator’s Atlas." There is 
no suggestion of indebtedness on the part of either writer, 
for both shared a common emporium of ideas. Nevertheless, 
it would seem that the individuality of which Whiting speaks 
here is a salient example of the importance of the idea of
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sympathy in Milton, for each of the emphases above ipheres 
in the notion of a sympathetic bond of nature postulated on 
a common primal source.
Another idea held in common by Milton and Mercator 
gives further indication of the significance of the idea of 
sympathy, potential and actual, in Milton. According to 
Whiting, both men believed that "original virtue was not 
wholly destroyed by Adam's sin. There are yet in the world 
'the reliques of that matter, of which celestiall and super- 
celestiall things were created* and a natural sympathy be­
tween the higher and lower w o r l d . S u c h  a view, as well 
as those outlined in the preceding paragraph, is seminal to 
Milton's monistic position, for it implies a belief in an 
immanent-transcendent Deity. A brief look at Milton's con­
cept of God is necessary for a fuller understanding of 
Milton's monism.
Whiting offers this description of Milton's God. He 
is a curious blend of the Neoplatonic and the Christian in 
that He is
Plato's Self-Sufficing Perfection and his Self- 
Transcending Fecundity. Through the Demiurge, his 
Son, Plato's Timeless and Incorporeal One (not the 
orthodox Trinity) becomes, without necessity, the 
source of the universe which is temporal, beautiful, 
and, before sin, beneficent.26
This distinction between Milton's God and the orthodox
Judaeo-Christian Deity is, I think, overly nice. Milton's
God is, by and large, a union of Greek immanence and Hebrew
transcendence, so there is no essential conflict in spirit
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between Milton's and the orthodox biblical God— though 
there might be differences in aspectual emphases from time 
to time. Even the orthodox concept of the Trinity inheres in 
kind of modal differentiation of a spiritual Deity accord­
ing to his attributes of immanence and transcendence. The 
capability of a transcendent God to isolate an immanent 
factor, according to Professor Boodin, "proves it to be 
transcendent; for as a uniting spirit it does not belong to 
mere aggregation, but, as a wholeness, is transcendent both 
as a concept and as an experienced v a l u e . C h r i s t  is in 
Milton, as in orthodox Christianity, the highest form of im­
manence, God made man— but not all of God. The third per­
son, the Holy Spirit, is rather protean in Milton's theol­
ogy; but He seems to be most closely connected with the
pO
sympathetic manifestations inhering in immanence
Milton's view of God is compatible with his monistic 
position and serves as an ontological basis for his tendency 
to embrace the ex Deo theory of creation. Since he seems to 
hold that the universe is an emanation of the Supreme Being, 
it follows that the idea of God's immanence is that He is 
the Universe; although He is also more than it is. As 
Kreyche puts it, "the primary cause though extrinsic to his 
effects in the sense only of being distinct from them, is 
nevertheless present in them through a unique mode of cau­
sality that is identical with his being."29 The oneness of 
life so explicitly stated here obviates any hostility
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between matter and spirit since they constitute two phases 
of one eternal life and consciousness that makes up the uni­
verse. This indubitably is the view Milton found acceptable, 
for his monism is unmistakable in both his prose and poetry. 
He saw matter and spirit as emanations of the Supreme Being; 
so he taught that the love of God's creatures, because of 
divine immanence, is the essential direction to salvation or 
ultimate unity with God. Likewise, Milton's concept of evil 
as a product of the apostate will rather than of the gross­
ness of matter is also a reflection of his monism. Milton, 
then, is monistic because he views the whole universe as 
some kind of expression of God's life in that His will sus­
tains it and His consciousness embraces it all. The various 
parts differ only in degree.
The concept of degree is the informing principle of 
holistic sympathy in that all parts of the whole are ranked 
according to the portion of the divine consciousness within 
each of them,^^ On this foundation rests the concept of the 
hierarchy of being. Nauert, in his book on Renaissance 
thought, offers pertinent commentary on the concept of 
hierarchy in the ancient and modern world. It is the more 
or less typical view of the age, here expounded by Agrippa. 
"All parts of the universe are closely connected for the 
superior rules its immediate inferior and is ruled by its 
own supreme." In this way God transmits His power "down 
through the entire system." Universal harmony is,dependent
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on respect for such a scheme. In the "harmonious whole, 
which God created for his glory, every creature has its 
proper place and its limits which it is forbidden to trans­
gress. To break this prohibition, to attack this order, to 
seek to abandon one's proper place is sin, the sin of Adam' 
and Satan."31 This hierarchical structuring was held to ob­
tain in the soul, in society at large and in the cosmos. 
Milton's emphasis on ascension by merit is an implicative 
departure on this well-known tradition. Such emphasis, 1 
suggest, is based on his concept of relatedness and responsi­
bility.
Though static in most of its implications or mani­
festations, the concept of degree and order had many appli­
cations to the macrocosm and the body politic and the body 
politic and the microcosm. Basically optimistic, this scheme 
offered unlimited hope for some; for others it offered stark 
despair. Milton is in the former camp because he embraced 
the dynamic view of the scale of things— we ascend by merit. 
Moreover, ascension in Milton, concomitant with the develop­
ment of his other epistemological and ontological views, 
came to be anchored in a rationally considered dependence on 
God and a voluntary allegiance to Him. Such a position 
evinces a consciousness of "man's spiritual limitations as a 
fallen being as well as his spiritual potentialities as a 
redeemed creature."3^ Thus by seeing divine harmony and 
order at work in the micro-macrocosm, man directs his
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activities toward the source of his being rather than towards 
the impoverished self-sufficiency of anthropocentric human­
ism. The twofold rhythm of life brings hope to man, but 
loss of equilibrium reverberates through every sphere of 
thought and action bringing him disintegration and despair.
Man as the microcosm is the link between the material 
and spiritual worlds and the master of the forces of the 
created world. Sir Thomas Browne summed up this traditional 
idea in this way: "Thus is Man that great and true Am-
phibium, whose nature is disposed to live, not onely like 
other creatures in divers elements, but in divided and dis­
tinguished worlds."33 The notions of man as the "middle," 
of the "vinculum," of "sympathy guaranteeing the unity of 
the universe and the parallelism of the micro-macrocosmistic 
events" are all interrelated and are significant elements in 
the structure of ancient, medieval, and Renaissance philos­
ophy.^^ Milton was squarely in this tradition, using such 
views as image and principle in his cosmology.
The epistemological bases of Greek natural science 
were postulated on the analogy between the macrocosm nature 
and the microcosm man.^^ Implications for wider realms per­
haps developed synchronously. In religion, particularly 
among the Alexandrians through the influence of Philo 
Judaeus, oriental and occidental interpretation came to­
gether. From this development, the macro-microcosm con­
ception became a fundamental to many Jewish and Christian
3^
sages.36 Though in St. Augustine microcosmistic ideas are 
limited to that of the all-pervasiveness of order— the same 
order which holds together the universe is also within every 
being, and the more clearly visible the higher the being37—  
the notion of the parallelism of micro-macrocosmistic events 
and conditions is "never completely lost in Christian 
thinking."^8 The idea was powerfully subscribed to down 
through the Renaissance in both art and ethics.
Robert Burton in 1621 summed up the ancient and 
medieval thought on the microcosmos in his glowing tribute 
to man: "Man, the most excellent, and noble creature of the
world, the principall and mighty worke of God, wonder of 
Nature, as Zoroastes calls him; audacis naturae miraculum. 
the marvaile of marvailes, as Plato; the Abridgement and 
Epitome of the World, as Pliny; microcosmos, a little 
World." The implications of such an assertion are perhaps 
as infinite as they are grave. Man is given much, but much 
from him is expected. So Burton consequently agonizes all 
the more over man's original sin because man was "created 
microcosmus, a little world, a modell of the World, sole 
Commander and Governour of all the creatures in it."39 Thus 
since what happens to man is invariably reflected in the 
other spheres, man must diligently cultivate his little 
world. This he does through the use of right reason and by 
revelation. In this way man effects order and harmony in 
his soul, his body, the microcosm, the body politic, the
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macrocosm and the universe at large. The underlying purpose, 
then, of all man's activities and thought is to repair the 
breach occasioned by the Fall.
An analysis of Milton's prose and poetry shows how 
thoroughly these ideas permeate his deontology and art.
Milton teaches the unity and relatedness of life. Unlike 
the dualists Calvin and Hobbes, Milton does hot turn away 
from nature as evil. Rather he, like the Cambridge Platon- 
ists, sees God and nature as degrees of the same being.
Hence his repudiation of any artificial restraints on re­
ligion and morality.Milton, like Augustine, Aquinas, and 
Hooker, felt that the calls of the "law of nature" were 
stronger than any man-made restrictions or codes. For them, 
the law of nature included "man's capacity to reason, to 
contemplate, to comprehend [more than infallible moral judg­
ment] the workings of his' own mind and body as well as of 
plants and animals and stars, resulting in scientific judg­
ments as well as moral ones . . . [It] incorporated means as 
well as ends to man's material and spiritual happiness" (ÇPW, 
I, 17-18).^  ^ In Milton, the law of nature is at times 
"identical with the law of God"; in other words, it is what­
ever "agreed with Milton's own interpretation of the Bible"
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or with his own "conception of right and wrong." There 
are Christian, Stoic, and Aristotelian elements in the con­
cept as Milton used it in its various contexts. But at all 
times the poet-philosopher held the concept to be the
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highest law because It is evidence of the direct bond be­
tween man and his creator. Therefore,- as long as man 
governs himself rationally, acts according to his innate 
sense of what is just and right, he is by his goodness and 
freedom, beyond any artificial or man-made restraints— in 
case of conflict.
Closely related to the law of nature and many times 
fused with it in Milton's thought is the pivotal concept of 
right reason. Douglas Bush sets forth the following analy­
sis of the concept: "It is a kind of rational and philo­
sophic conscience which distinguishes man from beasts and 
which links man with man and with God. This faculty was im­
planted by God in all men, Christian and heathen alike, as a 
guide to truth and conduct. Though its effectual working 
may be obscured by sin, it makes man in his degree like God; 
it enables him, within limits, to understand the purposes of 
a God who is perfect reason as well as perfect justice, 
goodness and l o v e . "^3 Without a doubt. Bush's remarks sug­
gest the wide implications and the pervasiveness of this 
concept in Milton's canon. Grounded in the Miltonic con­
sciousness of a natural bond between man and his fellows and 
between man and God, right reason is another manifestation 
of the sympathetic principle that underlies Milton's sense 
of the unity of all truth— thus his awareness of and love 
for the spiritual contributions of the classical tradition. 
It is the sine qua non of order and harmony in the soul, in
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the microcosm and in the macrocosm.
Occurring somewhat as leit motifs in Milton's deon­
tology and ambiance, harmony and order undoubtedly are among 
his most basic predilections. Milton's ideas on harmony, 
like those of his age, are principally an adaptation of the 
Pythagorean conception of the "harmony of the spheres." 
Milton, in his second prolusion as a Cambridge student, sets 
forth his interpretation of the Pythagorean tradition. As 
it were, the harmonious cosmos revolves on the spindle of 
Necessity which contains nine "enfolded Spheres." Upon each 
of these spheres sits a celestial siren who makes harmonious 
music as she turns the spindle round, Milton was later to 
relate in his "Arcades." Only Pythagoras heard the harmony. 
As a consequence of this, he descended to the earth to teach 
men its basic measures. But alas, by the sin of Prometheus, 
man's ears were bereft of the song. Only by recapturing that 
pure state of innocence and virtue can man again hear the 
music of the revolving stars.
The incorporeal, mathematical harmony which 
Pythagoras assumed to pervade the universe— though inacces­
sible to human ears, but to some degree accessible to human 
reason_because it is reducible to numbers— is identified or 
joined with the notion of the world-soul permeating the uni­
verse. Gregory of Nyssa (fl. 379-39*+) might be adduced to 
illustrate this point. Commenting upon the correspondence 
of the soul of man and his body to the artist and his
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musical .ijjstriiment, Gregory states that "the soul informs 
the different organs like a musician eliciting different 
tones from different strings. The soul living in and en­
dowing with life the whole of the body is the microcosmic 
analogy of the soul of God in the world; this is everywhere 
present as is shown by the all-binding, invisible harmony of 
contrasting elements in this w o r l d . T h u s  the animating 
principle behind the harmony in the music of the instrument 
or that of the world, behind the soul of the body or that of 
the world, inheres in an elemental symbiosis between the 
created and the Creator. Therefore the "element of numbers, 
guaranteeing beauty, order and measure to the cosmos, is the 
one important and lasting element of the world-soul—  
consequently, the human s o u l . H e n c e  the importance of 
music down through the ages not only as figure but as fact.
The transference of this mathematico-harmonical ap­
proach to the life of man in the community was a logical and 
inevitable development of the stage just discussed. From 
antiquity down through modern times, poets, scientists, and 
philosophers alike have vigorously appropriated from this 
concept brilliant and daring figures to express concord and 
consent among various parts within the whole scheme of 
things. Democritos, a Greek philosopher of the fifth cen­
tury B.C., expressed perhaps the feeling of his time when he 
stated that the essence and happiness of mankind consist in 
"harmony." Archytas, Plato’s Pythagorean friend, sought
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(after 4-00 B.C.) to find the essence of the individual soul, 
as , of the world-soul, in tones of m u s i c . S u c h  an endeavor 
was possible only in a cosmology based upon an active aware­
ness of the sympathetic bonds uniting the natural and spir­
itual worlds. The derivation of the simile world-harmony 
itself is indicative of such relatedness. Originally fash­
ioned , it is believed, on the attributes of the human lute, 
the concept of world harmony was reversed by the Pythagoreans 
who saw the human lute as an imitation of the music of the 
stars. Hence the numerous parallelisms of human and divine 
activities, i.e., of the processes of nature, of human art
L o
and divine art, i.e., of reasonable nature.
The relation between friendship and music is another 
significant reflection of the concept of world harmony de­
riving from antiquity. Friendship, accordingly, might be 
viewed as a musical performance which consists of the tuning 
of two souls. In Aristotle, perfect friendship, therefore, can 
exist with only one person because real accord of souls is 
more probable with one than with two persons. And so 
Castiglione's The Courtier and other Renaissance treatises 
on the subject of friendship down through the eighteenth 
century cult of friendship dwelt on the relationship as the 
tuning of two brother s o u l s . T h e  similitude between this 
idea and that of fellow-feeling which inheres in sympathy is 
self-evident. Agrippa, in a typical Renaissance conceit, 
put it this way: "The sympathy among [the parts of the
ko
world] is like that between two harps tuned to the same 
pitch. If one is struck, the strings of the other will also 
v i b r a t e . T h e  appropriateness of this figure, no doubt, 
explains the pervasiveness of the harmony theme in all con­
texts of natural, human, and divine relationships.
Just as cures were supposedly effected by sympathetic 
powders, balms, and what not, it was also deduced that music 
produced a curative effect upon body and soul. Hence the 
vogue of psalmody and devotional music, to say nothing of the 
numerous uses of music for secular purposes. The high esteem 
in which music was held during the Renaissance is a fact too 
obvious to require comment. Indeed, one of the most common 
epithets used to characterize the age is that of "the nest 
of singing birds.Shakespeare’s rich iconographical use 
of this tradition is well known; his dramatic use of mood 
music is also noteworthy. Milton was squarely in this musi­
cal tradition. Both as image and principle, Milton enhanced 
and enlarged the concept of harmony in many of its applica­
tions, actual or imaginative.
As the Renaissance wore on, astronomy made serious 
inroads into the hitherto secure metaphysical strongholds.
The belief in the music of the spheres drew one of the first 
blows. Once it was fairly well given up as principle, it 
continued as a prolific source of images. Sir Thomas Browne 
furnishes a fine example of this latter development. "There 
is a music where ever there is harmony, order, or
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proportion; and thus far we may maintain the music of the 
Sphears; for those well-ordered motions, and regular paces, 
though they give no sound unto the ear, yet to the under­
standing they strike a note full of harmony." Observing the 
salutary effect of any music upon him, Browne assuredly ar­
rives at the position that "the soul . . . hath its nearest 
sympathy with M u s i c k . T h u s  it is also seen that the 
appeals of music were far-reaching and profound; conse­
quently, it is many times hard to determine where the line 
really falls that separates its use as image from that as 
principle, But this was hardly a concern of Milton's age.
The idea of sympathy, then, is a fountainhead from 
which flowed many significant and vital streams. It touched 
or intermingled with the predominant currents of ancient, 
medieval, and modern thought. The concepts of magnetism, the 
chain of being, hierarchy of being, the corresponding planes 
of the microcosm and the macrocosm, harmony and order as 
well as the ethical principles of right reason and the law 
of nature and their numerous implications all depend for 
their meaning on an elemental awareness of a fundamental re­
lationship among created things and their Creator. The 
nature and extent of this perceived relationship has profound 
implications for man's religious, philosophical (scientific), 
and societal doctrines. Nor is the relationship always seen 
from one side only. Indeed the same principle underlying 
the sympathetic impulse informing the concepts above is also
k2
the theoretical basis of the tangential developments of 
magic, astrology, alchemy, and Hermeticism. Since they were 
very much a part and parcel of the intellectual equipage of 
Milton’s age, it is well to consider their role in Renais­
sance art and thought.
It is generally conceded that even the most creative 
minds from ancient down through medieval and Renaissance 
times believed fully in the sympathetic bonds linking all 
reality, the hierarchy of being, the existence of occult 
qualities, the astral influences, the actions of good and 
bad demons, and the dignity of man as the "knot of the uni­
verse," as Ficiho put i t . B u t  the exploitation of these 
beliefs out of pride or hope of gain was met with censure 
by some of the Church Fathers, St. Augustine had objected 
to these practices because he suspected them to be contrary 
to faith and morals. So had St. Aquinas. Many others saw 
the belief in certain astral influences contrary to the be­
lief in the freedom of man and could not therefore lend them 
total credence.
During the Italian Renaissance, magic and astrology 
rose to a new prominence. Part of the Plotinic heritage, 
being itself a mixture of the Neo-Pythagorean, Gnostic, and 
oriental source's, the Renaissance views on magic came to 
England, as did most of other classical learning of the age, 
via Ficino. With Ficino Cabbalistic,and Hermetic notions 
are fused with Ficinian Platonism. Consequently, the plan of
^3
the magic involved not only sorceries, witchcraft, and 
demonology, but also the whole concept .of the world and 
man’s relation to it.^^ To the Renaissance mentality magic 
was not a force "hemming man’s freedom in, but a tool used 
to win dominion over the world." Hence it did not portend 
loss of freedom; rather it promised a liberation of man from 
his "subjection to the usual order of n a t u r e . T h u s  the 
view of man’s exalted position in the universe was especially 
attractive to magicians. They reasoned that "since man 
stood between the upper and nether worlds, he could reach 
out and apply the powers of each to his own purposes.
Far from denigrating man, this view emphasized the divine 
power in man; Hence the popularity and wide acceptance of 
magic and the occult sciences.
Of course magical practices conflicted with the 
orthodox faith and as such necessitated at least an attempt 
at the reconciliation of the two. Agrippa, for one, tried 
to "explain much of his occultism in purely naturalistic 
terms." Assigning many of the so-called magical effects to 
natural forces, he tried to deemphasize or obliterate the 
stigma of demonic influence. He tried to show that the mind 
needed aid from God to attain power over the universe; there­
fore, far from jeopardizing his relationship with God, magic 
actually furthered his faith. "He believed that the caba­
listic, Hermetic, and other supposedly ancient sources would 
restore knowledge of God’s original revelation, and so would
assist the work of religious regeneration."^^ But Agrippa, 
like others of his kind, was unsuccessful in his attempts to 
reconcile the practice of magic with orthodoxy. Though 
Milton toys with the idea in some of his earlier works as a 
charming diversion, magic in Paradise Lost is relegated to 
the realm of the demons.^ 9
But Hermeticism and its concomitant, alchemy, 
fascinated the seventeenth-century mind. Based on revela­
tion and empiricism, these traditions made up a supplementary 
reservoir from which Christian authors incessantly drew 
figures, imagery, and at times, notions. Literary refer­
ences such as elixir, signatures, essences, influences, are 
indicative of this trend. John Donne and Sir Thomas Browne 
were particularly fascinated by Hermetic imagery. But as a 
reservoir of typology, Hermeticism had earlier gained the 
sanction of the Church Fathers. "Lactantius cites Hermes—  
along with Plato, Aristotle, Antisthenes, Thales, Anaximenes, 
Pythagoras, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Zeno, Seneca, and Cicero 
as among the philosophers who testify mightily to the one 
God . . . And in the Renaissance, Richard Hooker cites 
'Mercurious Trismegistus»— along with Homer, Anaxagoras, 
Plato, and the Stoics— in support of the proposition that" 
the heathens had made significant steps toward the discovery 
of the true God.^^ So the Renaissance man could feel fairly 
safe in drawing from any or all of these sources. Such a 
fact is further testimony of the philosophical presupposition
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and universal acceptance of the doctrine of sympathy.
Since this matter was rather common property during 
the Renaissance and since Milton devoted a long period of his 
life to diligent and full study of the available tradition, 
his knowledge of the sources cited is a well-founded as­
sumption. Besides, he mentions many of them in his Common­
place Book and in other"pieces. At times Milton echoes 
others of these commentators without directly quoting them: 
the knowledge was so common that it was not only second- 
nature to Milton, but he could also count on it to be so for 
his audience.
Milton's doctrine of sympathy, then, is eclectic.
It absorbs from the tradition whatever is suitable to its 
purposes and makes it into the poet's own through his unique 
interpretation or use. For, as Anne Ferry says, "the whole 
energy of his mind was directed toward the search for unity, 
his language reaching always toward expression of the whole­
ness of experience. . . . All his beliefs and habits of mind 
denied the division of spirit and matter, of physical and 
psychological experience, of fact and meaning.Milton's 
belief in the doctrine of sympathy, as I see it, is the 
philosophical basis of this quest for unity of experience 
and of the shape that it takes in his deontology and ambiance. 
Before I test this hypothesis in a detailed examination of 
specific works of Milton, a preliminary inquiry is necessi­
tated to show Milton's relationship to the literary climate
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of his ovna age. Since the idea was rather universally ac­
cepted down through Milton's time, we gain perspective by 
taking a cursory glance at the doctrine of sympathy as it 
functioned in the works of some of his immediate predeces­
sors and contemporaries. This inquiry will reveal both 
similarities and contrasts. Its aim is to suggest tendencies 
based on what are considered representative examples. In 
Herbert and Donne, the focus is on man; in Vaughan, it is on 
nature.
CHAPTER II .
THE LITERARY PERSPECTIVE
What ever is, is Life and Energie
From God, who is the Originall of all;
Who being everywhere doth multiplie
His own broad shade that endlesse 
throughout all doth lie.
Henry More, Democritus Platonissans
Then sing of secret things that came 
to pass
When Bedlam Nature in her cradle was.
John Milton, "At a Vacation Exercise,"
Works, I, -^5-^ 6
As far back as Homer, the sympathetic bond of nature 
has been a philosophical presupposition which characterizes 
a dominant trend in Western world literature. The ocean 
grieves, the spear is brave, the grain joys in the rain—  
nature shares in the grief of humans and the sense of intimacy 
between man and the world of nature is a commonplace. Drama, 
poetry, especially the elegy were all informed by the concept 
of sympathy in image and principle. English literature, as 
well as its extensions, is a part of this tradition both in 
substance and thought. From the Anglo-Saxons to the Vic­
torians, relatedness in the universe is a basic assumption, 
being most compatible with the Romantic temper. The
4?
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anonymous poet showed nature in sympathy with the plight of 
the wanderer in "The Wanderer." Chaucer in Troilus and 
Creseyde. Book III, credited this "holy bond of thynges." 
James Thomson, Wordsworth, and Shelley made the bond with 
nature their core principle of moral idealism.
American literature likewise reflects this abiding 
concern with the unity of existence. Many literary char­
acters are portrayed as experiencing this bond with nature: 
Natty Bumpo in the prairies and woods of this country's 
virgin soil; Henry David Thoreau afloat on Walden Pond;
Huck and Jim on the Mississippi; and Walt Whitman observing 
a blade of grass. Melville in Chapter LXXII of Moby Dick 
declared the unity of man with his fellows in his use of the 
rope to symbolize the bond of humanity, "the precise situa­
tion of every mortal that breathes," the "the Siamese con-
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nexion with a plurality of other mortals." Likewise, 
Hawthorne in Ethan Brand described the human bond as all men 
linked together in a "magnetic chain of humanity.
Twentieth century literature becomes increasingly a 
rhapsody on broken harmony, a lament for the loss of unity 
with God, man, and nature. Yet the sympathetic impulse is 
most eloquent by its conscious and unconscious denial. W.B. 
Yeats's cry in "Second Coming": "Things fall apart, the
center cannot hold" is a bleak appraisal of the contemporary 
attitude.
Milton's age was the last great age with a common
^9
center that did hold. But already the shades of a negative 
scientific spirit were closing in upon it and many felt that 
all coherence was surely gone. Others, however, like Milton, 
rested in the faith that things would not fall apart so long 
as God held the center. The turn, then, to the sympathetic 
bond of nature as an assurance of meaning and morality in 
the universe is interesting in its variety of expressions, 
whether from the poet or the philosopher.
The Cambridge Platonists used sympathy as a seminal 
concept in their apologetics. Seeking the best of both 
worlds, pagan and Christian, they sought to penetrate the 
religious conflicts of the age by appeals., to sympathy. 
Following Whichcote, Henry More, one of the leading Cambridge 
Platonists, felt that emphasis should be placed not on doc­
trinal agreement but on human sympathy and charity.^ From 
More’s notion of an "incorporeal substance in the human 
being he moved to the idea of a spirit of nature holding to­
gether the different parts of the universe."^ From this 
point. More went on to define the spiritual substance higher 
than the spirit of nature. This he called God. Thus More 
was able to evolve a world view which could accommodate 
scientific thought with "philosophical knowledge, spiritual 
insight, and religious revelation.In ethics, sympathy 
came to be emphasized mainly as a reaction to Hobbes’s 
postulations on man in the state of nature as the battle of 
each against all.^ According to Crane, Hobbes jolted a
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number of Anglican divines into making sympathy a primary 
tenet in their sermons.?
Indubitably, the notion of sympathy informs the best 
poetry of the seventeenth century, for much of it reflects 
the ethical concerns of the day. The vision of oneness is 
clearly evident in the widespread poetic concern for the 
rendering of the Eden myth in its many forms. Nearly every 
poet engaged this theme and its implications of primal 
harmony. Whether it was a Traherne or a Vaughan in his 
Edenic vision of innocence or childhood, or a Donne in his 
portrayal of two lovers who make each other's world, the 
seventeenth-century poet, invariably, goes back in one manner 
or the other to that period in Judaeo-Christian history when 
the state of perfect universal sympathy characterized the 
universe. Perhaps this was a means to achieve through art 
what reality increasingly denied.
Milton's age was not so different in the kinds of 
emphasis that it gave the doctrine of sympathy as it was in 
its applications. Shakespeare, for example, had used the 
idea of nature's sympathy with man to reinforce events of 
great moment in the lives of the great. In Julius Caesar, 
violent storms portend the death of Caesar. The tempest in 
Lear's soul is attended by a tempest in nature. But these 
devices do not necessarily lend themselves to deontological 
concerns. Shakespeare's world view, best enunciated in 
Troilus and Cressida. throws into relief a telling difference
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between himself and Milton as well as between the tempers
of their respective times. Shakespeare puts the Renaissance
concept of harmony and order in the mouth of Ulysses;
The heavens themselves, the planets, and
this centre.
Observe degree, priority, and place
insisture
Take but degree away, untune that string.
And hark, what discord follows! Each
thing meets 
In mere oppugnancy.o
Milton’s chain of being, as has been shown, was dynamic,
/
allowed ascension by merit. Shakespeare’s is static, in­
dicative of the relative conservatism of the age. Milton’s 
age was revolutionary. Milton’s view of the chain further 
reflects his optimism regarding man’s possibilities with 
God at the center.
The seventeenth century is generally more balanced 
in its perception of man’s possibilities than was the 
Elizabethan. Perhaps three examples will serve to illus­
trate this point. Very much in the tradition of sympathy, 
each of these men was deeply religious, a lover of this 
world and of the other. Alike in many ways, George Herbert, 
John Donne, and Henry Vaughan serve as an enlightening con­
trast with Milton in their application of the doctrine of 
sympathy. The differences, as I see them then, are not so 
much in perception of man’s relationship to God, man, and 
nature as in the conclusions drawn about the responsibility 
inherent therein.
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George Herbert saw his relationship to God as that 
of a benign taskmaster working along with the worker and 
thus making the enterprise a pleasure not a task. Richard 
Baxter, the famous Latitudinarian, showed his estimate of 
Herbert by "quoting the poet's 'Home' in full at the end of 
his 'The Saints' Everlasting Rest'; and in the preface to 
his Poetical Fragments (1681), Baxter stated of Herbert's 
faith; 'Herbert speaks to God like one that really be­
lieve th a God, and whose business in the world is most with 
God. Heart-work and heaven-work make up his B o o k s . S u c h  
is a splendid appraisal of Herbert's concept of relatedness 
and responsibility. For Herbert saw in the least significant 
things lessons on his relationship with God. The object is 
always secondary and God is primary in Herbert's deontology 
and ambiance. For Milton God too is always the center; but 
he so fuses the idea of God in all with that of God above 
all that his reader is forced to maintain a just sense of 
proportionate merit. Thus Milton never agonizes over man's 
unworthiness; rather he stresses his potential because man 
is made in God's image. This idea, as we shall see, was at 
the heart of Milton's deontology and ambiance. Herbert is 
perennially aware of man's imperfection. In "Even-Song," he 
expresses this conviction:
Thus in thy ebony box 
Thou dost inclose us, till the day 
Put our amendment in our way.
And give new wheels to our disorder'd
clocks.
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My god thou art all love,
Not one poore minute scapes thy
breast,
But brings a favour from above;
And in this love, more then in bed,
I rest.
(Works, p. 64.)
Yet Herbert is aware of the tension of the middle 
state in the chain of being. Rather than worry about ascen­
sion he is reconciled to it and accepts such as the human 
condition.
For sure thy way is best 
Stretch or contract me, thy poore
debter;
This is but tuning of my breast.
To make the musick better.
Whether I flie with angels, fall with
dust.
Thy hands made both, and I am there:
Thy power and love, my love and trust 
Make one place evry where.
("The Temper," Works. p. 55)
Herbert's relationship to his Maker seems always to inhere 
in the bestowal of grace by God as an unmerited favor;
Milton sees merit as a precondition to grace, as we shall 
see. Such an attitude towards man's potential worth ex­
plains much as to the role one plays in his advancement. 
Where Milton was for around twenty years engaged in active 
reform, Herbert is decidely orthodox— a, confirmed Anglican.
Herbert is no dualist. As the last lines above in­
dicate, he sees the unity of existence in God. Such knowl­
edge aids his peaceful resignation to the human condition. 
Not disturbed by violation of degre^ as was Shakespeare,
5h
. Herbert at times expresses concern that man cannot fulfill
the regimen of his link:
I am no link of thy great chain,
But all my company is a weed 
Lord place me in thy consort; give one strain 
To my poore reed.
("Employment (I)," Works, p . 57)
Here is an example of Herbert's use of ambiance that ex­
presses the unity with God by two modes of holistic sym­
pathy, the chain of being and world harmony. To be worthy 
of one's place in the total scheme involves some aspiration 
toward the divine. Divine response puts the "poore reed" in 
tune with world harmony.
At times Herbert exults in man's greatness as the 
"knot of the universe." In "Man" the poet portrays the 
individual as the "little world" within the world, the micro- 
cosmistic notion. He reflects on the importance of the re­
lationship of the parts of the body to the whole and, im­
plicitly, to the whole universe.
Man is all symmetrie.
Full of proportions, one limbe to
another,
And all to all the world besides:
Each part may call the furthest,
brother :
For head with foot both private amitie.
And both with moons and tides.
(Works, p. 9 1)
Then as further testimony of the bond of nature, Herbert al­
ludes to man as the master of the universe. Man subjects 
nature to his use for sympathetic cures, or perhaps, for 
God's abode:
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Herbs gladly cure our flesh; because
they
Finds their acquaintance there 
For us the winds do blow
Nothing we see but means our good.
(Works, p. 9 1)
But man sometimes misuses the fullness of the earth:
He treads down that which doth be­
friend him, pale 
and wan.
Oh mightie love! Man is one world
and hath 
Another to attend him.
(Works. p. 9 2)
Both worlds, however, must be kept fit for God to dwell in; 
and man is given the responsibility of the microcosm and the 
macrocosm. But man's insufficiency to meet his task is re­
flected in Herbert's plea:
Since then, my God, thou hast 
So brave a Palace built; 0 dwell in it.
That it may dwell with thee at last!
Till then afford us so much wit;
That as the world serves us, we may
serve thee 
And both thy servants be.
(Works, pp. 91-9 2)
As God is the active agent here, so generally does Herbert
think of the role of the Christian in passive terms. Thus
he subordinates every consideration to the part it plays in
cementing man's relationship to God. Herbert, then, sees the
unity of the world and hence, sympathy of the parts, in God;
but he generally is not concerned about the parts except as
they lead him to reflection on the Creator behind them.
Therefore, he studies nature because:
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It is thy highest art
To captivate strong holds to thee.
0 smooth my rugged heart, and 
there
Engrave thy rev’rend Law and fear.
( ’Nature,” Works, p. U-5)
Christ’s birth and his death are prime events to Herbert for 
they show forth God’s perfection and man’s imperfection:
We cannot reach our Saviours puritie;
Yet are we bid. Be holy ev’n as he.
In both let’s do our best.
(’Lent," Works. p. 87)
But his is not the call to an active quest for perfection
that is evident in Milton, who regards man’s relationship
with God as an incentive to be like Him.
John Donne, another seventeenth-century poet who 
flourished during the transitional phase covering the first 
third of the century, also supplies interesting similarities 
and contrasts with Milton’s perception and application of 
the doctrine of sympathy. His well-known verbal gymnastics, 
I suggest, find much of their source and vitality in his 
sympathetic impulse. His works reveal appropriations from 
the basic ambiance of sympathy: the chain, microcosmistic 
notions, the harmony theme, and the elementaristic modes of 
influence, affinity, and unity. Having played many parts in 
life— from that of the rake to that of the eminent dean of 
St. Paul— Donne had a broad vision of life and its essential 
relatedness. To Donne, love in all of its forms is the com­
mon denominator. ’Since lovers are their own world, their 
feelings resemble, by their harmony, the concentric spheres
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of the Ptolemaic u n i v e r s e . i n  one of his sermons, Donne 
expresses the sympathetic orientation of his concept of love. 
"Love is a Possessory Affection, it delivers over him that 
loves into the possession of that he loves; it is a trans­
mutât ory Affection, it changes him that loves into the very 
nature of that he loves, and he is nothing else."^^
Belief in the unity of existence brought Donne de­
spair as well as bliss. Reflecting the great concern of the 
hylozoists at the turn of the century, Donne lamented the 
decay of the world and all of its implications. Poets 
grieved that because of man's original sin, the biblical 
prophecy of destruction by fire was hard at hand. Davies of 
Hereford is a splendid example :
Our Sinnes have so the Elements 
defil'd
That they with Fire must need re­
fined be;
Nay, more; our sins the Heav'ns them­
selves have soil'd;
Then melt they must, from soile to 
set them free.12 
("The Muses Sacrifice")
Such bleak portents had been precipitated by the disturbance
of man's faith in the heavenly order consequent to certain
scientific discoveries. Beginning perhaps with that of
Copernicus in 1 5*+3 which disclosed the irregularity of the
movement of some stars and planets, man could no longer be
sure that order governed the microcosm or the macrocosm.
The discoveries of new stars in 1572, 1600, and 160^ further
accelerated the crumbling of the old medieval synthesis.
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Brahe and Kepler added more experimental evidence to the 
data already collected on terrestrial and celestial proc­
esses. Galileo's telescope added more verification of 
cosmic disorder. In short, the new science gained foothold 
as the foundations on which the old cosmology rested began 
to crumble.'^8 Such a development, Donne said in "Anatomie 
of the World," "calls all in doubt,"
The sun is lost, and th' earth, and
no man's wit
Can well direct him where to look for
it.
And freely men confesse that this
world's spent.
When in the Planets, and the Firmament
They seeke so many new; they see that
this
Is crumbled out againe to his Atomies.
'Tis all in peeces, all coherence gone;
All just supply, and all Relation.
Disturbance in one realm then is reflected throughout the 
whole. Just as "One woman at one blow, then kill'd us all," 
so "one by one, they kill us now," for the "first marriage 
was our funeral" (11. 106-107, 105). The act which origi­
nally broke universal harmony is still the cause of death 
and of all that is now "quite out of joynt" (1. 192).
Union and order in the parts of this total frame had 
originally been evident by the fact "the noblest part, man, 
felt [the breach] first, and then / Both beasts and plants, 
[were] curst in the curse of man" (11. 183-849. But Donne 
felt the process of degeneration continuous and probably 
then in its last days. Many years later, Donne is still 
concerned about the effects of the curse brought on the
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"whole frame" by man's original sin, and he concludes that 
even now "the heavens as well as the earth" are in a state of 
"sensible decay and mortality.^ Milton, as we shall later 
see, reasoned in the opposite direction from the same phe­
nomena : because God is perfect order, disorder cannot ulti­
mately prevail.
But Donne can find more bliss in his microcosmistic 
portrayals of love as the universal principle. The little 
analogical world of the lovers is animated by a unity of 
body and soul. Though Donne does at times disparage the 
body in favor of the soul, typically he sees them in partner­
ship. The body is not the soul’s "dross," but its "alloy," 
he tells us in "The Extasie." It is through the body that 
the souls can reach each other. And:
On man heaven’s influence workes not so.
But that it first imprints the ayre.
So soule into soule may flowe.
Though it to body first repaire.
(Works, p. h - 7 )
The sympathy between lovers is depicted as "the soules 
language" (1. 22). Talk then is unnecessary (1. 20). The 
paradoxical nature of human love in all of its fluctua­
tions, Donne carries over into the realm of divine love.
Basically his concern to explain his relationship to 
God, man, and nature are approached through the portals of 
love— physical, intellectual, and divine. But he had that 
Keatsian ability to dwell in uncertainties. Hence his life­
long intellectual struggles and his longing for heaven’s
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fulfillment. The feeling of sympathy between God and his 
creation is at the moral base of his ideas. He yearns for a 
closer union with God, but is ever aware of the separation 
caused by sin— the corrupter of both the microcosm and the 
macrocosm. His sermons and religious verse reflect this 
tension. Mainly, it takes the form of a debate between the 
goodness of God's grace symbolized in the blood of the lamb 
and the extent of man's unworthiness.
Perhaps the following passage from one of Donne's
sermons, based on II Peter 1; 3-10, best summarizes his
final view of the sympathetic bond of nature:
By his precious promises we are partakers of the 
divine nature. . . . not that we so derived from 
the nature and essence of God, as that our soul 
should be of his very substance. . . . That God 
should be all in all, so as that at last, the whole 
nature of mankind, and indeed, all other natures and 
substances . . . should be swallowed up, and drowned 
in the very substance of God himself. But this trans­
mutation is a glorious restoring of Gods image in us, 
and it is our conformity to him; and when either his 
temporal blessings, or his afflictions, his sun, or 
his fire, hath tried us up to that height, to a con­
formity to him, then come we to that transmutation, 
which admits no re-transmutation, which is a modest, 
but infallible assurance of a final perseverance, so 
to be joyned to the Lord,, as to be one spirit with 
him; for as a spirit cannot be divided, so they who 
are thus changed into him, are so much His, so much 
He, as that pothing can separate them from him; and 
this is the ladder, by which we try, how far we are 
in the way to heaven.
( Sermons, I, 1643 
Though Donne was aware of each of the secular implications 
of this bond of nature and used them many times in his 
verse and prose, as any careful study of his imagery will 
reveal, the foregoing statement perfectly incorporates the
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doctrine of sympathy in its higher manifestations. It is a 
statement of the unity of all in God, impaired by the Fall, 
of the need for restoration of this unity by accepting the 
redemption made available by the Son, and of his faith there­
from of a final indissoluble union with God. It differs 
fpom Milton’s doctrine of sympathy only in its implicit 
passivity.
Though Douglas Bush mentions some instances of 
Donne’s Anglican intolerance,^^ Donne, by and large was not 
the revolutionary Milton was. Perhaps, with both Donne and 
Herbert, one of the explanations for non-revolutionary 
spirit— excepting their church affiliations and the rela­
tively calm decades in which they wrote— is their compara­
tive views on the potential nature and extent of man’s 
capabilities and his responsibility for the amelioration of 
his condition. Donne could hold himself apart from the ec­
clesiastical and political controversies of his day by, as I 
see it, a negative appeal to the doctrine of sympathy: ”I
never fettered nor imprisoned the word Religion . . . nor 
immuring it in a Rome, or a Wittenberg, or a Geneva; they 
are all virtuall beams of one Sun, and wherever they find 
clay hearts, they harden them, and moulder them into dust; 
and they entender and mollifie w a x e n . Then, in a plea 
for emphasis on the common element in all religions that 
anticipates a statement Milton is later to make in 
Areopagitica. Donne says: ’’They are not so contrary as the
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North and South Poles; and . . . they are connatural pieces 
of one c i r c l e . M i l t o n  would agree with this basic state­
ment; but he would not stop there. Rather he would use this 
as a strong incentive to search for the true beam.
Henry Vaughan presents still another phase of the 
tradition of sympathy. While Herbert and Donne, to a large 
extent, were concerned with nature and man as parts of the 
great universal order, their focus is on man. Natural 
imagery is used essentially to explain man and his relation­
ship to man or to a larger pattern of divinity. Vaughan sees 
the richness and sanctity of nature for itself--not however, 
to the exclusion of the symbolical value of the wider world 
of existence. He sees in nature's response to God a natural 
law which, in turn, leads him to see the order in the uni­
verse as a reflection of God’s purpose and the evidence of 
the "intercourse between him and it."^9 in this respect he 
is closer to Milton than to Herbert or Donne.
The basic concerns of Vaughan in his poetry center 
on God's immanence and transcendence in His creations. To 
express his essential ideas Vaughan, like the other poets 
of this period, used the available tradition. He speaks of 
^hidden ascents," "spheres of rings," "signatures," "har­
mony," "the symphony of nature," "flints," and "divine rays" 
in contexts other than those of devotional literature.
They are the staple commodity of the Hermetic and alchemical 
tradition; for Hermeticism and alchemy, like magic.
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have orientations in the doctrine of sympathy, as we have al­
ready seen. But such imagery was used for the negative and 
the positive, as Vaughan skillfully demonstrates. Such use 
too is inherent in the concept of relatedness. More con­
temporaneous with Milton than Herbert or Donne, Vaughan had 
more emotional attachment to nature and its bond of sympathy 
with God and man. Yet his concept of relatedness did not 
lead him to join hands in the reformation of the world; it 
led him to withdraw from the world as a mystic. A few ex­
amples from Vaughan's poetry will illustrate the foregoing 
conclusions.
Vaughan sees in magnetism clues to a universal prin­
ciple in nature. From certain manifestations of this phe­
nomenon in nature, he goes on to draw conclusions about at­
traction in other areas. Miss Mahood has noted that "Vaughan, 
more than other poets, sees this correspondence as a circu­
lation of sympathy between the various planes of existence."20 
Hence the poet says in "To Amoret":
Thus to the North the Loadstones move.
And thus to them th' enamour'd steel 
aspires:
Thus Amoret,
I doe affect;
And thus by winged beames, and mutuall
fire.
Spirits and Stars conspire.
And this is Love.21
As the North draws the loadstone, so lovers attract each
other; and all the elements are so united by the principle
of sympathy. Instinctively, then, like seeks like.
6^
A further example of this sympathetic bond of nature 
may be adduced from "Cock-Crowing." Because of the affinity 
planted in the cock by nature, he responds to the sun by 
crowing:
Father of Lights! What Sunnie seed,
What glance of day hast thou confined 
Into this bird? To all the breed 
This busie ray thou hast assigned;
Their magnétisme works all night.
And dreams of Paradise and light.
(Works, II, Ç88)
And then Vaughan moves to the logical conclusion:
If such a tincture, such a touch 
So firm a longing can impowre 
Shall thy own image think it much 
To watch for thy appearing hour?
(Works, II, ^88)
With this mystical insight, the poet is forced to reflect on 
the only obstacle which prevents the perfect fusion of him­
self with his Maker— the veil of the flesh:
This veyle by full-ey'd love denies.
And only gleams and fractions spies.
And in passionate plea for mystical union, he cries:
0 take it off! Make no delay.
But brush me with thy light, that I 
May shine unto a perfect day.
And warme me at thy glorious eye!
(Works. II, ^89)
Further evidence of Vaughan's use of the elementar­
istic mode of sympathy is seen in his concern for astral in­
fluence. He shows the influence of the stars on plants and
other forms of external nature as well as on man. Though 
bodies infected, depraved or dead can with stars have no 
sympathy.
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These are the Magnets which so strongly
move
And work all might upon thy light and
love
As beauteous shapes, we know not why,
Command and guide the eye.
For where desire, celestiall, pure desire 
Hath taken root, and grows, and doth not
tire.
There God a Commerce states and sheds 
His secret on their heads.
(Works. II, !+90)
Thus Vaughan learns the lesson that those who give their
hearts to God will likewise feel His effect as do the herbs
when they "put on their youth and green" (11. 29-32).
In a symbolistic use of sympathy, Vaughan equates his
lover's face with a star:
But Amoret, such is my fate
That if thy face a Starre
Had shin'd from farre,
I am perswaded in that state 
Twixt thee and me,
Of some predestined sympathie.
(Works, II, 7)
Just as there is more active commerce between the stars and 
certain objects, so is there a stronger attraction between 
lovers who have a natural affinity for each other.
Vaughan, then, sees nature as a visible representa­
tion of interrelationship governing the universe. He too is 
concerned about the effects of the Fall on this relationship.
Man, he feels, is doomed to be an exile from his former
Eden, "a sully'd flowre" cast out of Paradise (Works. II, 
^11). But some may yearn for and achieve the mystical 
union with God. This is the end of Vaughan's quest.
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Glimpses and fractions seen in nature are his inspiration.
The bonds of nature to Vaughan, then, are real and indi­
vidual. His approach is not social, but ascetic.
So three men in Milton’s age shared a similar per­
ception of the doctrine of sympathy, but differed in the ap­
plication they made of its tutelage. Herbert is the most 
balanced in his approach to the unity of existence. But his 
sense of unworthiness does occasion intermittent seasons of 
despair. He can accept the ebbs and flows of life because 
"Christ left his grave-clothes, that we might, when grief / 
Draws tears, or bloud, not want a handkerchief." (Works, II, 
112), Thus so secure did he feel in the love of God that he 
was not moved to a higher zeal than that of the inspirational 
parson.
John Donne is the most passionate in romantic and 
divine love, the most insatiable. Incessantly aware of his 
debt paid by Christ on the cross, after his commitment to the 
religious life, he was ever seeking ways to repay this su­
preme example of love— yet ever aware of the impossibility 
of his achieving this goal. Having known all sides of life, 
either vicariously or actually, he drew upon this rich re­
pository for ways to express his yearning for a fulfillment 
of the unity he perceived. His distinctive conceits, his 
perennial debates on the relative merit of matter and spirit 
— only to conclude in favor of both— his bifocal view of 
life and death are all reflections of his desire to come to
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grips with unity in disparity. He was indeed involved in 
mankind as a man of the world, a poet, and as a preacher. 
Humanity was his first concern; but he was no active re­
former. Perhaps it was due mainly to Donne's "negative cap­
ability" that he, seemingly unable to dwell in certainties, 
did not choose the mantle of the reformer.
Henry Vaughan is most deeply immersed in the mys­
teries of the bond of nature as the handiwork of God. To 
him, nature is a symphony with God as the conductor. In 
praise of this perfect orchestration, Vaughan is moved to 
say; "Hark1 In what rings/ And hymning circulation, the 
quick world/ Awakes and sings!" (Works, II, ^2^). This is 
the perennial miracle that Vaughan celebrates in his verse. 
Life to him is ever a waiting for the dawn, his symbol of 
fulfillment^^— the final dispensing of the darkness of this 
world by the Light of Lights. But the perfect sympathy of 
nature with God whets his desire for the mystical union with 
God on earth. This is his quest. Any imagery from the 
available tradition which helped Vaughan to express this 
union of life in God, he used. As his thoughts were mainly 
directed towards the other world, he could not be an active 
reformer. A mystic, he could entertain very few hopes for 
regeneration of any but the individual man.
The concept of sympathy enriched the ambiance of 
each of these poets according to his personal predilections. 
But these men were basically at home in their faith; and
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though the tone of each is to an extent inspirational, it is 
certainly not revolutionary. Deontology, then, is minimal 
if not completely absent. It remains then for Milton to 
combine the best elements of the tradition with the re­
former' s zeal. Milton does not agonize over man's insuf­
ficiency as did Donne or Herbert. Rather he sees unlimited 
possibilities for "man's immortal mind in its quest of uni­
versal knowledge and wisdom, a goal ascertainable only by 
the good,"^3 Milton, then, places God at the center of the 
good life. Man created in the image of God can make of 
this world what God originally intended it to be through 
contemplation and action according to the precept and ex­
ample of the Christ. We now turn to Milton's early works to 
see how the doctrine of sympathy functions in the poet's 
evolving deontology and ambiance.
CHAPTER III
THE POET HIMSELF A POEM: TOWARDS INDIVIDUAL 
HARMONY AND PROPORTION
He who would not he frustrate in his hope to write well 
in laudable things, ought himselfe to be a true Poem, 
that is, a composition, and patterns of the best and 
honourablest things.
John Milton, Apology for Smectymnuus
The desire to be a true poem is a desire for harmony,
for unity among the parts according to a conscious purpose 
and plan. If we accept Milton's own account of the evolution 
of his plan for excellence in his life and his art, then the 
desire to be a true poem is the controlling influence in his 
choice of a goal for himself as well as of the activities 
engaged in to achieve such an end. To be a true poem, then, 
is to shape oneself by the highest pattern of the greatest 
good. For Milton, this greatest good is to be found in the
accumulated wisdom of the ages. From his conscientious and
systematic study of this lore he affirmed his faith in the 
great Christian exemplar, the Son of God. The discovery of 
his relationship and responsibility to this pattern is, as 
I see it, the concern of the early poems.
Milton's early activities are mainly self-directed:
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he devotes most of his time to study and contemplation. 
Knowledge and virtue are the means to his end, the tools with 
which he shapes the elements of the poem into fitness to 
serve. The fitness declares his relationship to the pattern, 
the service, his responsibility. A life of virtue, Milton 
had learned through his wide reading, is possible for the 
pagan as well as the Christian; but the quality and limita­
tions of the pagan virtue, Milton still had to reexamine at 
this point. The doctrine of self-sufficiency extolled by 
the classics engaged Milton for a time. The early poems, I 
suggest, reflect Milton's attempt to come to grips with the 
role of individualism in the heavenly quest, its part in the 
composition of the true poem-poet. The "Hymn on the Morning 
of Christ's Nativity," Comus. and Lycidas. though all are 
explicitly occasional, represent successive stages in the de­
velopment of Milton's perception of individual limitations 
and possibilities.
Milton's program of excellence, as reflected in his 
work of the period down to l6*+0, revolves around a con­
sciousness of his relationship to the divine. As a unit it 
resembles an ordered pattern of meditation not unlike the 
Platonic ascent up the ladder of virtue through rungs of 
heavenward movement to a vision of unity with the divine. 
Woodhouse outlines such a form of meditation in another con­
nection: "a meditation of the love of God as revealed first 
in the creation and then in the Incarnation, in Christ's
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earthly ministry and his redemption of fallen man, with the 
response of love which this love demands."^ While this pat­
tern of necessity does not include all the poet's works, it 
does suggest an important tendency and it helps to explain 
the vision of oneness evident throughout the poet's work.
While Milton was still at St. Paul's School, he 
showed himself alive to nature, the external manifestation 
of divine immanence. The "Elegiac V e r s e s , worthy of note 
only in passing, shows the poet's minute observation of na­
ture as a part of God's creation. He remarks on the affin­
ities of the grass and the dew, the violets and the grain. 
The depiction of the coming of the dawn with the cock as its 
sentinel might be said to anticipate Vaughan's "Morning- 
Watch." Even the "Fable of a Peasant and his Landlord" 
seems to be indicative of Milton's nascent interest in the 
elemental natural and human symbiosis by its account of the 
effects of greed and covetousness on a tree's productivity. 
In the care of the kind peasant, the tree flourished; but 
once it was relinquished to the selfish landlord, both the 
tree and fruit were lost.3 His "Elegy the Fifth," recounts 
the natural effects of spring, not the least of which is its 
real or supposed effect upon the poet's genius: "My soul is
deeply stirred, is all aglow with mysterious impulses, the 
madness of inspiration and holy sounds stir me to my deeps 
within" (I, 12-15)* While these are youthful efforts, they 
certainly indicate the poet's sensitivity to a bond of
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nature and a more than casual interest in it.
Nature and the poetic talent have already been as­
sociated in Milton's early works. The indication that the 
poet desires a serious muse is quite evident in his first 
great English poem, "On the Morning of Christ's Nativity.".
In this poem Milton skillfully combines the themes of di­
vine, human, and cosmic sympathy in his study of the Incarna­
tion. The Nativity itself is not the poet’s primary inter­
est, for that limits the event to the human realm. Milton,
I suggest, is concerned with the relationship which Christ's 
coming signified, not the mere event of His coming. Fur­
thermore it is because of his propensity towards relation­
ship and responsibility, which I attribute to the sympathetic 
impulse, that he chose such an emphasis. The questionsof 
relationship and responsibility were very much his concern 
in his desire to become the "composition and pattern of the 
best and honourablest things." The Incarnate Christ, I sug­
gest, not only furnishes the best example of the combination 
of the human and the divine— a marriage of heaven and 
earth— but also the best example of the pattern for Milton's 
poem-poet, It is Christ as the testimony of the relation­
ship between God and His creations and Christ as the great 
exemplar that engaged the mind of Milton.
The relationship between God and His creation is the 
unifying element in the Ode. It is announced in the prologue 
in the skillfully adumbrated account of the divine lineage
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of the Son who through maternity of a "wedded Maid, and 
Virgin Mother"
Forsook the Courts of everlasting Day,
And chose with us a darksom House of
mortal Clay.
(I, 3, 13-14).
Such an account depicts the blending of the human and the 
divine not only in relationship but also in responsibility. 
The Son, through God’s mercy, assumed the responsibility for 
man's redemption by entering the world through a human in 
human form. By this means. He releases "our deadly forfeit," 
restores our relationship with the Father abrogated by the 
sin of the first parents, and imposes upon man the responsi­
bility of accepting this gift and thereby securing for him­
self "a perpetual peace" (I, 4^ . 6-7).
The meaning of the Incarnation, then, is the sealing 
of a bond between pian and his Creator. It is the meaning of 
life for all who accept the gift of God's love; for Christ 
sets into motion the means by which man might conquer death 
which came into the world as a consequence of the Fall. His 
life is the pattern; His death is the price. So Milton does 
not dwell on Christ as the Bleeding Lamb. Except for the 
abortive effort in "The Passion," Milton wrote only one other 
poem on the subject of the crucifixion, "Upon the Circum­
cision." He returns to the theme in P.L.. XII, 395-450, to 
indicate its place in the history of man. I suggest that 
one of the explanations for this reluctance is the greater 
appeal of the theme of Christ the Exemplar. In the latter.
7^
the poet could find support for his concept of merit as a 
basis for ascent; and the life of Christ as depicted by its 
effect on all parts of creation is implicatory of the pos­
sibilities for the man who strives to be like Him.
Not only, then, is the poet concerned to show the 
relationship between the divine and human, but he is also 
concerned to show the relation of God to nature as well. 
Milton, in keeping with tradition, holds that before the 
Fall man, nature, and God existed in perfect sympathy; but 
"disproportioned sin” broke the original harmonious state. 
The Son's coming prepares the way for a reunion of all in 
God, for He is visible evidence of the relationship of the 
parts to a responsible whole. I think Miss Tuve's observa­
tion of peace as the center of this poem is apt because she 
incorporates into this term "all those wide and deep mean­
ings [Milton] has gathered in, touching the redemption of 
all nature from guilty harmony and final union with the di­
vine l i g h t . P e a c e  is certainly an effect of the Son's 
coming and a manifestation of the fact that the primal union 
was not entirely destroyed by the Original Sin. But that 
peace is not yet to be. The Son sets into motion the means 
of reparation; but the perfect union, without which there 
can be no true peace, is a futuristic projection. Rather 
the center of the poem is the relationship between God and 
His creatures that it is now possible to salvage from the 
ruins incurred by the Fall. The effect of the Nativity of
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the Son on the entire creation declares that the universal 
bond of sympathy, though abrogated, is not destroyed. Man's 
receptivity to this relationship and its consequent benefits 
is by choice, but nature’s is instinctual.
The fact that nature is lower in the chain of being 
and hence has neither the understanding nor the responsibil­
ity that man has is implicit in its responses. Moreover, 
there is the implication that nature is more disposed to af­
firm its bond than is the indifferent or insensate man.
Thus in anticipation of the advent:
Nature in awe to him
Had doff’t her gawdy trim
With her great Master so to sympathize.
(I, 32-3^)
Then, in keeping with the traditional time of the Savior's
birth, Milton further develops his idea of sympathy by
showing that only in the winter could nature assure itself
of putting forth its best appearance. Because nature had
shared the penalty incurred by man's original sin, she "must
hide her deformities" from the view of the holy guest. So
She WOO'S the gentle Air
To hide her guilty front with inno­
cent Snow,
And on her naked shame,
Pollute with sinful blame,
The Saintly Veil of Maiden white 
to throw.
(I, 37-**)
Such gestures may show respect, but they show little knowl­
edge of the ways of God. Yet nature well knows through its 
relationship with the divine that this event has
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significance even for it, because nature shares with man 
weal or woe, as Milton more explicitly states in Paradise 
Lost. So God sends down "the meek-ey'd Peace" to calm na­
ture's fears.
Peace is the harbinger of the Christ; but true peace
is a manifestation of His presence. Nevertheless, earthly
peace can be only a shadow of the perfect peace which man
can know only when he is finally reunited with God. This
peace which she brings is the mere absence of war, not the
true peace which obtains from perfect harmony with the
divine will (I, U-5-52).
No War, or Battel sound 
Was heard the world around:
And Kings sate still with awful1 eye.
As if they surely knew their sovran
Lord was by.
(I, 53-60)
Scholars generally agree that Milton here is pointing to the 
Pax Romana. According to the tradition, for the seven years 
preceding the birth of Christ the Roman world was at peace. 
Popularly, it was held, as Lyly comments, that "Christ would 
not be borne, untill there was peace throughout the whole 
worlde."^ Douglas Bush suggests that Milton wishes to de­
velop the typological significance of peace. "Christian 
writers," he says, as exemplified in St, Augustine's City of 
God "saw a fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy in the 
peace prevailing in the Roman empire at the time of Christ's 
birth,Milton uses this earthly peace under the aegis
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of the earthly kings as a type of the peace that will be 
perpetual when God, the King of Kings, fulfills His final 
promise of peace.
The Prince of Peace by His presence brings a higher
type of that eternal peace, and nature feels its effects:
The Winds with wonder whist.
Smoothly the waters kiss’t.
Whispering new joyes to the milde 
Ocean,
Who now has quite forgot to rave.
While Birds of Calm sit brooding on
the charmed wave.
(I, 64-68)
Milton's use of the word charmed is further indicative of 
his concern for affinity among the parts of nature. For the 
seventeenth-century, the word was more charged in its meaning 
than it is for the modern reader. B.A. Wright, in another 
connection, observed that charm then referred to a "magic 
spell; a mysterious, extraordinary or preternatural power to 
influence, subdue, c o n t r o l . I  shall later have occasion 
to refer to other uses of this same meaning of this word in 
Milton. Here the primary meaning of this word lends rich­
ness to the context. It becomes more than a record of oc­
cult effect, but a further testimony of the immanence of 
God in His creation. Such is indicated by the effect of His 
presence on the waves: the preternatural power of the Cre­
ator calms and subdues them. Since Milton had stated 
basically the same idea in the previous two lines, emphasis, 
and thus extension of the image, seems to me the only legit­
imate reason for the repetition.
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The poet goes on to emphasize this natural sympathy
between the Creator and the created:
The Stars with deep amaze 
Stand fixt in stedfast gaze,
Bending one way their prêtions influence.
(I, 69-71)
Milton's allusion here to astral influence is a commonplace
of the age, as we have already seen in the discussion on his
contemporaries. I have also noted, in the discussion on
philosophical backgrounds, the stigmatization by the Church
Fathers of the idea of a deterministic influence of stars on
man. A quotation from Donne's "A Valediction: of My Name in
the Window," will serve further to exemplify the typical
notion of the power attributed to stars:
As vertuous powers which are 
Fix'd in the starres, are said to 
flow
Into such characters, as graved bee 
When these starres have supremacie.
 ^ (I, 33-36)
One's character, as many believed, could be influenced for
good or ill according to the ruling star under which he was
born. Milton here at least lends tentative subscription to
this notion by noting that on the night of the Nativity, the
stars shed only good influence.
Nature is receptive of the divine effects, and thus 
it is obedient. The stars remained in open daylight; even 
Lucifer the "Morning-Star" remained until "the Lord himself 
bespake and bid them go" (I, 75-76). Milton next alludes to 
the standard typological use of the Sun-Son figure: the sun
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not o#ly sta,nds still but hides its face in shame. No need 
for the type to remain when the reality that it pre-figures 
arrives: "He saw a greater 8un appear" (I, 77-840. Thus
Milton celebrates the universal bond typified in the In­
carnation,
But man, the prime benefactor and occasion of His 
coming, gave no such instinctual response to Him. The un­
suspecting shepherds thought little that "the mighty Pan/
Was kindly come to live with them below" (I, 89-90) until 
the "music sweet" greeted their ears. Music is widely used 
as ambiance for the depiction of the unity of things. With 
this figure, Milton fuses temporality with eternity; for 
such music was heard only once before and will be heard again 
only at the end of time, according to tradition. Such a 
harmonious proclamation is further testimony of the inter­
relationship of the human, divine, and cosmic realms.
The tradition of musical harmony is a heritage of 
long-"Standing and one of Milton's favorite figures. Harking 
back to the Pythagorean notion of the "music of the 
spheres," it was widely adapted to Christian thought as fact 
and figure. Unbroken harmony symbolizes and signifies un­
broken unity, The state of perfect unity and perfect 
harmony, then, existed only, as Milton says in "At a Solemn 
Musick"
Till disproportion'd sin 
Jarr'd against natures chime, and with harsh
din
Broke the fair musick that all creatures made
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To their great Lord, whose love their motion
sway’d
In perfect Diapason, whilst they stood
In first obedience, and their state of good.
(I, 19-2»+)
The idea of perfect harmony in Milton invariably goes back to 
the universal sympathy it typified. Therefore, the harmony 
of the spheres cannot be heard again until the reparation of 
the ruins occasioned by the Fall. But even now we may grasp 
some semblance of the archetypal harmony in our own "undis- 
cordihg voice" by which we may bring ourselves in tune with 
"heavens melodious noise" and effect a blissful union (I, 
17- 18) ,
That oyily souls in tune can hear the celestial har­
mony is evident by Milton's use of the idea in his mask 
"Arcades." Milton had written in his "Prolusion II"; "If 
our souls were pure, chaste, and white as snow, as was 
Pythagoras' of old, then indeed our ears would ring and be 
filled with that exquisite music of the stars in their 
orbits; then would all things turn back to the Age of Gold." 
Milton goes on to fuse this idea of harmony with that of a 
peace so blessed that "even the gods might envy." Such a 
condition also bestows a privilege of sharing "the most 
secret mysteries of nature" (CPW. I, 239). Accordingly, 
Milton assigns the power of hearing the music of the spheres 
in 1Arcades"only to the superhuman Genius of the Wood.
The Genius describes the abode of the celestial 
sirens in typical Pythagorean terms. The sirens
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sit upon nine enfolded Sphears,
And sing to those that hold the vital
shears,
And turn the Adamantean spindle round,
On which the fate of the gods and men
is wound,
(I, 63-67)
But then the figure shifts to a statement of natural prin­
ciple.
Such sweet compulsion does in musick ly.
To lull the daughters of Necessity,
And keep unsteady Nature to her law.
And the low world in measur'd motion
draw
After the heavenly tune, which none
can hear
Of human mould with gross unpurged ear.
(I, 68-73)
Milton's use of the Pythagorean figure, then, calls up the 
associations of all connected with the Original Sin: its 
abrogation of the primal sympathy in the microcosm, geocosm 
and macrocosm and the means by which its effects can be set 
aside.
Sip, then, had clogged man's ears to the perfect 
music of the heavens. But Christ's coming brings hope of 
redemption from sin; therefore, it is fitting that his ad­
vent be announced by music, it too a symbol of the primal re­
lationship and its hope of fulfillment. So the music took 
the souls of the shepherds "in blissful rapture" (I, 98).
And nature, hearing the music, thought that "her reign had 
here its last fulfilling/ She knew such harmony alone/ Could 
hold all Heav'n and Earth in happier union" (I, 106-108). 
Though nature does not fully understand the ways of God— a
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sign of its lower place In the chain of being— it recognizes 
this perfect harmony as symbolic of the primal union nulli­
fied by sin. But aware of the promised restoration, nature 
thinks that the time is now. The theme possesses the poet as 
he rhapsodizes;
Ring out ye Crystall sphears,
Once bless our humane ears,
(If ye have power to touch our senses
so)
And let your silver chime 
Move in melodious time;
And let the base of Heav'ns deep
Organ blow)
And with your ninefold harmony
Make up full consort to th' Angelike
Symphony.
(I, 125-132)
The power of music was of perennial fascination to 
Milton, and he uses its rich suggestiveness to enhance his 
recurrent ideas in poetry and prose, I see this predilection 
as rooted in the poet's sympathetic impulse. Leo Spitzer has 
traced the development of the use of musical imagery in con­
nection with faith. Chime. specifically, as employed in the 
passage above takes on more significance when it is regarded 
"as an expression of the musical harmony of the universe and
O
at the same time, of the faith of believers." Milton's 
hymn, then, becomes a plea to man for renewed faith as a re­
sponse to this music if not as a precondition to it. Faith 
itself may be called music in tune with the heavenly harmony.
But such music cannot engage one long (I, 135), for 
it effects the mystical union, perhaps, and sets into motion 
the blissful peace of the classical Age of Gold or the
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Christian Paradise;
Time will run back and fetch the age 
of gold,
And speckl'd vanity 
Will sicken soon and die,
And leprous sin will melt from earthly 
mould,
And Hell itself will pass away.
And leave her dolorous mansions to the
peering day.
(I, 132-1^ -0)
The debt incurred by man’s first disobedience cannot be paid 
in this manner. The breach can be healed only by the "bitter 
cross” (I, 152). Thus will the Son glorify Himself and man 
(1, 1^). The poet will again attempt to poeticize this 
paradoxical event in "Passion." But there also he sounds 
the note that would engage him more. Christ is the "most 
perfect Heroe, try'd in heaviest plight/ Of labours huge and 
hard, too hard for human wight" (I, 13-1^)* Milton was to 
use this idea in all of its implications as a cornerstone of 
his deontology, and as I believe, as the pattern for his poet 
as the true poem. As we shall later see, that is the central 
lesson of Paradise Regain'd.
But here in the Ode. Milton sets the tone for all 
his future treatments of the Son. With a backward and for­
ward sweep into history, Milton fits the Incarnation into 
the scheme of the divine program. Christ is the fulfillment 
of the covenant made at the Fall. The oracles, which served 
men who did not have revelation, are now silenced. Mt.
Sinai, representing a revelation to a chosen group, is in 
Christ fulfilled and extended. Satan, the "old Dragon,"
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begins from this day his descent "under ground/ In straiter 
limits bound" (I, I67-I6 9). Thus with Christ a new era 
begins tending toward "our full and perfect bliss." The end 
of this era will be signified by the completion of this 
binding of Satan. But this is not yet to be (I, 165-166).
As Christ is a man of action, He puts to rout the false 
gods; the reality banishes the appearance. Man now has vis­
ible evidence of the true god:
Our Babe to show his Godhead true,
Can in his swadling bands control the
damned crew.
(I, 227-228)
Thus the true God is a God of action, and He proves 
His Godhead not by His death alone, but by His life also.
And in the Ode Milton presents the Incarnate Christ as one 
vftio proves His relationship to the Godhead by His effects 
and His action. The emphasis on the Incarnation rather than 
the Nativity, then, would appeal more to the poet, as I see 
it, because of his present need for a pattern which best 
exemplifies relationship and responsibility. Christ is the 
highest example of relationship, as evidenced by His effects, 
and responsibility, as evidenced by His action. In the Ode. 
then, the pattern for man is apparent; the duty is implicit. 
Milton is to return to this theme time and time again, to 
reexamine it and to refine it.
The Ode, as Douglas Bush notes, ends quietly with an 
affirmation of "the bond between heaven and earth" in the
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simple oblique statement^ that summarizes the entire rela­
tionship :
And all about the Courtly Stable,
Bright harnest Angels sit in order
serviceable.
(I, 244-2^5)
The message of the Incarnation is the message of union with 
the Father in the Son. Through it the bond is sealed by 
which man can again experience that primal sympathy which 
characterized the prelapsarian state. But just as the event 
itself is a symbolic union of both realms, so the final re­
union by which evil is overcome and eternal bliss earned 
must be accomplished by man in cooperation with God. The 
service of the angels reflect this activity of the virtuous, 
and the image conflated in the witty paradox "courtly 
stable" symbolizes the union of the human and divine.
The images which Milton uses in this Ode are all ap­
propriate to the idea of relationship and responsibility.
The poem seems to me to illuminate its deepest meaning when 
so read. I object to Broadbent's conclusion that the work is 
hysterical and "confirms a suspicion that in these stanzas 
Milton, faced with the rude fact of a God being born, is 
confused and falls into the worst kind of imagery— personi­
fication which is extremely figurative, but not in the least 
n a t u r a l ."10 i ho not recognize any hysteria reflected in the 
poet's choice of imagery. I see his imagery as carefully 
patterned around the idea of the Incarnation, its blending
86
of opposites in a perfect union. "Wedded Maid," the "babe in 
smiling infancy," juxtaposed with the "bitter cross," the 
Babe "in swadling bands" who can "controul the damned crew," 
the Son as a greater Sun, and lastly the "Courtly Stable," 
all indicate a conscious choice of imagery to reinforce the 
idea. Milton is not confused that a God is being born for 
that is just the point: he does not see the Incarnation in 
such terms. To him the fusion of the divine and human in 
human form is the sacred miracle to celebrate. For this 
testimony of God's love and mercy is the greatest assurance 
of man's relationship to God, .and it was in this relation­
ship that Milton finds his prime inspiration to be the true 
poem.
Nor do I agree with Fixler's analysis of Milton's 
use of imagery in the Ode. He remarks that "the images in 
which Milton saw the Incarnation reflect his tendency to 
conceive the relationship of God to nature as one of effort­
less power."11 Such a comment damns the poet with faint 
praise arid fails to take into account the symbolistic value
of Milton's images. I do not wish to duplicate Miss Tuve's
1 2perceptive study on Milton's images and themes, but I would 
agree with her basic conclusion that Milton imagery is the 
result of conscientious and skillful selectivity. Further­
more, as I have suggested and hope to further demonstrate, 
Milton's selection of imagery here and throughout his canon 
is to a large extent determined by his pervasive concern
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with the Creator-created relationship. In the Ode, Milton is 
concerned with the active commerce between the divine and 
created. His presentations of the sympathy between the Son 
and the created, effortless or otherwise, are mere recog­
nitions or tokens of the vestigial Immanence in the created. 
The response of such immanence to the Son's immanence bears 
witness of the Godhead of the Son. But the power resides in 
the source of all, God, and is shared in proportion to the 
degree of immanence in the object. Milton is later to make 
this idea more explicit. The Son is effective because of 
the immanence in Him. Implicitly such power and effective­
ness are available to all the sons of God through knowledge 
and virtue. Hence the implication of the Incarnate Christ 
as the pattern for the true poem.
II
Comus. written by request in 1634-, is the first of 
Milton's works devoted ostensibly to the theme of individual 
responsibility. Though the form and the occasion dictate 
certain choices, Milton's use of these clearly reflects his 
conscious attention to his personal program of excellence.
A masque for the Inauguration of the Earl of Bridgewater as 
President of Wales, Comus makes a statement on the limita­
tions of the individual posed by circumstances external to 
himself and the role of divinity or grace in the quest for 
perfection. The work is concerned with the theme of chastity, 
and through its treatment of the humanistic idea of
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self"-sufficiency juxtaposed with the biblical idea of grace, 
it ma^es a significant statement about the poet's progress 
in his plan to become the true poem.
On the surface level Comus presents the story of a 
journey of a Lady and her two brothers to Ludlow, there to 
greet their parents, the earl and the countess. In the wild 
wood, the Lady is separated from her brothers. Deceived 
through the cunning of a rustic swain in disguise (Comus), 
ghe is led to his palace. Being the son of Circe and Bacchus, 
Conius attempts to seduce her with his magical powers. Through 
her inner strength (chastity), she withstands all the wiles 
of her çaptor. Through the intercedence of the Attendant 
Spirit, the brothers invade Comus's domains, rout him and his 
band but find themselves unable to mobilize their sister, 
paralyzed by a magic spell cast upon her by Comus. To pro­
ceed to Ludlow the intervention of a superior force is 
needed, Sabrina, goddess of the Severn, performs the feat 
by the agency of water. They go on to Ludlow where they 
join their parents. 3^
The poem, by the conventions of its form, presents 
a variety of possibilities for use of the poetic imagina­
tion, not the least of which is the study of the use or mis­
use of nature as a key tp moral fitness. Comus, then, might 
be approached from this angle as another study on the theme 
of relationship and responsibility. Douglas Bush points to 
three spurees, among many othep possible ones, that can shed
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light on the ideas in the work. Homer, Ovid, and Spenser, 
notwithstanding its Christian-Platonic base, supply proto­
types for the encounter of heroic virtue and sensual tempta­
tion. Further devices used by Milton to convey his message 
s^ re the miraculous change in forms, the presentation of 
chastity as an active virtue rather than a passive condi­
tion. Such were, individually and corporally, the staple of 
the aforementioned p o e t s . T h e  interplay of the natural 
and supernatural worlds, the magic and counter-magic, shep­
herds and pastoral motifs are likewise the staple commodity 
of the masque tradition. However, the form as such concerns 
us here but incidentally. Primarily, the message behind the 
form, the universels are our Interest.
Many critics have had much to say— each with some 
truth perhaps— about Comus. its meaning or lack of it. D.C. 
Allen considers Comus a failure because Milton's "artistic 
emphasis" does not coincide with his intended "moral empha­
sis." More specifically, Milton fails "to establish a true 
intellectual conflict between Comus and the Lady" and ef­
fects an unbelievable "forest-change in the Lady" and brings 
her off with a tour de force as much as a true moral vic­
t o r y , R . M .  Adams countered by placing the matter in per­
spective. So long as Comus can be read satisfyingly on the 
level of a public performance, reasons Adams, any metaphys­
ical interpretation of its contents should be held suspect
16and kept subordinate. But this response strikes a blow
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without answering the question. Denis Saurat finds little 
that is Christian in C o m u s . if the virtue assayed in this 
poem is discussed against a pagan background, such a fact 
dpes not necessarily render it non-Christian. Such an ob­
servation overlooks the conventions of the genre and the 
poet's own admonition about such forms "where more is meant 
than meets the ear" ("II Penseroso," I, 120). I think 
Milton is here testing pagan doctrine in light of Christian 
revelation and that his conclusions are, contrary to Saurat, 
quite Christian.
A,S.P. Woodhouse has probably set forth the most 
meaningful answer to all such critics. Woodhouse sees the 
poem as an organic whole and its message as Christian, but 
he does not deal specifically with the debate. He sees the 
focus of the masque to be the insufficiency of virtue with­
out grace. Rosemund Tuve handles the question of form and 
meaning. "Masques," she says, "are inescapably symbolical. 
The peculiar relation borne by the work of art to real hap­
penings and meanings— symbolized, rather than described, or 
dramatically viewed— is borne by the action itself." Thus 
it not only represents but presents a basic truth by "the 
central figure as a 'hinge' upon which the whole invention 
moved, and the constantly double reference to two equally 
but differently real w o r l d s . T h u s  the work requires a 
basic knowledge of the form and levels of meaning to per­
ceive its full inypact. Miss Tuve is able to find such unity
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of form ar%d theme in the literal and figurative meanings of 
the word chastity; "the chaste principle in man's total na­
ture unseducible by that which would alienate it from its 
celestial original, tempting to substitute idolatries for 
the love of God."^^ Woodhouse also seems to be correct in 
hi? analysis when he places the climax of the poem, not at 
the point of Comus's displacement, but at the point of the 
restoration of action for the Lady occasioned by the inter­
vention of grace (Sabrina).^0 Such does no discredit to the 
Lady's virtue— it is still inviolate, signifying her fitness. 
Such does no discredit to the "agent of God's providence in 
the natural o r d e r , t h e  Attendant Spirit--it is the faith­
ful guide to the means of heavenly grace. But only grace 
liberates. Both of the above readings are, I feel, ap­
posite; but I think some more light can be shed on the 
issues Allen raised.
I suggest that the poem can also be seen as a study 
of contrasts aimed at testing virtue and the revelation of 
its insufficiency and need for a higher power, God. As such 
it is a further examination of the relationship-responsibility 
motif which I find the basic element in Milton's quest for 
perfection. Having already noted the poet's concern for the 
relationship of all in God in "The Hymn on the Morning of 
Christ's Nativity," I now point tp Milton's study of the use 
of nature as a key to man's relationship and responsibility 
to God.
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Postulating a common primal source, Milton sees all 
things as proceeding from God and dependent on him. At the 
same time all created things are related to each other. Any 
relationship among created things is good if it furthers 
man' 9 relationship with God and nature's through man. Since 
man is given dominion over things, the lower things are to 
he used by him as tools by which he ascends to God, as Milton 
will later state more explicitly in Paradise Lost. Such a 
use is good. To pervert the use of nature to selfish ends 
is evil. Because the world contains both good and evil 
forces at work, virtue in the postlapsarian man consists 
not in withdrawing from the world, but in sallying forth, 
meeting the tests, and if fit, triumphing spiritually over 
evil through his own inner moral defense and, ultimately, 
through divine intervention. Only in this way can there be 
true love of virtue and freedom of the virtuous. A look at 
some salient examples from the poem will serve to test these 
hypotheses.
Milton affirms his doctrine of fitness not by one's
ability to remain safe from harm but by the desire and
ability of the individual to keep his soul incorruptible.
Such a state insures his connection with God and its effect,
virtue. Hence in the thematic passage of the poem, the
relationship-responsibility motif is set forth:
Love vertue, she alone is free 
She can teach you how to clime,
Higher than the Spheary Chime
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Or if vertue feeble were,
Heav’n it self would stoop to her.
(I, 1018-22)
s responsibility is to seek virtue by a conscious ac­
ceptance of his relationship to his source. By knowledge 
and action he effects his ascent up the ladder of perfection, 
not necessarily by performance but by fitness. God inter­
venes with His grace at need. Milton is later to return to 
this idea in his concept of the law of nature.
In Comus. one of the requisites for the virtuous 
life is to know the right relationship between man and na­
ture and of both to God. That what is natural is good is 
the underlying premise of the argument between the Lady and 
Comus. From the Platonists to the Hobbesians, this question 
was debated during the seventeenth century in social, re­
ligious and political circles. Milton doubtless was echoing 
some of the current notions and fallacies in the debate in 
Comus. According to his monistic position, Milton held na­
ture to be good in itself when -it is ordered by right reason, 
or evil according to the grossness of the one who orders it, 
as we recall from the discussion of his philosophical pre­
suppositions. The right use of nature is as an instrument 
of God's glory in furtherance of the relationship with Him. 
Such a use, then, to Milton as to the Lady in Comus is good 
and therefore natural. Comus, on the other hand, regards 
that as natural which serves his selfish ends.
The fundamental dichotomy between the right use and
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wrong use of nature is posed at the outset. The wild wood 
could indeed be a fit place for contemplation. But it could 
also be a workshop for evil forces, as it is here and again 
in Paradise Regain'd. But for those who aspire to "lay 
their just hands on that Golden Key/ That ope's the Palace 
of Eternity," little ill can ultimately befall them (I, 
12^ 14).
Nature is seen according to the mental or moral state 
of the beholder, and so is it used. Bacchus misused wine. 
Comus, like his mother before him, misuses nature. His use 
of magic for evil purposes-rto disguise his true nature, to 
change the human countenance from the "express resemblance 
of the gods" to "some brutish form," and his general ex­
ploitation of nature's bounty in riotous living (I, 16$ff., 
68-69, 58-70) all show Comus to be of the Devil's company.
The Lady, on the other'hand, sees the woods as "kind and 
hospitable" (I, 186). This, of course, is ironical in view 
of the evil forces present. Instead of seeing daylight sin­
ful as does Comus (I, 126), she sees the night as "thievish" 
(I, 19^) because it prevents their use of natural light to 
show her the way. But her complaint against nature is 
natural in that she desires its use to help her gain a 
legitimate end. Unlike her, Comus prefers night because it 
better hides his evil activities.
Nevertheless, the Lady's relationship with the divine 
is such that she can rely on her inner strength and upon
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■ultlmq.te triumph over any evil forces in the cosmos. Such
faith is confirmed hy the response which she experiences,
signifying sympathy between the Lady and "the Supreme good" 
(I, 204-216). "New enlivened spirits" manifest themselves 
in her (I, 227), So sweet is the song she sings that even 
Comus is moved by it. Such "divine enchanting ravishment" 
makes him realize that
Sure something holy lodges in that brest,
And with these raptures moves the vocal
air
To testifie his hidden residence.
(I, 245-247)
This power indeed has its ultimate source in the supreme 
good, which on the symbolical level, is God. The sympa­
thetic bond of nature is credited by the fact that Comus, 
though he wills not to accept the good that the Lady em­
braces, can experience its effect.
Further testimony of the sympathetic effect is seen 
in Milton's use of music, the charms of vhich the poet fully 
appreciated. The effects of music too can be used for good 
or evil ends, but even Comus recognizes the superiority of 
that used for good. The Sirens, in their skillful though 
evil use of music, set off a striking chain of effects.
While "culling their potent hearbs and balefull drugs," their 
songs would take the "prison'd soul/ And lap it in Elysium, 
Scylla wept/ And chid her barking waves into attention/ And 
fell Charybis murmur'd soft applause" (I, 252-258). Their 
song, though still potent and charming, was an abuse of
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nature, a perversion of the good. It "lull’d the sense,/
And in sweet raadnes robh’d it of it self" (I, 259-260). 
Sympathy, then, can function for good or ill according to the 
will that orders it. So the Lady uses her talent for good 
and the effect is more potent, even on the arch-perverter. 
Never had he heard such a "sacred and homefelt delight" (I, 
261). But because of his inner condition Comus, like Satan 
upon his approach to Eve in Eden, is charmed but not changed. 
He proceeds on his evil purpose.
Meanwhile back in the woods, the brothers philoso­
phize on the relations of externals to internals. Nature 
seems to share in the human condition. The stars shed their 
influence (I. 335) but the beneficence of such influence is 
hampered by "usurping mists." In short, all occasions in-L 
form against them; but they comfort themselves with divine 
philosophy. Such discourse serves as a solace for the 
Second Brother's premonitions of his sister's fate: perhaps 
she has. fallen victim to either "savage heat or savage 
hunger" (I, 358). The discourse also serves as a philo­
sophical background for one side of the dialectics to be 
presented in the climactic scenes of the masque. The sub­
stance of the message is Platonic, but it is also a sort of 
type of the real Christian chastity or charity. Essentially 
this virtue is the precondition of the prevenient grace. It 
is a further indication of Milton's belief that fitness for 
performance rather than mere performance is the actual key
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to virtue. Thus:
Vertue may he assail'd but never hurt,
Supriz'd by unjust force, but not
enthrall'd,
Yea even that which mischief meant most
harm.
Shall in the happy trial prove most glory.
(I, 588-591)
Thus chastity is good in itself, but incomplete. Grace is
needed as its complement to insure ultimate victory. Evil
is a part of the human condition for the postlapsarian man,
and since it cannot be avoided, the virtuous can depend upon
grace for the added power with which to defeat it.
But evil on itself shall back recoyl.
And mix no more with goodness when at
last
Gather’d like scum and settl'd to itself 
It shall be in eternal restless change 
Self-fed, and self-consumed.
(I, 592-597)
Such is an expression of the Elder Brother’s faith in a 
moral universe. It likewise is the poet’s own, and he will 
express this idea in many ways throughout his works. It is 
at the heart of his justification of the ways of God to men.
Comus does indeed assail the Lady with his perverted 
sense of things, his "rhetoric.” Clearly he, like Hobbes 
and the Renaissance naturalists, on the one hand, had ar­
rived from the same premise at a strikingly different con­
clusion from that of the Lady, Milton, the Cambridge Pla­
tonists and the Latitudinarians on the other. They all 
agreed that what is natural is good. But the rub comes when 
the word natural is defined. Both Hecate and Diana were
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votaries of the moon, but the former because it aided her 
witchcraft and the latter, her chastity. So both Comus and 
the Lady appeal to the same nature. Where he exploits it for 
selfish gain, she would direct its sober use to the glory of 
God.
Such exploitation has already been seen in Comus's 
use of magic for evil purposes. But the Attendant Spirit 
later counters his magic for the good of the human condition. 
Magic was held in higher esteem in Milton's day than it is in 
ours. Many of the leading scientists— Brahe and Kepler, for 
example-^ecclesiastics, and politicians sanctioned the use 
of magic for legitimate p u r p o s e s .22 Milton here, notwith­
standing the fact that magic is one of the staples of the 
mask form, seems to be in the current tradition because of 
the importance magic serves to the plot. However it is a 
part of the contrasts developed in Comus. It, like all of 
the other activities and ideas which Comus or the Lady af­
firm, is postulated on the common bond of nature, a Creator- 
creature relationship. The difference lies in the use or 
abuse of this relationship as it derives from a conscious 
will. This is what the Lady meant in her reply to Comus:
None
But such as are good men can give good things.
And that which is not good, is not delicious 
To a well-govern'd and wise appetite.
(I, 702-70H-)
One may compare this later with the Son's response to the 
Devil's proffered banquet in Paradise Regain'd. Jesus
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promises to eat "thereafter as I like the giver" (II, 322), 
To justify his Sybaritism, Comus resorts to the 
theory of nature’s plenitude, a further indication of his 
ability to pervert. He attempts to shift his own responsi­
bility to nature: "Wherefore did Nature powre her bounties
forth" but that they should be enjoyed else we "live like 
Nature's bastards, not her sons." Besides, Comus suggests, 
we do nature a favor when we greedily use her goods, for she 
would become otherwise overweighted and "strangl’d with her 
own fertility" (I, 7P9 728 ). So he moves on to his al­
ready purposed end with a classical non seauitur:
List Lady, be not coy, and not be cozen’d 
With that same vaunted name Virginity,
Beauty is Nature’s coyn, must not be
hoarded.
But must be currant, and the good thereof 
Consists in mutual and partak’n bliss 
Unsavoury in th’ enjoyment of it self.
( X, 736-7^1 )
Comus begins from a fair premise: nature is for man’s use.
But he fails to make distinctions germane to the issue.
The use must further man’s relationship with God. Good use 
does not consist in furthering purely selfish ends. Comus 
leaps from a consideration of external nature, the common 
property of all, to apply the same criteria to a personal 
possession. The same rules do not hold. Furthermore he 
argues for mutual bliss without considering the Lady's 
wishes. So the Lady is unimpressed by his "logic"; for she 
knows that the principle of good consists in the exercise 
of reason, that faculty implanted in all men by which they
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come to know and understand God's will. This reason directs 
the will and its consequent action affects nature for good 
or ill. So the Lady tells Comus to blame not "innocent na­
ture" for his sensuality (I, 761).
The principles that the Lady expounds in her debate 
with Comus follow the pattern of life she has represented 
throughout and do not, as Allen contends, represent any 
drastic "forest-change" in her. The test of all good for 
her is whether the act furthers man's relationship with God. 
She defeats Comus on these grounds. Temperance in chastity 
becomes not a question of abstinence or moderation; con­
versely, it is whether the action furthers man's ties with 
God and uses rightly that entrusted to one's charge. As de­
fined by Miss Tuve in the above cited reference, chastity is 
more inclusive than our modern term virginity. It includes 
all that unseducible part of man's nature that rejects any­
thing that would alienate him from his celestial origin.
Thus the Lady does not by her rejection of Comus's proposi­
tion reject marital love. Her conduct reflects no "forest- 
change," as Allen says. Any other conduct would have been 
out of character.
Since Comus is a selfish materialist, Milton does 
not have the Lady lecture on abstractions at this point. 
Doubtless, they would leave him cold. So she does not un­
fold "the sage and serious doctrine of virginity" to him, 
seeing him "not fit to hear himself convinc't" (I, 785-.
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91). But the Lady has no doubt of the weight of her case
and its relationship to the general principles underlying
the universe in God;
The uncontrolled worth 
Of this pure cause would kindle my rapt
spirits
To such a flame of sacred vehemence,
That dumb things would be mov'd to sym­
pathize,
And the brute Earth would lend her nerves
and shake.
Till all thy magick structures rear'd so
high.
Were shatter'd into heaps o're thy false
head.
(I, 792-798)
This is not a tour de force in the frame of the total masque.
Rather it is an affirmation of the moral base of the story.
Comus's reaction bears this out. So poignant are the Lady's
words that even he feels the force of "som superior power"
behind them— a recognition of the active sympathy informing
a mind in tune with God. He goes on to make this explicit
by detailing the occult effect upon him:
And though not mortal, yet a cold shuddring
  dew
Dips me all o're, as when the wrath of 
Jove
Speaks thunder.
(I, 801-803)
But this effect likewise is external, so he again attempts 
to explain virtue as an externally oriented quality rather 
than an inner condition. Looking at it in deterministic or 
naturalistic terms, he places its cause in melancholy blood, 
not in the conscious will. Nevertheless, the Lady main­
tains her chaste mind and thereby renders herself fit.
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Throughout, her test of what is natural or good has been 
whether it furthers her relationship to God. This resolve 
on her part, as Milton saw it, merits the aid she now re­
ceives .
Through the guidance of the Attendant Spirit, 
Thyrsis, the brothers are led to the Lady's rescue. They 
rout the enemies but cannot mobilize her. W.G. Madsen 
therefore interprets the symbolic meaning of the Attendant 
Spirit's role as being "the higher potentialities of human 
nature, as Comus represents the l o w e r . H e  seems to be on 
firm ground. Thyrsis does guard the good through diligence 
and vigilance, not omniscience. Thus he is not superhuman, 
but highest human: he has more insight and can extract from 
nature its highest uses for human need. An example of this 
is the haemony he supplied the brothers as an antidote to 
Comus's diabolical use of nature to frustrate human need.
His clearer insight is also seen in the recognition of what 
is proper and fit for a particular occasion. Thus he could 
recommend haemony as the weapon to use in the struggle 
against Comus. A supernatural battle requires supernatural 
armament.
Much intellectual energy has been spent on the 
elucidation of the root "of divine effect" (I, 629) which 
the Attendant Spirit calls haemony. Most, so far as I have 
been able to determine, accept temperance as its figurative 
meaning. But I think there is njuch to recommend Adams's
103
pi+hint that it may be a pun on the word harmony. However, a
study of the etymology reveals that the two terms are not 
exclusive. Spitzer holds that temperance means "a har­
monious state of the mind," or tunedness of the soul in its 
derivative sense. His further meaning of the word is an 
even closer indication that at least connotatively, temper­
ance and harmony can be used interchangeably: temperance is 
a state in which "all the senses converge in one harmonious 
f e e l i n g ."25 Certainly the harmonious working of reason and 
passion is needed at the point at which Thyrsis introduces 
the haemony. Indeed harmony, in the Miltonic sense of "un­
corrupted nature," does not grow to its full potential "in 
this soyl" (I, 6 3 1), but it does in the world of the final 
union of all in God. A man by keeping all of his senses in 
proper balance may come to get some perception of this 
heavenly harmony, as indicated in the Ode, but he cannot 
know it in its fullness.
But fitness makes one more able to receive God's 
grace, not to dispense with it. Thus the Lady is delivered 
by one who is generally considered the agent of God's grace 
in the poem, the "pure" Sabrina (I, 825). Purity is the 
necessary quality of a redemptive agent, just as Milton held 
it to be for the great poet. With this act a sense of 
rightness is restored and virtue rewarded. Rescue, however,
.does not preclude further vigilance and diligence in the 
pursuit of knowledge for the cultivation of virtue. This is
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evident in the Attendant Spirit's final words:
Let us fly this cursed place,
Lest the Sorcerer us entice 
With som new device.
(I, 938-940)
Such will be necessary until they "com to holier ground;" 
and they will also need a guide (I, 942-943). Meanwhile the 
rhythm of the universal heart-throb (to borrow Hawthorne's 
phrase) is restored. The "Stars grow high" to reflect na­
ture's sympathy with the affairs of man just as they had 
been hidden by mists when man's affairs were awry. But 
night sits monarch yet in the mid sky (I, 956-957)» sig­
nifying the fluctuations of light and darkness attendant 
with the human condition. Man can see but through a glass 
darkly. Only at the "father's residence" is there perfect 
illumination (I, 946)..
Thus Comus deals with the question of individual 
fitness. Such fitness is gained through a regimen of ex­
perience by which the individual learns to recognize the 
right relationship between himself and his Creator and the 
right use of that which is entrusted to his care. True fit­
ness consists in an active pursuit of the good from among 
the evil. It is an inner condition deriving from a con­
scious relationship with the Creator. This relationship is 
developed by knowledge, contemplation, experience, and reve­
lation. The right relationship, then, requires of the in­
dividual chastity, inner sanctity, not performance for that
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can be curtailed by externalities. But nothing can harm the 
sanctity of one's mind against his will. The true poem must 
possess chastity, a sound Creator-creature relationship, and 
reason to know right from wrong to guide the will in its 
choices. But it is not by this made self-sufficient; it 
must have grace to insure its ultimate triumph over evil. 
This I believe is the message Comus has for Milton's study 
on relationship and responsibility in his quest to be the 
true poem,
III
Milton continues to unfold his vision of perfection, 
and once again he is called upon to write before he is ready 
to write the great poem. And once more, the poet by his 
study of the secular and theological assumptions of the doc­
trine of sympathy, arrives at a convincing statement on the 
interrelationship of things and the responsibility inherent 
therein. The occasion is the death of Camus's "dearest 
pledge," Edward King. Lvcidas is Milton's contribution to 
the group of elegies written for this occasion. As Hanford 
has well stated, this poem "bears its meaning plainly enough 
on its face, and there has been little room for disagreement 
regarding its larger features; [but there are] a few famous 
cruxes in particular p a s s a g e s . T h e s e  famous cruxes have 
stimulated much critical activity; yet few fail to conclude 
with Mark Pattison that Lvcidas "is the highwater mark of 
English poetry."^? I concur in Pattison's judgment.
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We need not here cross all these crowded ways of 
Lvcidas commentary, but some must be noted. At least one 
early critic engages us for his astute observation on the 
subject of the poem. Legouis remarks : "Ce n'est pas King
qu'il faut y chercher, c'est Milton lui-m&me."^^ Such a 
notice is significant and certainly goes far towards opening 
up new levels of meaning for the poem; but it does not go 
far enough. It lacks precision in that it fails to say 
exactly how Milton is the subject of a poem ostensibly about 
King. B.C. Allen attempts to meet this need in his analysis 
of the poem by saying that "Lvcidas moves as a pendulum be­
tween the universal and the particular, between the special 
lesson of the inner Milton and the cosmic principle drawn 
therefrom that each man is part of the human e s t a t e . T h i s  
I think is correct. But Allen goes on to say that "the sub­
ject of the poem is seldom Edward King, and his death is not 
the real occasion of the poem."3® This, I feel, is an over­
statement; and Allen, like Legouis, fails to explain the 
basis of his observation. I suggest that there is identi­
fication of the poet with his subject; but there is also the 
identification of both with mankind and with the source be­
hind them. Thus I see this poem as a study on the sympa­
thetic bonds of nature; and viewed as such. King is the sub­
ject and his death is the occasion.
Milton's role in the poem, then, is seen not as a 
thinly veiled persona for an Aüsdruck of Hobbesian self-love
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nor for a prayer of gratitude that "there but for the grace 
of God go I." Rather it is viewed as a manifestation of the 
sympathetic bond of nature like that which Donne expresses 
so well in his "Meditation XVII": "Any man's death di­
minishes me, for I am involved in m a n k i n d . I  suggest 
that this identification evolves from the individual or par­
ticular to humanitas. identification with mankind in gen­
eral, to an identification with the cosmos and finally, with 
the divine source behind them. Such a consideration de­
rives from the fact of King's death and evolves to the fact 
of death itself, its causes and final remedy, to the uni­
versal principle behind all.
The essential quesiion posed by Lvcidas. apropos of 
this paper, is individual responsibility in a world of 
mutable relationships. Through the juxtaposition of the 
natural and unnatural, Milton moves from the natural and the 
unnatural to the supernatural. To ply one's trade, to be 
diligent in the pursuit of knowledge and virtue is natural. 
But is it natural to be cut off by premature death or 
worldly corruption short of fruition? Such a question leads 
the poet to a reflection on the interrelationship of man to 
man, of man to nature, and of all to God.
King's death is the pivotal event. Douglas Bush 
feels that there is no reason to assume a "close connection" 
between King and Milton.3^ But they did know each other. 
They were similar beings with similar aspirations. As such
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it was Milton’s duty to sing for King as others should do 
for Milton upon the poet’s own death. Implicitly stating 
their bond, the poet enumerates their points of identity. 
They shared like goals: both aspired for service to their 
Maker as poet and/or priest; like talents: both could sing 
(write poetry); like occupations: both, according to the 
convention, were shepherds (in reality, Cambridge students).
For we were nurst upon that selfsame
hill.
Fed the same flock; by fountain, shade
and rill.
(I, 23-240
Both led chaste lives. The identification therewith ceases 
as a fact, but not as a principle. Lycidas is dead; he is 
alive. And (no doubt Milton thinks) so is death alive.
Contemplation on the fact of King’s death leads the 
poet by way of the elegiac tradition to a contemplation on 
nature. But he goes further than the tradition. From the 
study of nature’s relationship to man, the poet moves to 
first causes and to an affirmation of the moral order in the 
universe. The poet’s movement from identification of man 
with man to identification of man with the cosmos raises the 
question of relationship and responsibility both to mourn and 
to question the cause for mourning— death. Since nature and 
man are involved in King’s death, they both grieve. The 
contemplation of death as a universal fact of life leads to 
identification with humanitas. for death is a universal re­
ality. Lycidas. then, becomes' a commemoration of the common
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lot of both the all in King and of the King in all. But 
this only states the common lot, it does not explain it. 
Final explanations lie in the realm of transcendence. In 
this way, the contemplation on the meaning of death leads to 
significant insight on relationship and responsibility as 
the universal principle.
To illustrate further the function of the idea of 
sympathy in Milton's treatment of his subject, I adduce by 
way of contrast the poet's other famous elegy, "Epitaphium 
Damonis." This poem was written to mourn the death of a 
bosom friend, Diodati. Here the poem is not universal, but 
personal. I suggest that the nature of Milton's relation­
ship with the two men dictated the difference in treatment. 
With King there was identification; with Diodati, fellow- 
feeling. Scheler points out the essential differences. 
"Identification (1) takes place below the level of waking 
consciousness (2) is automatic (involuntary) in operation 
(3) is confined to the sphere of vital consciousness, in 
subject and object alike. . . In fellow-feeling, the
subject has a reality of his own though he is united by a 
bond of mutual feeling. "It springs," says Scheler,
"rather from the freedom of personality as against the sway 
of impulse in g e n e r a l . T h e  two beings are kindred souls, 
not an emotional identity. Since the first is a qualita­
tive extension of the latter, they differ in degree but not 
essentially in kind. "The moral principle of the Identity
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of Being imposes a common ethical obligation"; love or very 
close fellow-feeling, "is unaware of the universal nature of 
the obligation [except in] a particularized s e n s e . T h u s  
King, an acquaintance, is elegized in a universal manner ; 
but Diodati, a bosom friend, is mourned in a more particu­
larized manner.
The same elegiac conventions are employed in 
"Epitaphium" as in Lycidas. But the selection of details 
attests a closer bond, not just a common lot. Their ex­
perience was a mutuality, perhaps unique for the two of 
them. There is no universal obligation to mourn for him, 
but there is a very real personal one. Contemplation on 
nature, again, leads him to a sense of a corresponding re­
ality about man.
How unlike the bullocks that frolic over the meadow!
Of one heart are they, one with another, by the law's 
decree, close comrades all. No one of them sets apart 
from the herd or this or that as his [peculiar] 
friend. (I, 122-125)
Bullocks, asses, wolves, in general, the lower animals have 
an instinctual awareness of their bond and do not exercise a 
conscious will to set up artificial walls or preferences 
among their kind as man does. They are all mutually com­
panions together.36
But the "law of the deep is the self-same law." The 
sea-calves and the birds all react to the bond of sympathy, 
and have neither the need nor the ability for conscious 
valuation. Such creatures, likewise, do not suffer, as does
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man, when a companion dies. Each of them straightway "seeks 
another to be his comrade" (I, 128-138). Human beings, 
having a conscious will, are different. Mortals "are har­
ried by accursed fates, alien to one another in soul, and 
discordant in spirit" (I, 137-39). It was nevertheless his 
will which caused the first discord; for this antipathy is a 
result of the Fall, as the poet sees it. But the will in 
postlapsarian man at its best is volitional and valuative: 
"hardJ^ does a man find out of a thousand one— only one—  
that matches himself" (I, 139-1*+0). Thus though all are re­
lated by the bond of sympathy, some are by nature more 
closely related than others because they have greater simil­
itude.
The idea of greater sympathy based on greater simil­
itude has been expressed in many ways, but Milton here al­
ludes, I think, to the notion of the twin-soul. Harking 
back at least as far as antiquity, Plato's myth of Androgyne 
is perhaps the most famous Western rendering. According to 
this myth. Androgyne, the original being, was split in half 
by Zeus. Thus the idea of the self-other-self motif. 
Egyptian lore also had earlier contained the myth that man­
kind was originally of both sexes united and afterwards di­
vided into male and female.37 So the idea became pervasive 
in treatises on friendship that to find a true friend is to 
find one's other half, that being closest to one in unity 
of mind and spirit. The two become one soul in two
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bodies.38 "Such a friendship Is durable and Is based on 
virtue and reason, not on passing accidents."39 "Real 
friendship, then, derives from nature, the inclinations of 
the soul joined with love— rather than from a sense of 
utility.Milton's Idea of quality-quantity In friend­
ships, as stated in line 1^0 Is similar. The quality of 
friendship Is In Inverse proportion to the quantity;
"hardly one In a thousand." This Is the highest compliment 
to their mutual bond.
Damon too performs a role somewhat like that of the 
guardian spirit, as does Lycidas. He Is skilled In healing 
potions, and the arts of healing--but he could not heal him­
self (I, 192-198). Milton here examines much of the magical 
lore postulated on the sympathetic bond of nature. The Idea 
of sympathetic cures, occult affinities and effects are all 
cases In point. But again these elementarlstlc manifesta­
tions of sympathy point to a larger meaning, the higher power 
behind all. Such a reflection leads Milton to consider the 
responsibility Incumbent upon his poetic gifts. And the re­
turn to Damon In the skies at the nuptial feast "amid the 
souls of heroes, and amid the gods that live for ever . . . 
quaffing eternal draughts . . . drinking joys with holy 
lips" Is the poet's consolation (I, 264—266). He Is further 
comforted by the hope of a new and higher relationship with 
his beloved friend: he requests Damon's tutelary presence 
with him on earth (I, 267-273). The consolation too, then.
113
is personal.
So "Epitaphium" is a poem about a personal grief oc­
casioned by a personal loss. The grief is not universalized 
though it is placed in a universal frame. The difference 
then in the treatment of these two elegies lies in the dif­
ference of the poet's relationship to the subjects. But the 
subject of Lvcidas is Edward King, "a learned friend" (I, 
p. 76), just as the subject of "Epitaphium" is Charles 
Diodati, a friend, "as close as e'er men were" (I, p. 2 9 k )  
And the occasion of Lycidas is the death of King. A few 
examples from the poem will serve to illustrate these facts.
The poet passes from identification of man with man 
to a study of nature's relationship with man. Is nature be­
nign, hostile, or indifferent? Perhaps it is benign if it 
mourns for Lycidas:
Thee the Woods, and desert Caves,
With wilde Thyme and the gadding Vine
o'regrown.
And all their echoes mourn.
(I, 37-44)
The "Willows, and the Hazel Copses green" can no longer fan 
their "joyous Leaves" to Lycidas' "soft layes" (I, 43-45).
But why should nature mourn if nature had failed to protect 
the head of Lycidas (I, 50-55)? As Allen observes, Milton's 
choice of imagery in the preceding lines hints a kind of per­
versity in nature: "the thyme is wild, the vine gadding and 
o'ergrown, the top of Mona is shaggy. Living color is al­
most w a n t i n g . I n  addition to these natural excesses.
1l4-
the poet muses on unseasonability in things: "the white
1x0
thorn blooms unseasonably." And the, poet imagines a fur­
ther randomness in nature's action instead of that according 
to the order and harmony that nature is supposed to exem­
plify: the canker in the rose, a taint-worm among the herds, 
and the killing frost on the flowers. So the poet, of 
course, relates these ideas to the occasion of his grief. 
Lycidas' death ere his prime is as unseasonable, as un­
natural as the randomness in nature.
The fact that nature mourns but did not prevent the 
young man's death is a fact that gives the poet some pause. 
He recalls the archetypal poet "whom universal nature did 
lament" (I, 60). To expect the nymphs to save Lycidas when 
in reality they did not save Orpheus is to foolishly dream, 
to dignify myth with validity. As the myth goes, the Muses 
protect their sons; but the muse. Calliope, that bore 
Orpheus, could not prevent his horrid death (I, 55-63). The 
poet here seems to bring the entire mythological tradition 
to a severe examination in this note: the beautiful rela­
tionship between nature and man which the myths depict, per­
haps, was never really true— only imaginative efforts to 
explain the nature of existence. This, then, prepares the 
way for the higher flight of the poet's song.
Of greater concern for the present is the poet's 
fear that the muse is thankless. If so, why "scorn delights 
and live laborious dayes?" And the answer takes the poet
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beyond the realm of the here and now: "Fame . . . (That last
Infirmity of Noble mind)" is the incentive (I, 70-71)» Hume 
was later to make a statement connecting the desire for fame 
with sympathy that is instructive here: "he finds one of its 
causes in the opinions of others, whose influence upon us is 
due to 'that propensity we have to sympathize with others, 
and to receive by communication their inclinations and senti­
ments, however different from, or contrary to, our own.'
This is no doubt true of Milton's desire for worldly fame.
But the poet here transcends the mundane level to a meaning 
of real fame. For how can one hope for fame in a world of 
chance if when hopes are highest and perhaps nearest fru­
ition, "Comes the blind Fury with th' abhorred shears,/ And 
slits the thin spun life" (I, 75-76)? Who knows but that 
early death might negate all worthy efforts? This is a 
chilling reflection to the young ambitious mind. Only a 
contemplation of fame which rewards fitness and not per­
formance is the answer. Such is heavenly fame:
Fame is no plant that grows on mortal
soil
But lives and spreds aloft by those
pure eyes.
And perfet witnes of all- judging Jove;
As he pronounces lastly on each deed.
Of so much fame in Heav'n expect thy
meed.
(I, 78, 8l-8>+)
So Milton strikes the higher note in his song. Like the 
harmonious blending of the waters of the fountain Arethuse 
and the river Alpheus, the poet thus unites the concerns of
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heaven and earth.
The poet again turns-to a contemplation of nature to
probe her possibly hostile role in human affairs. He moves
from the particular, Lycidas, to the general, humanitas.
He ask'd the Waves, and ask'd the fellon
Winds,
What hard mishap hath doom'd this gentle
swain?
And question'd ev'ry gust of rugged wings 
That blows from off each beaked
Promontory 
They knew not of his story.
(I, 91-940
Possibly nature is indifferent. For as Hippotades says:
"The Air was calm"; and nature in general was peaceful on the 
day Lycidas was drowned (I, 95-99). As nature is apparently 
inculpable in the death of Lycidas, or at least it speaks a 
varied language, Milton turns to man to explain human af­
flictions .
The general human condition itself, theology teaches, 
is a result of the Original Sin. Since concomitant results 
of this sin were reflected throughout the universal frame, 
it follows that if man suffers from adverse effects of na­
ture, he himself is ultimately to blame since he committed 
the initial act which broke primal unity. So the poet re­
treats by way of the riddle of cause and effect in nature :
It was that fatal and perfidious Bark 
Built in th' eclipse, and rigg'd with
curses dark 
That sunk so low that sacred head of
thine.
(I, 100-102)
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In these lines the poet goes everywhere and no where at the 
same time. If astral influence, or natural forces can de­
termine an action or its outcome exterior to and superior to 
the victim, then are the laws of the universe just? But the 
gnawing question remains : Can man blame others for what he
set out of order? Yet because man’s head is sacred, there 
is indication of his connection with the divine. Such merits 
the concern of the Creator; but it also places into His 
hands the responsibility for ultimate control of the uni­
verse. A sense of order is experienced when man considers 
his limited vision and hence his limited understanding. He 
affirms his faith in a higher being and in a higher order. - 
than that which he now experiences.
The poet then turns again to his grief in the pro­
cession of mourners; for not only he grieves, but there is a 
common bond of grief for Lycidas. The mourners once more 
set into bold relief the interrelationship of the divine, 
human, and cosmic spheres. The grief which each articulates 
is indicative of his place in the scheme of things. Camus, 
representing the academic community, is limited in his vision 
of the ways of God and man. He mourns the death of his 
dearest pledge (I, 10 7). Perhaps there is a type of identi­
fication of pledge and professor. This would then compound 
the .grief for it represents the frustration of Camus or the 
academic community to fulfill itself in the youth of promise. 
This movement, then, continues to develop the theme of
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brokenness in the world which marr^set into action by his 
primal disobedience.
But having so lived, Lycidas belongs not only to 
this world but to the other one as well. The "Pilot of the 
Galilean lake" speaks for the divine realms. He introduces 
the consideration of a higher will and a higher order into 
which this event must be placed. True Lycidas could have 
been spared. True a good man is taken while many evil ones 
remain and flourish. But the fact that the speaker holds 
two keys in his hands: ("The Golden opes, the Iron shuts
amain") is, as I see it, symbolic of the now limited pene­
tration of the human into the divine. But as the golden 
key opens, there is hope that at a certain time all mysteries 
involving the ways of God and man will be dispelled.
The answer to the Jobean riddle, why do the good 
suffer while the evil flourish, lies in the general plan of 
universal order. Comfort may be taken in the fact that at 
the appointed time all seeming disorder will be set in order. 
The brokenness— corrupt clergy and all of its attendant 
vices— will be finally repaired. But this is not to be yet:
That two-handed engine at the door.
Stands ready to smite once and smite no
more.
(I, 130-131)
Perhaps this is cold comfort to one of limited vision; but 
it affirms moral order in a moral universe. I object to 
Fraser’s conclusion relative to lines 130-131. He states 
that "Milton at least meant a topical and political
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allusion here; and I do not think that he was by temperament 
the sort of man who would wait patiently for the Day of 
Judgement for his enemies to get their d e s e r t s . T h i s  
reference to "that two-handed engine," I think, goes further 
than a topical or political allusion. As I interpret the 
phrase, it is an oracular expression of Milton’s perception 
of the divine-human correlative.
While I do not categorically disallow such topical 
and political allusions, I am unable to find one to which 
Milton could have attributed the power to "smite once and 
smite no more." Certainly, Milton was not one passively to 
bide his time in the face of evil (if this is what Fraser 
means by wait); but he was also aware of human limitations, 
in spite of conscious effort. Milton's deontology, as re­
vealed in his works thus far considered, insists that it is 
man’s obligation to try. The time perspective is also an 
important element in Milton's ethical system. Paradise 
Regain’d turns on the very axis of the right time for the 
virtuous action. The life of Christ, as exemplified in this 
poem and as related in the Bible and in exegetical tracts, 
is a study in the awareness of the fitting time, of 
kairos
I see the "two-handed engine at the door" as an 
implicit statement of the divine-human effort needed to 
ultimately defeat the evil occasioned by the Fall. God 
works through the fit individual: his relationship to God
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poses this responsibility. But human hands are limited in 
their ability to perform, as Milton had shown in Cornus.
Hence the need of divine assistance. Man must do what he 
can here and by this effort secure the grace of God through 
whose power evil will be finally smitten. Perhaps Christ, 
the highest embodiment of the divine-human correlative, is 
also symbolically that two-handed engine. Support for this 
view can be found in James 5:8-9 (RSV): "You also be pa­
tient. Establish your hearts, for the coming of the Lord is 
at hand. Do not grumble, brethren, against one another, 
that you may not be judged; behold, the Judge is standing at 
the doors." The passage in question, then, would seem to be 
prophetic in nature and informed by the notion of kairos.
Such an interpretation not only increases the verity of the 
statement, but also makes it positive rather than negative 
in its import.
The poet again returns to nature in quest for this 
order. Both the theme and the elegiac conventions demand it; 
for he is yet in the world with real griefs and real broken­
ness. The procession of the flowers is cut short by the 
poet's awareness that this "is false surmise" (I, 153). 
Lycidas does not lie in the hearse, but is now being washed 
far away by the weaves "under the whelming tide." Or per­
haps, he is at the "bottom of the monstrous world" (I, 
15^-158). Milton has here in this image conflated two 
ideas: the malevolence of the human world like that of the
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lower world are both caused by sin. In the former, the sin 
is by the apostate will; in the latter, the malevolence is 
by consequence of the initial apostasy— for man's first sin 
corrupted the original bond of amity which existed between 
himself and the creatures. Both worlds are monstrous, then, 
to the extent that they are of Satan's l e a g u e . T h u s  the 
poet sweeps from the consideration of nature's benignity, as 
represented by the flowers that mourned in procession, to 
nature's malevolence. But his portrayal is yet within the 
human framework. Thus he can find consolation for his mus- 
ings on the fate of Lycidas' body by pointing to the dol­
phins, who protect those whom the muses love (I, 16 )^.
This-prepares the way for the higher confirmation of hope.
The rhythm of nature again bears out the unity of 
existence. Just as the sun sinks and rises, the affairs of 
man ebb and flow, so, though Lycidas' body be "sunk beneath 
the watry floar" (I, 167),. he will be "mounted high.,/
Through the dear might of him who walked the waves" (I, .
171-172). Here the poet adduces the highest proof of rela­
tionship, as he had in the Nativity Ode, the Incarnation.
Not only is this proof of relationship it is also proof of 
the divine control of the universe. This also proves that 
death is not the end of all for Lycidas. He has hope in the 
"blest kingdoms meek of joy and love." For he is joined
In solemn troops, and sweet Societies 
That sing, and singing in their glory
move
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And wipe the tears for ever from his
eyes.
(I, 178-181)
From the world of brokenness Lycidas has gone to a world of 
perfect unity. There he performs a greater service than he 
could have on earth. Not to be the poet's personal tutelary 
spirit (as is Damonis) Lycidas is:
Genius of the shore,
In thy large recompense, and shalt be
good
To all that wander in that perilous
flood.
(I, 183-I8if)
So the relationship and responsibility theme is 
again the keynote in the poet's reflections on the nature of 
reality, Milton arrives at a satisfactory statement on the 
problem of death and its place in the scheme of things only 
through a conscious examination of the sympathetic bond of 
nature and its implications. To convey the idea, Milton 
uses the standard imagery of a chain of beings linked in a 
mutuality of existence. In Lycidas the chain idea is im­
plicit in the effects and affinities described. Likewise, 
the poet considers the identification of man with nature, of 
man with man, of man with mankind, and finally his identi­
fication with the divine. Always the relationship poses the 
responsibility, the rejection of which -sets at variance the 
natural order. Therein lies the cause of all man's misery, 
even death. The higher the nature the greater the responsi­
bility.
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Thus in the three poems, ''Hymn on the Morning of 
Christ's Nativity," Comus, and Lycidas, Milton examines 
aspects of the pattern for the good life and, as I see it, 
incorporates them into his program for the perfect poem.
The Ode. I have suggested, supplied his basic pattern in its 
presentation of the Incarnate Son as man in his highest po­
tential. Christ's coming seals the relationship between God 
and man and the bond of all creatures both to the Creator and 
to each other. Highest good lies in the conscious submission 
to His will. The Son as exemplar inspires Milton's quest for 
the highest merit; it is by following His example that all 
the sons of God ascend toward the divine and finally become 
reunited with Him.
Comus broadens the spiral of the Miltonic quest for 
excellence. The poet extols the virtue of chastity, inner 
sanctity; for it is a precondition of God's grace. The in­
dividual has the duty to maintain the purity of the temple 
of his mind. Meeting this responsibility does not render 
him, however, self-sufficient; it renders him worthy to re­
ceive divine assistance without which he could not ultimately 
triumph over the evils that he must encounter as a part of 
the human condition. The measure of fitness, then, is not 
performance, but one's active relationship with the divine. 
Such a relationship gives value to all other relationships.
Lycidas continues the spiralling ascent toward the 
good life. Merit' ahd the ability to perform are considered
12k
in relation to their susceptibility to chance and the muta­
bility of human existence. The poet emerges with an aware­
ness that man's view is limited. To fully understand the 
parts one must view them from the perspective of the whole 
order. This man cannot do in his time and place. Yet from 
his observations in the natural realm and by the proof of the 
Incarnation, he can know that all things are related and find 
their source and recompense in the immutable will of God.
Thus a man has only the responsibility to be fit; the con­
trol and final answers rest in the divine hand. These are 
indeed chilly altitudes (to borrow Legouis's phrase). Per­
haps they are too chilly for the atmosphere of a perfect 
poem. But these aspects do fit the perfect pattern, the 
example of the Christ. Milton, the young idealist, embraces 
them as part of his program to make of himself a perfect 
poem. But a poem is not its own excuse for being. The poet 
is soon to leave his ivory tower and come down into the 
fresh, though hot and thorny, fields of the real world.
CHAPTER IV
THE WORLD A POEM: TOWARDS
THE HOLY COMMUNITY
No man is an Island, entire of itself; every man is a 
piece of the continent, a part of the main. . . .  No 
man hath affliction enough that is not matured and 
ripened by it, and made fit for God by that affliction.
John Donne, "Meditation XVll"
The end of all learning is to repair the ruins of our 
first parents by regaining to know God aright, and out 
of that knowledge to love him, to imitate him, to be 
like him.
John Milton, "Of Education"
From the outset of his dedication of his life to a 
serious purpose, John Milton was a man with a cause. Indi­
cations of this impulse are evident in one of his academic 
exercises, "Prolusion 11." Here he declares that "even a 
single individual endowed with the gifts of Art and Wisdom, 
may often prove to be a great gift of God and sufficient to 
lead a whole state to righteousness.We have noted his 
diligent pursuit of knowledge and virtue. It would seem 
evident that Milton considered himself a "great gift of God" 
sufficient to lead his country to righteousness. His sense 
of mission,- then, broadens from the individual quest for 
perfection evident in the earlier works to that of a vision
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of perfection for his country as the holy community, and by 
growing disillusionment and depth of perception, to a vision 
of the world as the holy community.
Having consecrated himself as the "relater and in­
terpreter of the best and sagest things among his own citi­
zens" (CPW, I, 811-12), after due consideration Milton 
entered the hot and dusty arena of religious controversy: the 
question of moment in his country. Although he does not here 
discount influence abroad, he is content now with "the 
British Hands as [his] world" and the Puritan dilemma as his 
cause (ÇPW, I, 812). From this center, by occasion and pro­
clivity, Milton moves into the domestic and political realms 
to repair any ruins he encountered. For he felt the world 
was what its good people made it, and he desired to make of 
it a perfect poem, a composition of the best and noblest 
things.
Milton's holy community evolves from an active aware­
ness of his relationship both to God and his fellowman. Its 
constituents are those "ingrafted in Christ and its effects" 
says Milton in Christian Doctrine.^  Milton saw it as his 
responsibility to relate to the people of England the effects 
of this connection with Christ: a life of virtue and good 
citizenship. Where there were relapses from justice and 
"God's true worship," he saw it incumbent upon himself to 
inveigh against them and instruct his fellowmen in the means 
of restoration to true piety (I, 816-17)* His constant and
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ceaseless struggle is directed towards regaining that 
original goodness which characterized the primal state. He 
saw no essential split between happiness in this world and 
the next. Thus he stated in "Prolusion VII": "Nothing can
be accounted justly among our causes of happiness unless it 
takes into consideration both that eternal life and this 
temporal life" (CPW. I, 291). So Milton’s poem^world is the 
holy community, deriving all virtue and all worthy knowledge 
from its relationship with God, the source of all good,
Milton's apologetics, then, spring from a genuine 
human sympathy, from a deep sensitivity of his relationship 
to God and its incumbent responsibility. He had promises to 
keep— but first with God, then with his fellow man, The 
test of any good was its harmony with the divine will as 
revealed in Holy Writ and the interpretation of its teach­
ings by the mind in the right relationship with God, This 
one must understand to deal justly with Milton’s polemic 
prose. His antipathies, his sympathies or loyalties all 
have their seat in his commitment to his Maker. The end of 
all action as well as "the end of all learning is to repair 
the ruins of our first parents" ("Of Education," CPW. II, 
366-6 7) and to regain that perfect unity and bliss of the 
primal state. Only through building the holy community 
could this desired end be reached.
In the antiprelatical tracts,3 Milton is swimming 
with a strong tide at his back. His position within the
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Puritan controversy is at neither extreme. Here the appeals 
to the individual's conscience in the realm of things indif­
ferent— things not expressly prohibited by Scripture— and to 
respect for discipline as a cohesive force in the church and 
civil affairs supply him grist for his own mill. Later, 
when he is faced with a personal dilemma, the desertion of 
his bride of a month,^ Milton is brought home to himself with 
apparently no company, Here he has a high personal stake and 
cannot avoid the judgment of others. He wrestles with his 
relationship to God, to his fellowman, and to himself as an 
individual destined to serve both. Christian liberty, in­
herent in the law of nature, takes on added significance in 
Milton's thought. From the spirited display of defensive 
tactics exhibited in the divorce pamphlets, Milton was to 
rush into the political crisis at mid-century, perhaps not 
as an angel, but certainly as no lunatic or fanatic— though 
some sage and serious commentators have expressed doubt con­
cerning the latter.^ Indubitably, Milton views all of 
his sallies as part of the general reformation aimed towards 
the realization of the holy community, the reparation of the 
ruins caused by our first parents.
Milton aligned himself on the side of the Puritans 
in the religious controversy, for there he saw the hope of 
the fulfillment of his dreams for the holy community. Thus 
he became a Presbyterian; but when "New Presbyter" proved 
to be "Old Priest writ large," as he put it in his sonnet
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"On the New Forcers" (Works, I, 1. 20),& he moved on to be­
come an Independent and from there to become Independent.
It is easy to see this development as inevitable for one who 
loved truth more than tradition and systems. Always in 
Milton, as Diekhoff notes, politics and ethics emerge openly 
as "not separate disciplines but parts of one.
Milton’s position, or rather, his base of operation 
in the Puritap controversy— for Milton could hardly be said 
to maintain a position except as it had God as the center—  
is somewhere between the two extremes. Henry Ainsworth rep­
resents one of these poles. He envisioned the holy com-
Q
munity or the kingdom of Christ as "no earthlie monarchie."
It was therefore "able to beat down, break in pieces, and 
grind to powder all adverse power and domination; whether of 
this world, or the spirituall wickedness which is in high 
places."9 Implications are here for both endless divisions 
and lack of tolerance.But on the other side is a more 
sobering view as stated in the first Moravian tract in 
English. With greater tolerance than Milton, according to 
Hughes, "the Moravian pled that love could, 'assimilate' all 
men. 'It did assimilate Christ into us, and now if we will 
entertaine it . . .  it will assimilate our Soules to his, 
and bring us into the perfect state of true felicitie . . . .  
We will not live to our selves, but unto the Communion of 
Saints.'"^ 1 This spirit of tolerance is somewhat reminiscent 
of Donne's statement on the schisms as being all beams of
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the same sun. But it is a little too moderate a view for 
Milton.
Milton's medial position in the controversy allowed 
him the use of tactics from both extremes. Even at the be­
ginning, he was not beyond harshly castigating against his 
opponents. In Animadv.ersions. he justifies this weapon of 
controversy in this way: "I suppose . . .  it will be nothing
disagreeing from Christian meeknesse to handle [any noto­
rious enemie to truth and his countries peace, especially 
that is conceited to have a voluble and smart fluence of 
tongue . . .] in a rougher accent, and to send home his 
haughtinesse well-bespurted with his owne holy-water" (CPW.
I, 662). But the positive side of Milton's efforts to re­
form the religious practices of his day revolves around the 
use of the Scriptures. His statement in Of Reformation best 
summarizes his view. Insisting that no special learning is 
necessary to comprehend the Scriptures, he goes on to say:
The very essence of Truth is plainnesse, and brightness 
the darknes and crookednes is our owne. The Wisdome of 
God created understanding, fit and proportional to Truth 
the object, and end of it, as the eye to the thing visi­
ble. . . .  If we will but purge with sovrain eyesalve 
that intellectual ray which God hath planted in us, then 
we would beleeve the Scriptures protesting their own 
plainnes, and perspicuity, calling to them to be in­
structed, not only the wise, and learned, but the simple, 
the poor, the babes, foretelling an extraordinary ef­
fusion of God's spirit upon every age, and sexe, at­
tributing to all men, and requiring from them the 
ability of searching, trying, examining all things, and 
by the Spirit discerning that which is good.
(CPW, I, 566)
When Milton voiced this doctrine, he laid the groundwork for
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all of his efforts in the religious, domestic, and political 
realms.
It is no doubt that Milton saw his activities of the 
next twenty years as a part of his whole perception of the 
spirit of his relationship-responsibility theme. But they 
were not without their personal rewards for him in his in­
dividual quest for perfection. As Aristotle once said, "by 
acting in the various relations in which we are thrown with 
our fellow men we come to be, some just, some unjust; and by 
acting in the dangerous positions and being habituated to 
feel fear or confidence, we come to be some brave, others 
c o w a r d s ; M i l t o n  reflects this same opinion in one of his 
letters: "It is an established fact that virtues are nour­
ished most and flourish most in straitened and hard circum­
stances" (Works. II, 11^-15)* Small wonder that he did not 
shirk the heat of the battle.
In the heat of the battle Milton uses the Bible as 
his armor. With its accoutrement, he challenged custom, 
tradition and error in any of their guises. "The Bible," he 
says, "should perfect the law, not imitate it" (CPW, I, 76^). 
Beginning with the attack on the hierarchy in the Anglican 
church and what he considered its attendant tyranny over the 
human spirit, Milton in support of reform declared that 
"there is a certaine attraction and magnetic force betwixt 
the religion and the ministeriall forme thereof" (CPW, I,
76 6). He broadened his base of attack rather easily as he
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connected these ecclesiastical affairs with the total 
destiny of England, individually and corporally.
It was also an easy step from the affirmation of 
the right of a man to interpret the Bible for himself to 
that of the appeal to man's innate sense for what is right 
and good when parts of the Bible conflict or mystify. Such 
a view, of course, glorified the individual, but only the 
individual rightly guided by reason, or as Milton and his 
age called it. Right Reason. The concept was, like most of 
the ideas of the age, a footnote to Plato. The ancient 
philosopher had earlier held that . . . "in its own right 
Nature would not concern the intellect at all, for the proper 
and adequate object of the intellect is not the symbols but 
the God whom they partially d i s c l o s e . T h e  Christianized 
extrapolation of this essential position is "that nature and 
Scripture alike are read by aid of a direct light from God. 
There is no difference in principle between natural knowl­
edge and the divine knowledge which makes wise unto salva­
tion."^^ Hence there is no divorcing politics from ethics 
nor of the principles of right action for individuals from 
those of social g r o u p s .15 Just as one understands the order 
of nature around him through God's light in every man alike, 
one can also understand God's requirements of him to effect 
a life of virtue through this same right reason.1^
The exercise of right reason is necessary for one 
to achieve true and substantial liberty and Milton makes it
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major emphasis in his program for the holy community. Added 
to right reason and indispensable to its perpetuity is dis­
cipline. In Reason of Church Government. Milton expresses 
his high estimate of this quality. In human affairs, there 
is no "sociable perfection in this life civill or sacred 
that can be above discipline, but she is that which with her 
musicall chords preserves and holds all parts thereof to­
gether" (CPW. I, 751)* Such discipline, as Milton sees it, 
is possible only when the parts are in contact with their 
source. And this discipline insures the true liberty, for 
it serves "to inbreed in [one that] generous and Christianly 
reverence one of another, the very Nurs and Guardian of 
Piety and Vertue" (CPW. I, 8^1). Later Milton restated the 
importance of discipline to "true and substantial liberty" 
in The Second Defence (165*+). Responding to criticism of 
his role in the military affairs of his country, Milton 
justified his pamphleteering activity in behalf of religious, 
domestic, and political freedom as superior to and more 
compatible with his calling than warfare. Such liberty as 
that which furthers the goals of the holy community "must be 
sought, not without, but within, and . . .  is best achieved, 
not by the sword, but by the life rightly conducted" (CPW.
IV, pt. I, 624).
That Milton could not and did not divorce his ethical 
and political principles is further evident in his other 
polemic works. At no time does he place higher authority in
13^
anything else than he does in the Bible. Seeing himself as 
a partner with God in the affairs of the world, Milton con­
tinued to labor for the common good through his counsel and 
exemplary life. Already having previously considered the 
topic of divorce, in 1642, upon his desertion by his new 
bride, îfery Powell, Milton was forced to carry his battle 
for human freedom into the domestic area. The Doctrine and
Discipline of Divorce, appearing anonymously in August 1,
17
1643, is Milton's answer to this call of duty. This 
pamphlet touched off one of the most explosive reactions he 
was ever to encounter. The nature of this controversy did 
not inspire supporters, and Milton was almost alone in his 
stand on divorce. Again he used the Bible to buttress his 
argument. The initial tract is followed by the appearance 
of an enlarged edition of the original with the author's 
name in January or February, 1644. The Judgment of Martin 
Bucer concerning Divorce, an extraction from a respected 
authority designed to win support for Milton's own position, 
appeared in August, 1644. His own Tetrachordon appeared in
1644. It was an attempt to reconcile the four key passages 
of Scripture on which he based his argument for divorce: 
Genesis 1: 27-28 compared and explained by Genesis 2: 18,
23, 24; Deuteronomy 24: 1, 2; Matthew 5: 31? 32 with Matthew 
19: 3-11; I Corinthians 7: 10-16. Finally in answer to 
severe attack on his Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. 
Milton published his acrid reply, Colasterion. in March,
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1 R"16^5* Since the latter pamphlets are for the most part re­
finements on the original, I consider the Doctrine and Dis­
cipline as the statement of Milton's basic doctrine concern­
ing divorce.
The divorce tracts are pivotal in Milton's apolo­
getics. Not only do they make the most explicit prose 
statement of Milton's doctrine of sympathy and its im­
portance in the commerce between man and his fellows and be­
tween man and his God, but they also mark the beginning of 
a new direction in Milton's concept of the law of nature in 
the affairs of man.
Most authorities agree that the divorce tracts were 
precipitated by Milton's personal dilemma,but many also 
have pointed to their transcending mere self-interests to a 
universal application. Fixler, I think, is right in his 
contention that Milton allows charitably for the human con­
dition of postlapsarian man in the divorce tracts because 
such is the basis for his efforts to achieve Christian 
liberty. "The stress on human imperfection," Fixler says, 
"led Milton to assert most forcefully the inviolability of
the individual conscience in deciding what was not to its
20own spiritual enhancement."
Christian liberty, as a necessary precondition for 
the achievement of the holy community, then becomes the key 
idea in Milton's deontology. As Milton had not earlier 
thought of the attainment of the holy community through
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juridical means, h e  had not up to the point of the divorce 
controversy recognized any conflict between the law and the
PI
exercise of his Christian liberty. But as time wore on, 
Milton came to see such a conflict and thereupon severed his 
ties with any activities which abrogated his liberty. The 
later stage of this same development finds him justifying 
the regicide in l6*+9 and proposing a plan for the Christian 
commonwealth— on the eve of the Restoration. He follows the 
same line of development in his religious affiliations, 
moving steadily towards independency. It was, I believe, 
his efforts to gain a hearing for his divorce propositions 
that brought Milton to a clarification of his doctrines on 
the inviolability of the human conscience.
Milton approached the matter of divorce, first, from 
the standpoint of "things indifferent." As he saw it, this 
was a realm of human activity in which the church should not 
interfere. Likewise, it was beyond the legitimate scope of 
civil law. The burden of Milton's argument, as Barker sum­
marizes it, "is not the prevention of mistakes through dis­
cipline but the freedom of divorce necessary if the unhappy
PPconsequences are to be avoided." Milton uses for support 
"an insistence on the infinite mercy of divine charity and a 
defence of the legitimate (if frail) inclinations of human 
nature."^3 For the strength of his case, he depended not 
only upon the Bible, but also upon the faculty of reason 
(CPW. II, 2*+2). "The center of reference in the divorce
137
tracts,” says Barker, ’shifts from the revealed word of God 
to the rights of the individual b e l i e v e r , T h e  implica-r 
tions of such a shift are phenomenal, as the Presbyterians 
recognized in their refusal to support him. Much of 
Milton’s attack on the bondage of canon law was nullified by 
the fear of possible anarchy, Milton parries by accusing 
the ecclesiastics of being more interested in bodily needs 
than spiritual or intellectual needs. Thus connecting epis­
copal hierarchy with "the licentiousness which it would 
foster for its own tyrannous p u r p o s e s , ”^5 jn this way Milton 
was able to join the cause of the general reformation with 
that of the divorce tracts.
Already in Comus Milton had examined the importance 
of the freedom of the mind in the pursuit of goodness. The 
inviolability of the human conscience was also shown to be 
the greatest protection against evil. Just as fitness in 
the individual and in the community of individuals compris­
ing Milton’s envisioned community of saints was determined 
by unity of mind and spirit with the will of God, so fitness 
in marriage is, according to Milton’s view, to be determined 
by the unity of the mates in mind and spirit, So the work 
of freeing man from the enthralling divorce law is the duty 
of all men of God, To the extent that it frees man from 
the tyranny of custom joined with error (CPW, II, 223), it 
is an integral part of the reformation,
Milton first argues for the recognition of divorce
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a v l n o u l o . w i th  th e  r i g h t  o f  b o th  p a r t i e s  t o  r e m a r ry .  He 
u rg e s  l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  th e  g rounds f o r  d iv o r c e  t o  in c lu d e  
i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  and f o r  th e  rem oval o f  d iv o r c e  from  p u b l ic  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  w h e th e r  e c c l e s i a s t i c a l  o r  c i v i l ,  t o  p r i v a t e  
( CPW. I I ,  14 6 ) ,  The f r a $ e  o f  th e  a rgum ent was c o n s t r u c t e d  
o f  th e  f o u r  key S c r i p t u r a l  p a s s a g e s  j u s t  c i t e d .  The b u rden  
o f  th e  argum ent r e s t e d  on th e  s a y in g s  o f  Moses and C h r i s t .  
The c ru x  o f  M i l to n 's  c a s e  c e n t e r s ,  f i n a l l y ,  on G en es is  2:
18 : "And th e  Lord God s a i d .  I t  i s  n o t  good t h a t  man shou ld
be a lo n e ;  I  w i l l  make him a n  h e lp  n^eet f o r  him" ( i t a l i c s  
a d d e d ) . Thus M il to n  s e e s  S c r i p t u r e  a s  t e s t i n g  a  m a r r ia g e  
by th e  f i t n e s s  (m e e tn e ss )  o f  i t s  p a r t n e r s .
I t  i s  i n  h i s  e l u c i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  word meet t h a t  
M il to n  comes t o  r e l y  h e a v i l y  on th e  c o n c e p t  o f  sym pathy a s  a 
most p o t e n t  f o r c e  i n  th e  a f f a i r s  o f  man. A mate t h a t  i s  
m eet i s  f i t  t o  " s e rv e  th e  c h i e f e s t  and n o b l e s t  end o f  mar­
r i a g e "  (CPW, I I ,  2 ^ 6 ) ,  P la c in g  g r e a t e r  v a lu e  on th e  s p i r ­
i t u a l  s i d e  o f  m a r r i a g e ,  M il to n  s e e s  i t s  c h i e f  end a s  "a meet 
and happy c o n v e r s a t io n "  ( CPW. I I ,  2 4 6 ) .  A m a r r ia g e  which 
does n o t  s e rv e  t h i s  end i s  n u l l  and v o id  t o  M il to n .  Con­
v e r s a t i o n . how ever, i n c lu d e s  " th e  a c t i o n s  o f  c o n s o r t in g  o r  
h a v in g  d e a l in g  w i th  o t h e r s ;  l i v i n g  t o g e t h e r ;  commerce, 
i n t e r c o u r s e ,  s o c i e t y ,  in t im a c y "  ( OED) . But even  s o ,  i t  
s h i f t s  th e  em phasis  from  t h a t  o f  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  canon  law  
w hich a l lo w e d  remedy from  a  m a r r ia g e  o n ly  f o r  a d u l t e r y  or 
im po tency . To M il to n ,  t h i s  s t a t u t e  spoke o n ly  t o  t h e
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secondary end of marriage, carnality, not to its primary 
end. Such a law, Milton argued, abrogates the ordinance of 
Christ, "the supreme dictate of charitie" (CPW, II, 250). 
Moreover, the law as it now stands is an incentive to ob­
liquity. Deprived of the chief end of marriage, one is 
likely to seek redress elsewhere, or from necessity, "despair 
in Vertue and mutin against divine providence" (CPW. II,
25*+). Thus he arrives at the point which logically follows. 
If the reason for the marriage is meetness and the meetness 
is absent, one is free to conclude that when the reason for 
inseparability disappears, the inseparability also disap­
pears (CPW, II, 150).
Milton’s theory of inseparability evolves from the 
passage, Gen. 18: 2 k .  "Therefore shall a man leav his 
father and his mother, and shall cleav to his wife; and they 
shall be one flesh" (CPW, II, 603). This dictum immediately 
calls up the archetypal marriage of Adam and Eve. Thus in 
this question, as in all others that Milton considers, he 
goes back to the Fall from which sprang all of man’s woes.
It is because of the Fall that man and, likewise, his in­
stitutions are imperfect. Milton feels, therefore, that 
proportional allowance should be made for man’s fallen con­
dition both in the construction and execution of customs, 
laws, and institutions. In prelapsarian man, there was 
nothing to prevent the true unity of mind, body, and spirit. 
But even then Milton sees that the unity of mind and spirit
1^0
was preeminent as the cause of inseparability. The full 
perfection of marital unity experienced by Adam and Eve is 
attainable for postlapsarian man only in such proportion as 
is his exercise of Christian liberty (CPW. II, 227). Where 
an erroneous custom or law curtails man's privilege of rec­
tifying his mistakes in marriage or in any of his human 
activities, such a custom or law nullifies its effect, ill 
serves its true purpose. It then becomes the responsibility 
of the fit members of society to institute its reform or 
abandonment.
The true test of a law on marriage, Milton argues, 
is whether it insures each of the partners a fit mate. The 
main element in fitness is sympathy, that is, the mutual 
bond of amity and concord (CPW. II, 272). Among human 
beings, the degree of sympathy varies from individual to in­
dividual. The primary reason for marriage, as Milton sees 
it, is this natural affinity which joins like to like. Only 
in such a mutual relationship is there the implicit re­
sponsibility to become one flesh, one mind, one spirit.
Only then does the condition of inseparability prevail. As 
we shall see, Milton was to return to this basic idea of 
marriage again in Paradise Lost and in Samson Agonistes.
Milton further argues for the right to pursue mari­
tal harmony by his appeal to the goodness of God and the 
necessary goodness of his gifts to man. Since God provided 
the first union as a comfort for man, it is right to e:q)ect
14-1
marriage to be "meetly helpful" (CPW, II, 326). A law that 
makes an unfit marriage binding is a greater hardship on man 
than Christian charity demands, or as Milton believes, ap­
proves. For "the fit union of [the partners’] souls be such 
as may even incorporate them to love and amity; but that can 
never be where no correspondence is of the minde; nay in­
stead of beeing one flesh, they will be rather two carkasses 
chain'd unnaturally together; or as it may happ’n,a living 
soule bound to a dead corps" (CPW. II, 326-327). So power­
ful is the sympathetic impulse that no true love or marriage 
can exist without it. So "it is not the joynlng of another 
body" that makes a marriage, "but the uniting of compliable 
minds" (CPW, II, 327). Without the antecedence of sympathy, 
to be of one flesh is "no blessing, but a torment, nay a 
base and brutish condition" (CPW, II, 327). So to reduce 
man who is made in the image of God to this state by a fal­
lible law is an abomination of the spirit of God, an abuse 
of something he ordained good (CPW, II, 326).
Since laws made by fallible men must inevitably be 
fallible, Milton resorts to the law of nature as the indi­
vidual guide in what is right for himself. Where a man "for 
just and natural cause [has] discover’d he cannot love," 
there is a law more ancient and more deeply "ingrav’n in 
blameless nature then the other" which compels him to sep­
arate (CPW, II, 3 3 0). Milton further develops his idea of 
right relationship and concomitant responsibility in a
1k2
rather far-fetched Mosaic-Platonlc myth. "Love was the Son 
of Lonelines, begat in Paradise by that sociable and helpfull 
aptitude which God implanted between man and woman toward 
each other" (CPW, II, 252). Implicitly, then, the perfect 
union is joined by God and should not be put asunder. But 
an unsuited match is no union and "there is no power above 
their own consent to hinder them from unjoyning" (CPW. II, 
3 2 8). But this privilege presupposes the rational use of 
this liberty.
Milton meant these freedoms only for the rational 
and disciplined individual. His liberty is not license. 
Man-made laws which conflict with the law of nature in the 
rational soul supercede their diocese. For they hinder 
"those deep and serious regresses of nature in a reasonable 
soul" (CPW. II, 346). It is the natural right of such a 
person to recollect himself "from that mistaken help . . . 
[and] unpredestin'd misery" and to seek the "person created 
for him" (CPW. II, 346). "To detain him by compulsion . . . 
is in diameter against both nature and institution" (CPW.
II, 346). Against this height of presumption, Milton, fol­
lowing Moses, warns: "Force nothing against sympathy or
naturall order, no not upon the most abject creatures"
(CPW. II, 272). "To command love, to forbid dislike against 
the guiltles instinct of nature, is not within the province 
of any law to reach, and were indeed an uncommodious rude- 
nes, not a just power," Milton declares (CPW. II, 346).
1^3
Natural selectivity in man is inevitable. Whether 
he looks for his twin-soul as in "Epitaphium Damonis," or 
the "help meet," Milton says that "there is a hidden ef- 
ficacie of love and hatred [sympathy and antipathy] in man 
as well as other kinds, not morall, but naturall" (CPW, II, 
271). Though either of these impulses may be dormant in the 
choice of a mate, it cannot be so in the success of the 
match. Milton supports his claim for this powerful element 
in human commerce by biblical and classical evidence. From 
the Bible he cites Ecclesiastes 13: 16: "A man will cleave
to his like." From classical lore, he cites Homer: "God
brings like unto like" (Odyssey. XVII, 218). He further 
notes that not every man or woman is fit for each other.
The chance is great that unsuitedness might develop or be 
discovered after marriage; in such a case this is not neces­
sarily the fault of the mismates, Nevertheless, Christian 
charity demands a remedy (CPW, II, 272-273)* And in a classic 
statement on the doctrine of sympathy, Milton clinches his 
argument for amelioration of external restraints on the human 
spirit:
Seeing there is indeed a twofold Seminary of stock in 
nature, from whence are deriv'd the issues of love and 
hatred distinctly flowing through the whole masse of 
created things, and that Gods doing ever is to bring 
the due likenesses and harmonies of his workes to­
gether, except when out of two contraries met to their 
own destruction, he moulds a third existence, and that 
is error, or some evil Angel which either blindly or 
maliciously hath drawn together in two persons ill 
imbark't in wedlock the sleeping discords and enmities
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of nature . . . what folly It is to stand combating 
and battering against invincible causes and effects,
( CPW, II, 272) 
Milton, then, sees the sympathetic bond of nature as 
a universal principle, powerful though nonmoral. Ordered 
by the reasonable soul, its claims are undeniable. But in 
no case can or should it be forced or commanded. Thus 
Milton sees sympathy in the human psychology as equal to or 
synonymous with the claims of the law of nature. In 
Milton's deontology, this law of nature is the highest law. 
So relationship and responsibility again become the standard 
of measurement for Milton's apologetics. Indeed it is here 
that he gains his greatest psychological advantage when he 
argues from the premise of sympathy. It is at once a strong 
plea for human dignity and a just defense of the claims of 
nature and charity "to which all other ordinances give up 
their seals" (CPW. II, 33*+)*
But at this point, Milton has not yet sufficiently 
harmonized the seeming conflicts in the Biblical pronounce­
ments on divorce. He himself had pleaded eloquently in the 
antiprelatical tracts for the recognition of the Bible as 
the sole guide in matters of the conscience. In spite of 
the growing tolerance for his cause, ecclesiastical surety 
dictated a just settlement of this claim. Milton wrote 
Tetrachordon to meet this need. It is, as I believe, only 
when he draws upon all of his resources to face this task of 
reconciling the texts that Milton comes to recognize the
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full implications of the doctrine of Christian liberty. By 
enlarging his concept of reason, nature, and Christian 
liberty in his successive tracts, Milton emerges finally 
with a gallant defense of human or natural liberty.
The revised version of Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce considers the relationship between the Old and New 
Testaments by limiting the application of the respective 
pronouncement on divorce to its respective dispensation. 
Milton buttresses this point by stating that "Divorce is 
not a matter of Law but of Charity" (CPW, I, 3^5)* As such 
it is God's law, beyond human jurisdiction. God's law "re­
quires the observance therof not otherwise then to the law 
of nature and of equity imprinted in us seems correspondent" 
(CPW, II, 297), This step, it seems, takes him beyond the 
Bible as well as beyond civil law. But Milton feels that 
no law of God is contrary to nature. Thus he sees divorce 
from an unfit mate as natural and any prohibitive measure as 
"not only against nature but against law [for] law and na­
ture are not to go contrary" (CPW, II, 3^6). The question 
confronting civil authorities and the "reasonable soul" is 
"how far the territory and dominion extends of just and 
honest liberty" (CPW, II, 227). For Milton's liberty is not 
license.
The question of harmonizing the texts on divorce from 
the Old and New Testaments is to provide an answer for the 
overall question of liberty. Milton approaches the problem
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by extending in Tetrachordon the figurative interpretation 
already given the key passages in the earlier editions of 
the divorce tracts. The use of the law of nature to justify 
human action demands that one must show its applicability to 
all men and times. To appeal to the Bible as the final 
court of authority demands that the New Testament must not 
abrogate the Old. Thus Milton to meet these problems 
broadened his concept to include a primary and secondary law 
of nature, the first to man in the unfallen state and the 
latter to fallen man (CPW, II, 156). "Had men continu’d 
perfet, it had bin just that all things should have remain’d 
as they began to Adam and Eve. But after the sons of men 
grew violent and injurious, it alter’d the love of justice 
and put the government of things into a new frame" (CPW, II, 
665). So through the broadening of the concept of the law 
of nature, Milton not only explicates "hardness of heart" to 
mean "the imperfection and decay of man from original right­
eousness" (CPW. II, 15^ -'155), but he resolves the apparent 
conflict between the Old and New Testament passages.
Furthermore, Milton’s new interpretation, by extend­
ing its application to embrace all fallen mankind, broadens 
his concept of liberty from Christian to natural liberty 
(CPW. II, 155)' But this liberty is not license for non- 
Christians; nor had it been so for Christians. It depends 
on an objective standard of righteousness, allowing "just 
and natural privileges" for the inwardly good. This
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extension is possible because "there are left som remains of 
Gods image in man, as he is meerly man” (CPW, II, 591).
This is certainly a significant step in Milton towards a 
universality not characteristic of the seventeenth-century 
polemicists. It is due to his idea of the unity of mankind 
in God that he is able to arrive at such a position. Even 
here Milton is moving his boundaries towards a universal 
encompassment.
Milton goes on to other implications of this second­
ary law of nature for the more secular idea of the ”law of 
nations” and thus integrates the case for divorce with that 
for Parliamentary supremacy: "They are twin consequences of
a single principle, the jurisdiction of the secondary law of 
nature" (CPW, II, 661-662). Milton had learned the tactic 
from Parliament itself, Ernest Sirluck observes (CPW, II, 
157). Just as the secondary law of nature provided, ac­
cording to Milton’s argument, a test of the validity of 
human laws with reference to marriage, so "it will do the 
same with reference to the state" (CPW, II, 158).
Milton’s first ardent defense of the principles of 
individual liberty in state affairs grew out of his own ex­
periences with censorship in the publishing of his divorce 
tracts. His response to this curtailment of human freedom 
called forth what many bel.ieve to be the most brilliant de­
fense of the freedom of the press even penned, Areopagitica 
(164^). In this pamphlet, Milton builds on the foundation
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of innate human dignity. He makes an eloquent plea for the 
freedom of postlapsarian man (with certain securities against 
popery and open superstition) to explore in unity ”through a 
bond of peace" the whole emporium of ideas (CPW. II, 565)• 
Such a freedom is necessary if one is to gain sufficient 
skill in sifting the good from the bad in the fallen world.
To prevent this open and free inquiry is "to bind Truth 
while she sleeps" (CPW, II, 563). Furthermore, we but en­
thrall her in the gripe of custom viewing her with bleared 
eyes dimmed with prejudice (CPW. II, 564-565)•
Milton can welcome sects as they represent the 
"earnest and zealous thirst after knowledge and understand­
ing which God has stirred up in this city" (CPW. II, 554). 
Then with genuine humanitas. Milton goes on to express his 
vision of the holy community. "A little generous prudence, 
a little forbearance of one another, and som grain of char­
ity might win all these diligences to joyn and unite in one 
generall and brotherly search after Truth" (CPW. II, 554). 
Such a statement does not portray the cold and surly "ex­
asperated individual [who] makes self-righteousness the law 
of right" which Paul Elmer More, V la mode de Dr. Johnson, 
finds.Rather it is a man in search of truth, a quest 
preconditioned not only by charity and goodness, but also by 
an awareness of man’s limitations. Milton’s appeals for a 
concept of right are not simply addressed to nature, but to 
nature in harmony with God’s will. A law emerging from such
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a source is not only natural, but it is for the good of 
man, as Milton saw it— though such a law might many times be 
in conflict with civil laws, customs, and traditions. Not 
that he loved public esteem less, but that he loved liberty 
and truth more.
Only one with a natural human sympathy could look 
beneath the surface dissimilitudes to a mutuality of as­
pirations which could ultimately subsume the differences.
That Milton desires such a harmonious quest for common good 
is evident by this positive tolerance of schisms and sects—  
though he did have a blind spot where papists are involved. 
But here again, I think this is because he saw them as 
antipathetic to the cause of freedom of the human spirit.
For he says, the goal of the quest for truth, for perfection 
consists in this "that out of many modérât varieties and 
brotherly dissimilitudes that are vastly unproportional arise 
the goodly and graceful symmetry" (CP¥, II, 5 5 5 )  • That only 
can guarantee the power of truth to triumph over error: "for 
opinion in good men is Truth in the making" (CPW. II, 55^).
The individual's right to moral choice should not be 
curtailed by laws, civil or sacred. Righteousness is not a 
matter of laws, Milton held, but of inward discipline. For 
an individual to perfect himself and sharpen his abilities 
to discern the good, an individual's "actions must be all 
elective and unconstrained" (CPW. II, 3^2). The test of 
this open choice is the open field. For Milton says that he
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cannot praise a fugitive and cloister'd vertue, un- 
exercls'd and unbreath'd, that never sallies out and 
sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, 
where that Immortall garland Is to be run for, not 
without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring not In­
nocence Into the world, we bring Impurity much 
rather: that which purifies us Is trlall, and trlall 
Is by what Is contrary.
(CPW. II, 515)
Such a gallant plea for freedom of the good man to 
test and try the conditions of this world Is evoked by 
Milton's ever-present desire to gain approval In his Task- 
Master 's eye. Milton saw this as the sine qua non of his 
relationship with God and man. But this sense of responsi­
bility did not always promise calm waters, as he had earlier 
divined and as he restates It In Areopagitica In the passage 
just cited. But his assertion In Doctrine and Discipline Is 
prophetic In Its Insight: "No man knows hell like him who
converses In heaven" (CPW, II, 333).
As time wore on, occasion and duty again called 
Milton Into the service of the reformation and, as he saw It, 
the service of liberty. Called forth by the regicide of 
Charles I, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates was Milton's 
contribution to the urgency of the moment. The hounds of 
history were In hot pursuit of England's destiny. The clamor 
and shout of factions resounded In every corner. But Milton 
heard the voice of freedom and, as he saw It, aligned him­
self with freedom's cause. The cause of freedom meant the 
death of a Charles who happened to have once been a king, as 
Milton would Interpret It. It also seemed that the
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installation of a commonwealth was the best means to freedom 
and piety, so he supported it. But it was only for the end 
of freedom that Milton, I believe, made any of the commit­
ments he was to make during this crisis.
In Of Reformation, Milton had earlier stated: "We
know that the monarchy is made up of two parts, the liberty 
of the subject and the supremacy of the king" (CPW, I, 592). 
Position here would seem to indicate a conscious priority, 
but if it does not the course of Milton's thought and ac­
tivities does. Being at the time in favor of the monarchy 
and against the prelates, he strikes an oracular note: "What
[is] more baneful to a monarchy than Popular commotion?"
(CPW, I, 592). It is also ironical to note here that 
Milton argues against James I’s clairvoyance: "No bishop,
no King" (CPW, I, 582). Yet even then Milton is no con­
firmed monarchist as may be inferred from the drift of his 
remarks. More indicative is his assertion: "Let not human
quillets keep back divine authority. It is not common law, 
nor the civil, but piety and justice that are our foundresses; 
they stoop not, neither change color for Aristocracy, de- 
mocraty, or Monarchy, nor yet all interrupt their just 
courses; but farre above the taking notice of these inferior 
niceties with perfect sympathy, where ever, they meet, kisse 
each.other" (CPW, I, 605-606). Therefore, it is certain 
that so long as any form of government incorporates justice 
and piety, it is satisfactory to Milton. Substance not form
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is his standard of value. Here, as ever, merit is the yard­
stick by which he measures any person or institution.
Milton must adhere to an intrinsic standard of 
values because he measures everything with a free and in­
quiring spirit (CPW. Ill, 198), not by tradition, custom, 
and legal sanction. The reason of government, as Milton sees 
it, is individual freedom. Since as a consequence of the 
Fall, man’s ability to exercise free will is impaired, a 
common league for benefit of all is thought necessary. 
Foreseeing that fallen man's propensity "to doe wrong and 
violence" might lead to the untimely destruction of all,
"they agreed by common league to bind each other from mutual 
injury, and joyntly to defend themselves against any that 
gave disturbance or opposition to such agreement" ( CPW. Ill, 
198-199). So the foundation of government rests on the as­
sumption of relationship and responsibility.
The relationship of the governed to the governor is 
mutual, and so is the responsibility. This contract is
binding if the cause obtains for which it was instituted.
Governorship originally was delegated on the basis of merit 
"to one whom for eminence and wisdom and integritie they 
chose over the rest" (CPW. Ill, 199). But this power is re­
tained by consent of the governed; for each, having
"originally and naturally the same powers and unitedly in 
them all," reserves the right to be "his own partial judge" 
(CPW. Ill, 199). Here, again, Milton’s hierarchical
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structure rests on merit, mutual relationship and mutual re- 
sponsibility.
The king is, in a sense, the other self of the popu­
lace, since he rules "by vertue of thir intrusted power, [and 
executes] that justice which else every man by the bond of 
nature and of Cov’nant might have executed for himself or 
one another" (CPW, III, 199). So a king, lord, or master 
- derives his name from the abstractions vhich the concretion 
should represent. If the two elements are not cojoined 
there is no king. Such offices, Milton maintains in The 
Tenure, "are relative, and relations have no longer being 
than the relation" (CPW, III, 229). Such a statement re­
enforces Milton’s contract theory and underscores the im­
portance to which he attributes sympathy in human inter­
course: only where there is mutual sympathy can there be an 
unbreachable contract.
As in marriage, where without love and sympathy there 
is no true marriage, so in government, where without mutual 
amity between ruler and ruled there is no true king and no 
loyalty incumbent upon the subjects. "Who knows not that a 
King is a name of dignity and office, not of person: Who
therefore kills a King, must kill him while he is still a 
king?" (CPW, III, 233). Thus Milton disposes of the claim 
of regicide by contending that Charles I was not a king but 
a tyrant, an enemy; and "the law of nature justifies any 
man to defend himself even against the King in person . , ,
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and Justice don upon a Tyrant is no more but a necessary . 
self-defence of a whole Common wealth” (CPW. ILI', 254), 
Milton, of course, is here poles apart from Hobbes’s tenets 
on the theory of government.
Hobbism had not yet made its official advent upon 
the English scene at the time of The Tenure ; but the ideas 
were already in the air. Hobbes's treatise. Considerations 
upon the Reputation. Lovaltv. Manners. and Religion of 
Thomas Hobbes . . . had earned for him banishment from 
England around 1640.^? Even before his Leviathan in 1651» 
then, his notion that sympathy is self-love to the exclusion 
of others was well known in learned circles. Upon such a 
theory, Hobbes evolved his theory of politics. Since man 
exists in a state of each against all, a ruler must be given 
unlimited exercise of authority over the people to prevent 
mass suicide, Hobbes reasoned (CPW. IV, pt. I, 31)» This is 
indeed a bleak view of man’s potential. But, as has already 
been suggested, Milton reasoned from the same premise to the 
opposite view of man.
The idea of interrelatedness is seminal in Milton's 
deontology: he always reasons from this premise. Such, a view 
lies at the heart of his aspirations for a better England 
and, as he had indicated in Areopagitica. the role of England 
in reforming the world. "Who knows not," he says in The 
Tenure, "that there is a mutual bond of amity and brother­
hood between man and man over all the world, neither is it
155
the English Sea that can sever us from that duty and that 
relation." But the closer the bond the greater the responsi­
bility: "a straiter bond ther is between fellow-subjects, 
neighbours and friends" (CPW. Ill, 2140.
With the assurance of human relationship and human 
responsibility, Milton led on amidst encircling hostility. 
Many, whether through myopia or predisposition, could not be 
convinced by his argument. Though Milton was in March,
1649, appointed Secretary for Foreign Tongues to the Council
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of State, such an appointment only rendered him more vul­
nerable to the showers of criticism being heaped upon his 
head at the time. Increasingly, he became the butt of both 
national and international aspersion. To justify a regicide 
was incomprehensible to Milton’s critics, so little account 
did they take of his distinctions. So Milton's first duty 
in his official capacity was to answer the propagandistic 
treatise Eikon Basilike (1649), issued by one of the royal­
ist sympathizers. In this work, Eikonoklastes. Milton 
elaborated upon his basic thesis already set forth in The 
Tenure. But Milton is by now not only disillusioned by the 
kingship, as he knew it, but also doubtful that any individ­
ual could ever qualify for a king, as he conceived the 
office. So, in refutation of James I's advice to Charles I: 
"Keep to the true principles of piety, vertue, and honour, 
and [you] shall never want a Kingdom"— Milton rejoined: 
"People of England, keep ye to those principles, and ye
1^6
shall never want a king" (CPW, III, 581).
At no time did Milton shrink from the heat of the 
battles that he entered in defense of his country and of 
himself. In his defense tracts he elaborated on the basic 
ideas already expressed on the relationship-responsibility 
theme. He crushed his enemies with levity and logic— all, 
as he saw it, in defense of truth and liberty. But the 
greatest battle that he faced during the early years of the 
fifties was the battle for his eyesight. This one he lost 
decisively in 1651.^^ Likewise he lost his wife Mary 
Powell in 1652. But he did not lose his resolve "to pre­
sent [his] true account," as he tells us in "On His Blinds 
ness" (Works, I, 11. 5-1^).
Milton’s eternal and sincere devotion to liberty and 
human welfare is perhaps best illustrated in his latest 
political pamphlet. The Readie and Easie Wav, published on 
the eve of the Restoration when hopes of its fruition were 
dimmest and the personal risk severest. The pamphlet out­
lines a plan for a commonwealth, which he now sees as the 
best means by which the just claims of the individual could 
be served. His government is still of the elect, and elec­
tion is still postulated on merit. Since few would achieve 
this merit, the government must be constituted of the 
"fit . . . though few" (Works, II, P.L. VII, 31). To insure 
against corruption, it is rotating in its membership. 
Milton’s standard of merit is not purely subjective; for a
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precondition of it is relationship to God and receptivity 
of its effects. As he had now despaired of finding the de­
sired quality in a single man, he recommends a republic 
based on aristocracy of merit.
The commonwealth that Milton envisions more nearly 
than any other form of government seems to him to insure the 
demands of God and human nature. It is "not only held by 
the wisest men in all ages the noblest, the manliest, and 
the equallest, the justest government, the most agreeable to 
all due libertie and proportioned equalitie, both human, 
civil, and Christian, most cherishing of vertue and true re­
ligion," (Works, VI, 119) but, as Milton sees it, "the hap­
piness of a nation must needs be firmest and certainest in a 
full and free council of their own electing, where no single 
person, but only reason swaies . . . within the joint 
providence and counsel of many industrious equals" (Works,
VI, 121-122). Here Milton sets aside all doubt as to his 
motivation for acting: human sympathy. His proposed govern­
mental system is predicated on the welfare of proportion­
ately equal persons with the checks and balances to insure 
the rights of the individual. Milton's principle of equality 
also recognizes and rewards merit: it is proportioned on the 
measure of the divine image in each. Thus again, the doc­
trine of sympathy provides the origin of Milton's insights.
Milton's theory of government is not contrary to his 
cosmological scheme of the chain of being, as many would
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suppose. Almost universally held to require the monarchical 
form of government, the chain idea, as Allers points out, 
need not imply a monarchy. To put it microcosmistically, 
there can be "a democracy of cosmic powers or stellar 
spirits."30 Allers further notes that "no such conception 
[of the universe as a republic] seems to exist."3^  If this 
is true, then Milton has in this insight also blazed a new 
trail, which is more to the credit of his sympathetic im­
pulse. Actually it was primarily Milton's desire to clarify 
the relationship-responsibility matter that led him to this 
conclusion. It was also for this same reason that he re­
nounced his passing tolerance for monarchy.
Aware of the impending Restoration, Milton sees it 
as his responsibility to relate this means of deliverance 
to his fellow country men. Although his hopes for the "Good 
Old Cause" are almost nil, he still hopes for the best. But 
as he could see, the people by their actions rather seek to 
be "by nature slaves and arrant beasts, not fit for that 
liberty they cri'd out and bellow'd for, but fitter to be 
led back into thir old servitude" (CPW, III, 581). This too 
is in harmony with Milton's theory of nature: only the fit is 
free to govern himself ("Second Defence," CPW, IV, pt. I,
684). So his expected "harvest of glory" of which he had 
spoken so fervently in the Second Defence (CPW, IV, pt. I,
685), threatens now to become a famine. This is one last 
effort to save the remnants. England could be governed by a
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freely elected body called by "the voice of liberty," whose 
"members are just and [of necessity] qualified . . . men not 
addicted to a single person or house of lords," that is, men 
with no entangling alliances, "ablest men chosen by the 
people to consult of public affairs from time to time for 
common good"; where sovereignty is delegated not transferred; 
where allowance for rotation is partial so as to insure 
permanence based on quality (Works, VI, 125-127). But in­
stead of choosing Milton’s system with the appeals of sta­
bility, self-evaluation, equality and insurance of human 
liberty, they chose the alternative which offered only 
tyranny over the human spirit, as Milton perceived it. It 
was to prevent this deathblow to freedom that Milton spoke.
But the tides were now fully against the realization 
of Milton's program for the holy community. His hopes for 
England had turned on the pivot of true religion from which 
all other virtues depend. To achieve the reparation of the 
brokenness caused by the Original Sin, man has to have free­
dom of the human spirit to pursue in a common bond for common 
good the paths of piety, justice, and truth. Laws which 
abrogate this basic right are contrary to the law of nature 
and should be abandoned or rectified— whether in religion, 
domestic affairs such as divorce, or a system of govern­
ment. This is the message of the polemic prose.
Having fallen on the evil days of the Restoration as 
he is later to say in Paradise Lost. Milton seeks the
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comfort of his own mind. His hope now lies in the reforma­
tion of the individual. • The world is not yet ready for the 
complete reparation of its ruins. And one must say regret­
fully that Milton was not quite ready for the world; for he 
did not always properly gauge the time factor nor the level 
of achievement possible in a given situation. But one can 
never say that he did not hope for the best for his country­
men and that he did not give of his best to achieve it.
Milton did not, however, give up his hopes to repair 
the ruins caused by Adam and Eve. He continued to use his 
knowledge and talent in the high realm of art, summarizing 
the whole theme of relationship and responsibility in justi­
fication of the ways of God to man. Though much of his more 
direct literature of utility is buried, there is much yet 
left to praise in the eloquent strains of human sympathy 
which reverberate throughout these volumes of polemic prose. 
And though his age received them little, his soul found 
among them the elements of the perfect poem, which he, the 
perfect poet, can now write.
CHAPTER V
THE TRINAL POEM AS A WORLD OF THREE IN ONE:
A VISION OF THE DIVINE-HUMAN CORRELATIVE
The c o r re sp o n d e n c e  and r e l a t i o n  o f  a l l  p a r t s  o f  n a tu r e  
to  one a u t h o r ,  t h e  dependence o f  e v e ry  p i e c e  and j o i n t  
o f  t h i s  fram e o f  th e  w o r ld ,  th e  a d m ira b le  o r d e r ,  th e  
im m utable  s u c c e s s io n  , . . :  i n  a l l  t h e s e ,  though th e r e  
be no so u n d , no v o i c e ,  y e t  we may even s e e  t h a t  i t  i s  
an  e x c e l l e n t  so n g , an  a d m ira b le  p i e c e  o f  music and 
harmony,
John  Donne, Sermon. A p r i l  19, 1618
. , . t h a t  t o  t h e  h ig h th  o f  t h i s  g r e a t  Argument 
I  may a s s e r t  E t e r n a l  P ro v id e n c e ,
And j u s t i f i e  th e  ways o f  God to  men.
John  M il to n ,  P a r a d i s e  L o s t . I ,  2^-26
A bercrom bie  sa y s  th e  f u n c t i o n  o f  an  e p ic  i s  th e  ex ­
h i b i t i o n  " o f  l i f e  i n  some g r e a t  sym bo lic  a t t i t u d e . I m ­
p l i c i t l y ,  t h e n ,  t h e  e p ic  aim s to  p r e s e n t  a  w orld  from  a 
c o n sc io u s  p o i n t  o f  v iew  e x t o l l i n g  i t s  p a t t e r n  and j u s t i f y i n g  
i t s  o p e r a t io n s  a c c o rd in g  to  a  t o t a l  p l a n .  Such i s  th e  "n ee -  
e s s a r y  f o u n d a t io n  f o r  any su b s e q u e n t  v a l u a t i o n  o f  l i f e . " ^  
M a r v e l l 's  o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  M il to n  d id  n o t  om it from h i s  
g r e a t  e p ic  o f  th e  C h r i s t i a n  f a i t h  a n y th in g  t h a t  "was f i t "  i s  
i n d i c a t i v e  o f  t h e  p e r f e c t i o n  o f  t h i s  " g r e a t  a t t i t u d e "  a s  t o  
s u b s ta n c e .  I s a b e l  M acCaffrey i n  P a r a d i s e  L p^t * ^ t h "
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rem arked on, i t s  p e r f e c t i o n  a s  to  s h a p e ,  n o t in g  which Anne D, 
F e r r y  was p e rsu a d e d  t h a t  th e  poem h a s  such co m p le ten ess  o f  
form  "as i f  i t  were i t s e l f  a w o r l d , "3 Indeed  M ilto n  does 
p r e s e n t  th e  C h r i s t i a n  w orld  i n  sym bo lic  a t t i t u d e .  I t  i s  a 
m oral u n iv e r s e  c r e a t e d  i n  p o e t r y . ^  The poem r e f l e c t s  m an 's  
b a s i c  a l l e g i a n c e s  t o  a l l  c r e a t e d  t h in g s  and to  th e  C r e a to r ,  
a u n i f i e d  v i s i o n  o f  r e l a t e d n e s s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  I t  i s  
th e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  th e  human f i g u r e  i n  c o n sc io u s n e ss  o f 
th e  bonds betw een h i m s e l f  and t h a t  which i s  e x t e r n a l  t o  y e t  
c o n ta in e d  w i t h i n  h i m s e l f .  I n  a r e a l  s e n s e ,  we p e r c e iv e  t h i s  
w o r ld ,  f o r  we, l i k e  th e  C r e a t o r ,  t h e  a r c h e t y p a l  man and 
woman, th e  d i a b o l i c a l  f o r c e s ,  a r e  a  p a r t  o f  t h i s  w o r ld .  I t  
i s  a  w orld  th e n ,  o f  cosmic d im e n s io n s ,  spann ing  d i v i n e ,  
human, and i n f e r n a l  r e a lm s .  At th e  c e n t e r  o f  t h i s  w o r ld ,  
p h y s i c a l l y ,  p s y c h o l o g ic a l l y ,  and t h e o l o g i c a l l y  s ta n d s  th e  
a r c h e ty p a l  man—Everyman. Man i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  h i s  s o u r c e ,  
to  h im s e l f ,  and to  h i s  w orld  i s  th e  c o n sc io u s  i d e a .  Thus 
M i l to n 's  cosmogonic a t t i t u d e  aims t o  j u s t i f y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  a w orld  begun i n  p e r f e c t  u n i t y ,  d i s ­
r u p te d  by s i n ,  and t o  be r e u n i t e d  by l o v e .  Hence sympathy i s  
n o t  on ly  th e  sem in a l  i d e a ,  b u t  i t  i s  a l s o  th e  shape o f  t h i s  
poem --of  one i n  t h r e e .
In  P a r a d i s e  L o s t  M il to n  p r e s e n t s  th e  t o t a l  p i c t u r e  
o f  m an 's  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  th e  d i v i n e ,  human, and i n f e r n a l  
rea lm s  i n  i t s  o u t l i n e s .  Thus i t  i n c lu d e s  th e  e s se n c e  o f  
P a r a d i s e  R e g a in 'd  and Samson A g o n i s t e s . f o r  th e y  in d ee d  a r e
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a p a r t  o f  t h i s  t o t a l  f ram e . Such H anford m ust have  had  i n  
mind Vhen he  o b se rv ed  lo n g  ago t h a t  th e  p o e t ' s  l a s t  t h r e e  
works a r e  com plem entary  i n  theme and e t h i c a l  i d e a . 5^ T here­
f o r e ,  I  c o n s id e r  th e s e  t h r e e  a s  one g r e a t  poem embodying th e  
t o t a l  m oral u n iv e r s e  o f  man, p ro c e e d in g  from  th e  p o i n t  where 
he i s  g iv e n  a p a r a d i s e ,  t o  m an 's  t e m p ta t io n ,  h i s  s i n ,  and 
c o n seq u e n t  l o s s  o f  Eden, to  h i s  r e s t o r a t i o n  from  t h a t  l o s s  
a c c o rd in g  to  t h e  p a t t e r n  g iv e n  by "one g r e a t e r  man" bo th  
human and d i v i n e ,  a n d ,  f i n a l l y ,  by th e  h i g h e s t  l e v e l  o f  
human p o t e n t i a l  e x e m p l i f ie d  i n  a mere i n d i v i d u a l  man i n  
to uch  w i th  God, who o f  f r e e  b u t  e r r i n g  w i l l  i s ,  by o b e d ie n c e ,  
r e s t o r e d  to  g r a c e .  Thus he  com ple tes  th e  scheme o f  s a l v a ­
t i o n ,  a s s e r t s  e t e r n a l  p ro v id e n c e  and j u s t i f i e s  f u l l y  th e  
ways of God t o  men. The poems a r e  v i r t u a l l y  one i n  t h e i r  
sym bolic  and a c t u a l  a t t i t u d e  tow ard  r e l a t i o n s h i p  and r e ­
s p o n s i b i l i t y .
P a r a d i s e  L o s t  i s  fu r th e rm o re  th e  t r i n a l  poem becau se  
i t  r e p r e s e n t s  th e  m a j e s t i c  p in n a c le  o f  M i l t o n ' s  e n t i r e  canon 
i n  i t s  c o m p le te n ess  a s  t o  theme and th o u g h t .  M i l to n 's  
e n t i r e  l i f e  and a r t  h a s  been  an  e x am in a t io n  and  v a l u a t i o n  o f  
th e  u n i t y  o f  e x i s t e n c e ,  th e  m easure o f  th e  sym pathy betw een 
th e  s e l f  and n o t  s e l f  a s  an  i n d i v i d u a l ,  a  g ro u p ,  a n a t i o n ,  
and th e n ,  a  w o r ld ,  a u n i v e r s e .  H is  lan g u ag e  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  
r e f l e c t  t h i s  endeavor t o  e x p re s s  t h i s  p e r c e iv e d  u n i t y  o f  
e x p e r i e n c e .  H is  monism, a s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  h i s  t h e o r i e s  on 
c r e a t i o n ,  on God, on body , mind, and s p i r i t  a l s o  t e s t i f i e s
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to his essential view of the relatedness among the parts.
It was typical of Milton always to begin with the 
Fall in any issue that engaged him. The Fall is the back­
ground against which he propounded his radical views on 
religious reformation, on divorce, and on political pro­
cedures. One of the chief goals of his educational scheme 
was to repair the ruins occasioned by the Fall of our first 
parents. Now, to reconcile any seeming conflicts in post­
lapsarian experiences, Milton begins with the initial breach 
between God and man which in turn takes him to Satan, the 
anterior agent of all evil and the first disrupter of unity. 
Because man.as a free consenter willed his action, he bears 
the responsibility for such actions. The relationship be­
tween God and His creation, then, is one of receptivity of 
His immanence by choice. Alienation from the source and its 
consequences issue from unreceptivity and a negative choice. 
Such a world is not predetermined; if it were, man indeed 
could not be held a responsible being. Relationship, though 
natural, obtains its morality from a conscious, free recep­
tivity of its primal source; conversely, it obtains its 
lack of morality from a repudiation of that primal source. 
Hence the justification of the ways of God to man and of man 
to man.
Milton's choice of the "Eden Myth" to present life 
in symbolic attitude is therefore an indispensable donne'e ; 
the story must not be limited by time, place, nor ethnic
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group. Perhaps this is why Milton abandoned his idea of a 
national epic, having concluded that England was not suited 
for lack of "fit" numbers to be symbolic of God’s holy com­
munity. Furthermore the course of his life pattern reflects 
a broadening of human sympathy. Its subject must be 
humanitas. its place, the universe and its time, both within 
history and eternity. Only then could one have a foundation 
for a true valuation of life. Most familiar to Western 
readers in the version recorded in Genesis and modified by 
subsequent Jewish and Christian exegetes, the Eden myth i^ 
nevertheless^ broadly human. The Chinese, Arabs, Egyptians, 
Hellenes, and Germans as well as the African, American, and 
Ottoman tribes all preserve a tradition "that the first man 
was formed of clay, that he was led astray by a woman or a 
serpent, thus losing his original happiness."^ Such an ac­
count of the universality of the myth augurs well for its 
validity and also for the common bond of humanity. "In a 
word, the Eden myth, like the death-and-resurrection myth, 
is a myth, an expression of a persistent pattern of ex­
perience and devotion, fears and desires that are common 
both to primitive societies and to at least the less fully 
accessible levels of all men’s minds.
No doubt Milton in his choice of subject matter for 
his epic was also answering Hobbes’s negation of the premise 
of sympathy as mere self-love. Besides the fact that Hobbes 
took the short view of man while Milton took the long one,
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the point of departure for the two men differs: Milton was
interested in first principles, origins Hobbes, only in 
pragmatic terms, the nature of the State, Undoubtedly, any 
meaningful and lasting valuation of life must be more 
broadly based than was Hobbes's. Hobbes's man is an iso­
lated individual in search of reunity for his own satisfac­
tion and preservation of life.® Unity in such a scheme can 
be merely contiguous, never continuous, Milton's man is the 
individual in relationship to God and his fellows by conse­
quence of a natural bond. He has responsibility not only to 
himself but to all because he is a part of all. Hobbes's 
system depends on an empirical valuation of history and the 
contemporary situation and would give the prince the power 
rather than the people. Milton's has the broad perspective 
of eternity and a teleological evaluation of time and place. 
For him "the closer we come to nature, the clearer it is 
that the power of the people surpasses the k i n g ' s . T o  
Milton, then, the natural is that which is most receptive 
to divine influence.
The law of nature assumed man's ability to rise "by 
degrees to perfection" as he said in the second edition of 
Readie and Easie Way (1660) (CPW, IV, pt. 1, 36). Milton 
however failed to assess realistically the timing of these 
degrees of perfection. So, according to Don Wolfe, Hobbes 
was a more accurate prophet of England's immediate destiny, 
but not perhaps of its long range destiny (CPW. IV, pt. 1,
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35ff); for England has since moved more in Milton's direc­
tion than Hobbes's. Milton's last poems incorporate this 
vision of ultimate perfection of the divine purpose in the 
universe, in spite of the apparent failure of his present 
dreams to materialize.
Paradise Lost presents a scala naturae, a chain of 
being uniting all creatures in a bond of sympathy from the 
lowest up to God, structured according to the proportionate 
share of these beings in the divine immanence. Thus hier- 
archial positioning is dynamic with ascension made possible 
by merit. Such order obtains in the divine, human, and in­
fernal realms as well as in psychological realm. All work 
together to effect the highest good, which tends toward and 
from God.
A world so structured does not allow evil as an
ontological condition of matter, because matter differs from
spirit not in kind, but degree. As Milton says in Christian
Doctrine. "Matter, like the form and nature of the angels
itself, proceeded incorruptible from God" (Works. XV, 2 h -
25). And again in Paradise Lost. Raphael states the scheme
of this universe:
0 Adam, One Almighty is, from whom
All things proceed, and up to him return.
If not deprav'd from good, created all 
Such to perfection, one first matter all.
Indu'd with various forms, various degrees 
Of substance, and in things that live,
of life;
But more refin'd, more spiritous, and
pure.
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As neerer to him plac’t or nearer tending
Each in thir several active Sphears
assignd,
Till body up to spirit work, in bounds
Proportion'd to each kind.10
Such a scheme is characterized by order, by interrelation­
ship, and by dynamism.
Since God is the source of all, Milton's cosmology 
allows for His immanence as well as His transcendence. The 
ex Deo theory of creation best accommodates Milton's view of 
God and the structure of the u n i v e r s e . I t  is impossible 
for God to be affected by evil in any way; therefore, to 
render a portion of the universe capable of corruption in 
use, but not essence, and thus unpredetermined, God withdrew 
a portion of Himself from it and assigned the role of cre­
ation to the Son (Works. XV, 9)* To the extent that a por­
tion of creation is removed from God it is imperfect. Hence 
the structural principle of the hierarchy obtaining in the 
universe.
The nature of the theme treated in Paradise Lost 
demands some appearance of God in the epic. Thus it is that 
Milton presents the traditional anthropomorphic God as well 
as the infinite transcendent Deity:
Boundless the Deep, because I am who
fill
Infinitude, nor vacuous the space
Though I uncircumscrib'd my self re­
tire.
And put not forth my goodness, which
is free
To act or not, Necessitie and Chance
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Approach not mee, and what I will is
fate.
(VII, 168-173)
Such a view of God is Biblical and subsumes the tra­
ditional anthropomorphic God that is employed to accommodate 
man’s intelligence. But it does not seem fair to say that 
Milton thought he had defined God, in either orthodox or 
heterodox terms, as he presented Him in Paradise Lost. In 
Christian Doctrine. Milton says "to know God as he really 
is, far transcends the power of man's thoughts, much more of 
his perception" (Works, XIV, 31). Such a comment should re­
move Milton from the calumny of those who look upon Milton's 
God as being consciously definitive.^^
Thus at the top, of the scale of being is God, the 
highest perfection of all attributes of goodness, love and 
justice. There is orderly progression inherent in the 
structure. The potential of the parts is realized only as 
they tend toward God, "the primary, absolute and sole cause 
of all things" ("Christian Doctrine," Works. XV, 21). This 
upward inclination is the sine qua non of order in the di­
vine, human, and infernal realms. If this upward inclina­
tion is lacking, alienation and consequent disorder—  
rebellion, apostasy, disobedience— with its attendant chaos 
ensues. Only through a redirection of one's aspirations 
towards God and submission to His will can restoration be 
accomplished. This fact, Milton illustrates on the divine 
level in the fall of the apostate angels, and on the human
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level in the fall of man. Such a scheme is postulated on 
the use of free will. The exercise of right reason insures 
the proper use of the free will.
We look first at the heavenly order, for from it 
issue all the subsequent order or lack of it— to the extent 
the parts are removed from this divine realm. It is also in 
the heavenly realm that the pattern of all goodness is per­
fected; so is the pattern of relationship and responsibility. 
Heaven represents the highest of realms and its constituents 
represent the highest essence descending from God and the 
Son down through the angelic degrees of "thrones, dominations, 
princedoms, vertues, powers" (VI, 601). A parodie version 
of this same order exists in hell, as we shall later see.
Don Wolfe makes the comment, regarding this scheme of order: 
"Though Milton in his apologetics recommends rule only by 
consent of the governed, no more consent of the governed 
obtains in Hell than in H e a v e n ."^3 The comparison, as I 
see it, does not hold, mostly because of its unfortunate 
implications. The two orders are poles apart. Consent of 
the governed does exist in heaven and is freely given so 
long as unity obtains. Failure to consent is the choice 
Satan exercised, and so did his followers. Even so, rule in 
hell is tyrannical and manipulative; in heaven, it is loving 
and just. Milton's apologetics were directed towards the 
alleviation of fallen man's condition and an ultimate repara­
tion of the ruins caused by m a n ' s  first sin. Milton did not
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object to submission to one's superior in virtue and intel­
ligence even in his apologetics. There is hardly any com­
parison between the best man’s merit to be ruler and that of 
God. Milton’s angels understand this and thus serve God in 
true freedom "united as one individual Soule/ Forever happie" 
(V, 610-611 ).
Original discord was introduced into heaven by a 
turn from God towards self, the essence of all forms of sin. 
Lucifer, an angel of high degree, rebelled against God be­
cause He elevated his Son to his right hand. Beside himself, 
Lucifer also "infused bad influence into the warie brest" of 
a number of other angels who also rebelled (V, 695)* Order 
is to be restored only by the Son. Milton’s explicitly meta­
phorical (V, 573) depiction of the cause and consequences of 
this activity is in keeping with the relationship and re­
sponsibility which underlie the harmony in all spheres.
The first rebel and his followers, consisting of "a 
third part of heaven’s Host" (V, 710), by their own free 
will separate themselves from God by choosing not to serve 
the divine will. Disobedience breaks union. In search of 
freedom, they gain "splendid vassalage" (II, 251-252). Satan 
has high intelligence and ability, but turned from God these 
qualities can be used only for destruction. He can infuse 
only bad influence. All his values revert. His logic is 
distorted, therefore, his characteristic duplicity is re­
vealed by his speech. In a distorted version of the law of
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nature which depends for its credence on proper relationship
with the source, Satan declares his independence:
Natives and Sons of Heav’n possesst
before
By none, and if not equal all, yet
free
Equally free; for Orders and Degrees 
Jarr not with liberty.
(V, 790-793)
This statement is only partially true. The angels were pos­
sessed by God; and so long as they were united to Him, by 
consequence of this union, they were free. Only separate­
ness, in Milton's view of things, brings servitude, whether 
the servitude is to oneself or to an unworthy master. Also 
inherent in the heavenly scheme is ascension by merit: the 
Son gains His position by His creative activities (VI, ^3)* 
Thus it is beside the point to talk of equal freedom. Who 
indeed raised Satan to leadership? Right relationship with 
the Father insures that "All honor to him/ Returns to our 
own" (V, 844-8^51, as Abdiel makes clear. But Satan and his 
group decide that they would be their own standard of good: 
"Our puissance is our own, our own right hand/ Shall teach 
us highest deeds [and] who is our equal" (V, 86 4 -8 6 6 ) .
Rebellion brought such discord in heaven that it dis­
turbed "Heav'n's peace and into Nature brought/ Miserie, 
uncreated until the time of [Satan's] crime" (VI, 267-270). 
Nature, then, in sympathy with the total of which it'is a
part reflects the discord. As the "Sovran spoke":
\
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clouds began
To darken all the Hill, and smoak to
rowl
In duskle wreathes, reluctant flames,
the syne
Of Wrath awak’t.
(VI, 55-60)
As -the battle wore on, Satan and his forces use nature in the 
construction of firearms in heaven (VI, 4#0ff.). This is a 
misuse of nature which must be compared with the construc­
tive use of it the Son is later to make.
The conduct of the battle is an interesting study 
in relationship and responsibility. The Son because of His 
relationship and His proven sense of responsibility will 
gain the glory for the restoration of order in heaven. But 
this must be done according to God’s plan. The Almighty 
could have with one blow "with one solitarie hand" finished 
all (VI, 138-1^2 ); but He gives His servants tasks to prove 
themselves. So Michael and Gabriel first have their day on 
the field in battle with the diabolical forces. Though 
they cannot win, they can prove their obedience, "their 
union irresistible" (VI, 6 3) with the divine will.
In his portrayal of the angelic warfare Milton re­
veals his monism. The strange wounds and recoveries which 
he describes the angels undergoing are mainly reflections of 
the angelology of the age.^^ But here again the poet ex­
presses his own individualism, especially in the area of the 
increased similarity between the angels and men.^^ This has 
the effect of narrowing the boundary lines between heaven
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and earth, thus increasing the sympathy between the divine 
and human realms. A detailed examination of this phenomenon 
is beyond the scope of this paper. But the poet's imagina­
tive portrayal of this abstraction in concrete terms reveals 
his philosophical predilections. As Raphael tells it, the 
battle between the good and evil forces reveal that though 
they are both wounded, the wounds heal quickly and easily. 
Only with Satan's cleverly devised engine are the apostate 
angels able to gain hold for a time. But the angelic host 
counters with the natural weapons of plucked up hills, 
mountains, woods, rivers (VI, 6^0ff.). The rebel host re­
turns the same. So they fight an indecisive battle; neither 
side could displace the other. Yet the angelic force under 
the leadership of Michael and Gabriel do their best, just as 
the "fit but few" in the future world must do, though they 
nor their human counterparts can ultimately triumph over 
evil. That feat lies in the power of God only, at his or­
dained time.
So the ordained time for the Son's true glory and 
that of the Father arrives. In the Chariot of Paternal 
Deitie (VI, 7 5 0 ) ,  in perfect obedience and bliss, the Son 
fulfills the Father's will, ends the war, casts out the 
rebel forces; thus He restores order in heaven to the glory 
of the Father:
Thou Shalt be All in All, and I in thee
For ever, and in mee all whom thou lov'st:
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But whom, thou hat'st, I hate and can
put on
Thy terrors, as I put thy mildness on—
Image of thee in all things.
(VI, 732-736)
The Son's will is perfectly fused with the Father's. This 
empowers Him to perform God's will— not of His own, hut of 
God's might (VI, 7 3 7 ) •  Even the chariot in which He rides 
is "instinct with Spirit" (VI, 752). He obeys God, and na­
ture, as the angel relates it, obeys Him:
Before him Power Divine his way prepar'd 
At his command the uprooted Hills retir'd 
Each to his place, they heard his voice
and went.
(VI, 780-7 8 2)
The restored order is also reflected in nature: "with fresh 
Flourets Hill and Valley smil'd" (78*+); and heaven is again 
at peace.
But the apostate angels cannot, by their own choice, 
receive the benign influence of the Son; conversely, they be­
come more resolute in sin. Thus they receive eternal sepa­
ration from God, banishment from heaven: "Disburd'nd Heav'n
rejoic'd and soon repaird/ Her mural breach, returning 
whence it rowld" (VI, 878-8 79). But in the infernal region 
the opposite of the heavenly state exists; for hell is, 
spiritually and physically, existence without God. In such 
a place there can be no true peace or harmony.
II
Hierarchy in hell parodies that of heaven. Satan 
is elevated, or rather he elevates himself, to leadership by
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an inverse merit; he is the least worthy of redemption and 
thus the most worthy to rule in hell. Their bond is their 
common hate of the divine. As hatred is divisive, there is 
not unity of mind. Thus Satan does not trust open parley to 
secure his wishes; he uses the dubious technique of "stack­
ing the deck," arranging the outcome of the infernal council 
in advance with Beelzebub. Because the demons are slaves 
both to Satan and to themselves, they do not know the dif­
ference.
Satan assumes the role of deliverer of the devils, 
not so much because he feels responsible to them, but be­
cause he desires self-glory (I, 39-*+0). Every action of 
Satan's is directed inward. His hatred is really self- 
hatred. Just as sympathy is all-inclusive, so antipathy is 
all-exclusive— even of self. To Satan love or hate is alike, 
both being eternal woe; for he himself is hell (IV, 69-70, 
75). He cannot ever be raised, for his goal is to be self­
raised (I, 633-63^). By a denial of his origin (V, 860-86^), 
Satan cuts himself off from the source of good; therefore, 
none of his actions can be good. In fact, evil is his good 
(IV, 110). Like an uprooted tree, the more separated Satan 
becomes from his source the more degenerated his condition.
In the garden of Eden, the epitome of harmony and bliss in 
its primal state, Satan saw "undelighted all delight" (IV, 
286). His heart no longer beats to the universal heart 
throb, for he is cut off from the totality of things. He is
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forever tormented "as from a hateful siege of contraries"
(IX, 121-122). Turned in upon himself, he is driven towards 
the domination of others. Self-acceptance for the demonic, 
as Frye points out, "is possible only by means of incorpo­
ration of other selves, as though the self could only
buttress its selfhood by reducing other selves to serfdom or
1 f\
by destroying them."
In Satan, Milton depicts the embodiment of separa­
tion from God. Hence Satan, like Comus and all others with­
out the proper relationship to God, can never use God's 
creation wisely. Rather he has a desire to "waste his whole 
Creation or possess /All as our own" (II, 365-366). Satan's 
ascendancy in hell, though admired by the demons, is in fact 
a descendancy. As he says, "With diadem and Scepter high 
advanc'd/The lower still I fall, onely Supream/ In miserie" 
(IV, 90-92). So aiming high Satan fell to the lowest point 
in the chain of being, the abyss of hell. To assert himself, 
he in reality rejected himself. As a figure and as a fact, 
then, Satan becomes the reverse of the relationship- 
responsibility pattern that makes for good in the divine, 
human, and infernal realms.
The role of Satan in the world is to frustrate God's 
plans. All of his actions are to that end. Man in Paradise 
Lost is his primary target. To effect his revenge on the 
divine for having banished him from heaven, he devises a 
plan to deceive man. The pattern of his guises reflects the
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degeneration of his character. His incarnation is Just the 
opposite of that of the Son. Satan's "foul descent" (IX,
163) takes him from a toad to a serpent. His creations too 
are unnatural. His daughter Sin, as Milton personifies her 
in the poem, springs from his head full grown at the time of 
his consent to the idea of usurpation of heaven. She em­
bodies Satan's actions, his self-love, his destructive qual­
ity. She is at once attractive and repulsive, the perfect 
image of the Arch-Fiend. With a female upper part and 
serpentine lower (II, 650ff.), she represents the nature of 
temptation, which, to some, may be attractive at a distance 
but usually repulsive upon a closer view. The incestuous 
union of this couple brings forth Death, and in turn, a host 
of hell-hounds. The total relationship is one of disgust 
and horror, a symbolic presentation of the essence of sin. 
Milton skillfully blends fact and figure to portray the re­
ality of sin and all of its effects, its ugliness, its 
horror, and its misery.
The mutual bond among Satan and his family is just as 
ominous. Sin and Death are Satan's other selves. Only they 
have latitude in hell. Satan's former cohorts in sin are 
now his slaves. Only Sin and Death share with him perfect 
sympathy and loyalty. Milton's genius in depicting this in­
dissoluble bond among them is superb. They not only share 
the closest bond known to man in the parent-progeny rela­
tionship, but this tie is compounded by the husband-wife
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bond, and further by the endless unions of Sin and Death, 
from which spring hell-hounds receiving their daily sub­
sistence (to the agony of Sin) at their mother's entrails 
(II, ySlff.). This scene is rare in its consummate depic­
tion of the infernal bond of horror, the complete reversal 
of the bond of sympathy uniting the divine. It is hell, the 
universe of death, the seat of evil where even nature "breeds 
perverse all monstrous, all prodigious things/ Abominable" 
(II, 624-626).
Ill
Man enters the universal picture with the sides 
sharply drawn. He is a creature made in the image of God 
(IV, 291-292; 364) and given dominion over the earth on 
which he is placed (IV, 430-434). He in his primal state is 
the perfect embodiment of the divine-human correlative in 
relationship and in responsibility. The divine will is that 
"Earth be chang'd to Heav'n and heav'n to earth,/ One King­
dom, Joy and Union without end" (VII, 160-161). But Satan, 
conversely, proposes that "Earth with Hell/ [should] mingle 
and involve" (II, 383-384). Now the first plan enhances re­
lationship with the Creator and insures perpetual bliss and 
peace; but the second breaks union and incurs discord and 
misery. Satan schemes, God permits, but man only can con­
sent. The gift of heaven is incumbent upon man's conscious 
receptivity and God's grace. In short, it is based upon a 
free and open choice between alternatives: obedience to God
180
and life or disobedience and death.
Milton’s stated purpose for Paradise Lost is to 
"justify the ways of God to men." Because it is in the 
cause and consequences of man’s first disobedience that 
justification lies, Milton’s concern in the poem is to pre­
sent the act in its fullest outlines. Wolfe says, "one is 
aware that Milton’s theme is justification of God’s judg­
ment, not sympathy for man’s sinful actions in the face of 
inexorable environmental determinants."1? If this asser­
tion be true, then man was not a free agent; and Milton’s 
poem fails to realize its purpose. I propose to show that 
Milton not only presents a sympathetic view of the Fall, but 
that he makes sympathy itself the actuating principle in 
every important incident in the poem, including the Fall. 
Furthermore I suggest that at no time are man’s actions de­
termined by his environment; for man was given dominion over 
his environment, not it over him. If he does allow his en­
vironment to control him, this control can be only an ironic 
reversal for which he is in some way to blame.
Milton holds that man was free to stand or fall (III, 
99). To be free there must be no necessity, but a choice of 
alternatives. If man had not been given free will, he could 
not have achieved his humanity (III, 125-126); nor could 
God’s ways be considered just. "But God left free the Will, 
for what obeys/ Reason is free, and Reason he made right"
(IX, 351-3 5 2). Right reason and the exercise of free will
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are interdependent, tut not synonymous. But the proper func­
tion of the will depends on the condition of the reason; and 
it is man's responsibility to keep his reason right. So a 
possible answer to the dilemma of man's Fall lies in his re­
lationship to God, to his fellowman, and to nature and the 
acceptance of his responsibility to them. At no time is his 
relationship to either predetermined, except as man himself 
wills it so. For man's world depends on what man does with 
what he is given. The case would seem to rest on the fact 
that man is given enough to effect good or ill and that he 
is given the choice between two clear alternatives. Milton, 
then, presents such a world in his study of the ways of God 
to man. I now examine this world in detail.
The bond of sympathy which unites all elements in 
Paradise Lost extends from God down to the lowest creation 
(V, -^70-563). Satan and his fellows, because of their own 
will and deeds, exist beyond this scheme in what might be 
called harmonious antipathy or negative sympathy (X, 2^7)* 
They do not share the mutual rapport which runs throughout 
the world. Their bond is that of hate and is consequently 
divisive, a negation of virtue. All beings and natural ob­
jects in Paradise tend toward God and ascend by merit. Fol­
lowing tradition, Milton places man at the central position. 
With Eve as his helper, not his equal, Adam is given dominion 
over the terrestrial spheres. The Fathers of the Church 
along with many other ancient, medieval, and Renaissance
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a u t h o r i t i e s ,  s h a re d  t h i s  v iew . F u r th e rm o re ,  th e y  gave man 
th e  d i g n i f i e d  p o s i t i o n  a s  s p e c t a t o r  o f  th e  u n i v e r s e ,  a s  th e  
microcosm c o n ta in in g  th e  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  th e  u n iv e r s e  w i t h in  
h i m s e l f .  I n h e r e n t  i n  t h i s  id e a  I  f i n d  e v id en ce  f o r  th e  sym­
p a t h e t i c  bond o f  n a t u r e .  The p a r t s  o f  t h i s  w o r ld ,  l i k e  th e  
p a r t s  o f  th e  body, a l l  depend on t h i s  f e e l i n g  o f  n a t u r a l  
s i m i l i t u d e  and a r e  a l l  co n n ec ted  i n  n a t u r a l  communion. The 
s t r o n g e r  th e  r e l a t i o n ,  th e  s t r o n g e r  th e  sym pathy, a s  M il to n  
had  i n d i c a t e d  i n  th e  D o c tr in e  and D i s c i p l i n e  of D iv o rc e .
Man i s  p la c e d  i n  th e  w o r ld ,  p r i m a r i l y ,  t o  a c h ie v e  
p e r f e c t i o n  and by t h i s  a t t a i n  th e  h e a v e n ly  s t a t e .  I  canno t 
a g re e  w i th  M adsen 's p o s i t i o n  t h a t  " i n  P a r a d i s e  L o s t  i t  i s  
n o t  th e  b u s in e s s  o f  man to  t r y  to  s p i r i t u a l i z e  h i s  body and 
r i s e  i n  th e  s c a l e  o f  n a tu r e  b u t  r a t h e r  to  a c c e p t  th e  human
18c o n d i t i o n :  t o  l e a r n  what h i s  n a tu r e  i s  and be t r u e  t o  i t . "  
T h is  s ta te m e n t  seems to  me e i t h e r  t o  beg th e  q u e s t io n  o r  to  
be p a t e n t l y  s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  Madsen, i f  I  r e a d  him c o r ­
r e c t l y ,  assumes th e  human c o n d i t i o n  t o  be s t a t i c .  This 
th e n ,  e x c lu d es  p r o g r e s s i o n ,  which i n  p r e l a p s a r i a n  man i n ­
c lu d e d  a s c e n s io n  i n  th e  s c a l e  o f  b e in g ,  as R aphael t e l l s  
Adam (V, 4 ^ 0 -4 7 2 ) ,  and u l t i m a t e  s p i r i t u a l i t y :  "As n e e r  to
him p l a c ' t  or n e e r e r  t e n d i n g /  T i l l  body up to  s p i r i t  work 
i n  bounds p r o p o r t i o n 'd  t o  each k in d "  (V, 4 7 8 -4 7 9 ) .  T h is  i s  
th e  meaning o f  a s c e n s io n  by m e r i t  i n  M i l to n 's  cosm ology.
True " to  t r y  [ s p e c i f i c a l l y ]  t o  s p i r i t u a l i z e  h i s  body and 
r i s e  i n  th e  s c a l e "  i s  n o t  m an 's p r im a ry  b u s i n e s s .  H is
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business is to obey God, and such obedience carries concomi­
tantly the rewards of ascension and spirituality. Man's sin 
was to attempt the ascension by repudiating the work and 
orderly process. Both, but especially Eve, discount the 
time factor by attempting to overleap the intervening steps 
between body and spirit. This attempt to rise in the scale 
was for Adam, if considered at all, only secondary^ as we 
shall later see.
Milton's entire justification rests on perspective, 
of which time is an integral part. Man's view is limited by 
time and place; God's is unlimited. God's time is ordained 
by himself. This Milton knew as early as the Nativity Ode, 
and this he reaffirmed in Lvcidas. and in the polemic prose. 
In Paradise Lost he makes his summary statement. Not only 
is time important to man's role in the world, but so is it 
necessary that he direct his efforts toward God, maintain 
the right relationship. So doing, he benefits from God's 
goodness, enjoys "choice unlimited of manifold delights"
(IV, M-35)« Nature exists in perfect harmony, "linkt to him 
in weal and woe" (IX, 132-340. Adam, higher up, inclines 
toward God through "contemplation and valor" and Eve to God 
in him through "softness and sweet, attractive Grace" (IV, 
1+3 5); "Fair couple linkt in Nuptial League" (IV, 339)* All 
this state is mutually dependent. Disturbance in any part 
produces a sympathetic reaction in the entire frame.
Everything in this world is contingent upon keeping
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the proper order and subjecting all to the test of "Reason, 
Loyal, Just, and Pure" (IV, 755)* Adam's love for Eve and 
Eve's love for the physical Eden are proper if kept in 
balance, that is, used as instruments by which they mount to 
God. To be excessive in zeal for God is not sin; to be so 
in anything else is idolatrous (III, 696). Any action is 
good so long as it furthers man's relationship with God.
Adam is the fount of Reason, then, man's closest 
link with God, being higher in the Chain of Being. He should 
rule and be granted obedience— "with gentle sway" (IV, 308), 
but "his fair large Front and Eye declar'd/ Absolute rule" 
(IV, 301). Hence it is clear that Adam is the head and that 
on him, therefore, rests responsibility for decision-making. 
This view of the male is grounded in the patristic, philo­
sophical, and political thought of the age respecting uni­
versal order. Multiple examples point to this same con­
viction. Bishop Edward Reynolds expressed it in this way:
". . .as God is in his Temple, the Church, So is He in his 
Pallace, (if I may call it so) the World, a God of order 
. . .  so that all things depend on his Government, without 
violence, breach, or variation. And this Order and Wisdom, 
is seene chiefly in the sweet subordination of things each 
to other, and happie inclination of all to their particular 
ends, till all be reduced finally unto Him."^^ It is axio­
matic in Renaissance thought that "there is an eternal order 
within which all things exist and outside which they are
18^
doomed to self-destruction."20
In the Garden of Eden the Initial state was char­
acterized hy blissful order. Eve, "Sole partner and sole 
part of all these joys [is] / Dearer . . . then all" (IV, 
411-12). Time and time again Milton emphasizes the perfect 
harmony, the oneness, the ideal love and sympathy of the 
pair. There is "Union of Mind, or in [them] both one Soule;/ 
Harmony to behold in wedded pair/ More grateful than har­
monious sound to the eare" (VIII, 604-606). Such fellow- 
feeling is possible only between Adam and Eve; this is the 
reason God gave her to Adam (IV, 412). Following Adam’s 
first recognition of his union and duty to a superior being, 
and his relationship and responsibility to the creatures by 
such knowledge "God endu’d [his] sudden apprehension" (VII, 
339-356), he sensed that neither they nor his solitude com­
pletely fulfilled his needs. God, he felt, was too high and 
the creatures too low:
Among unequals what societie
Can sort, what harmonie or true delight?
Which must be mutual, in proportion due 
Giv’n and receiv’d . . .
(VIII, 383-386)
Then in recognition of the need of man for man, Adam con­
tinues: ’Of fellowship I speak/ Such as I seek, fit to
participate/ All rational delight’(VIII, 389-391 )*
Sociality is possible only among like kinds: lioness and 
lion, but not bird and beast not ox and ape (VIII, 393- 
3 9 7 ) .  The farther apart beings are in the scale of nature.
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the lesser the possibility of true communion. So God gives 
him one "of his likeness, fit help, his other self" (VIII, 
*+50-^51 ) • Thus Adam shows an understanding of the nature of 
man as well as of the creatures by expressing his need for 
fellowship. Perhaps concupiscence is implicit in Adam’s re­
quest for a fellow man; for Milton did not share the 
Augustinian view that concupiscence was the "material element
Pi
of the original sin." Milton praised highly wedded love.
It, he says, is the
Perpetual Fountain of Domestic sweets 
Whose bed is undefil’d and chaste pro-
nounc’t
Here Love his golden shafts imploies,
here lights
His constant Lamp.
(IV, 760-761, 763-76 )^
Doubtlessly aware of the Reformation attitude stemming from 
Augustine, Milton would seem to have them in mind here: 
"Whatever Hypocrites austerely talk/ Of Puritie and place and 
innocence,/ Defaming as impure what God declares/ Pure . . . "  
(IV, 7^^-7^7); marital love founded.on reason, is the symbol 
of "all relations dear and all the charities" because it not 
only unites in perfect love and sympathy, but it is also 
creative (IV, 750-759)* And Adam does say that man must 
manifest his single imperfection by propagating which "re­
quires collateral love, and deerest amitie" (VlII, 422-^26).
But more desirous is Adam here of companionship, 
some one to share a mutuality of mind and spirit which
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Milton extolled in the divorce tracts as the heart of the 
marital union. The fact of Milton’s repeated emphasis on 
their being of one soul each time he speaks of their union 
indicates the indispensability of this element in the Adam- 
- Eve relationship. They are one, incomplete one without the 
other :
Part of my soul, I seek thee, and thee
claim
My other half. . -
(IV, 1+87-8 8)
But Eve was not only made for Adam, she was made 
from him (IV, 1+1+0-1+1 ). So the fact that they are one has a 
physical basis also: from Adam’s rib, God made Eve. Thus 
Adam declares: ”I now see/ Bone of my Bone, Flesh of my
Flesh, my self/ Before me” (VIII, 1+9I+-9 6 ); and Eve likewise 
recognizes the bond: " . . .  I was form’d flesh of thy
flesh,/ And without whom am to no end, my Guide/ And Head" 
(IV, 1+1+1-1+2). So they are individuals, but it takes both of 
them "hand in hand" (IV, 321) to make harmony in Eden. They 
need each other to function as a whole; for they complement 
rather than supplement each other. Hence their mutual inter­
dependence .
That what affects one affects the other is confirmed 
in at least three crucial scenes in the poem. The first of 
these is in the lines foreshadowing Eve’s fall wherein she 
relates her dream to him. Adam says: "The trouble of thy
thoughts affects me equally" (V, 96-97)* The second is in 
the dramatic scene of Eve’s disobedience. Adam and Eve
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share a community of feeling though separated; he felt the 
pangs of Eve's sin before she told him: "Yet oft his heart,
divine of something ill,/ Misgave him" (IX, 84-5-46). The 
third is the climactic scene of Adam’s fall: "And mee with
thee hath ruin'd" (IX, 906). Therefore, it is clear that the 
right relationship among the elements in Paradise must be 
maintained by knowlege, diligence, vigilance, and self- 
discipline. The fate of each is interdependent; but the 
nobler the nature, the greater the responsibility.
The fo resh ad o w in g  o f  a breakdown i n  o r d e r  i s  se en  
e a r l y  i n  t h e  i n t e r p l a y  of r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  Eden. The t e n ­
dency t o  i n c l i n e  tow ard  a low er o b j e c t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
e v id e n t .  Eve shows a g r e a t e r  a f f i n i t y  f o r  th e  lo w e r  th in g s  
th a n  she  seems to  m a n i f e s t  f o r  h e r  ach ievem en t o f  p e r f e c ­
t i o n .  She i s  i n n o c e n t l y  drawn to  th e  l a k e  where she  "w ith  
a n sw e rin g  l o o k s /  Of sym pathy and lo v e "  ( IV , 4 6 4 -4 65 )  b eh o ld s  
h e r  own im age. But g e n t l y  c o r r e c t e d ,  she r e p l a c e s  unknowing 
s e l f - l o v e  w i th  t h a t  o f  a f i t t e r  o b j e c t ,  Adam. Her p r o p e n s i ty  
f o r  th e  l e s s e r  good i s  a l s o  e v id e n t  i n  th e  f a c t  t h a t  h e r  
dream , though  u n i n v i t e d ,  i s  from  a l l  i n d i c a t i o n s  c h e r i s h e d .  
T his c o n d i t i o n  made h e r  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  t e m p ta t io n .  The dream 
i s  in n o c e n t  so  lo n g  a s  i t  i s  h e ld  i n f e r e n t i a l l y  and  n o t  ex -
p e r i e n t i a l l y . 2 2  Thus Adam tells Eve:
Evil into the mind of God or man
May come and go, so unapprov'd and
l e a v e
No spot or blame behind.
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So Adam rests his case on the hope that Eve "Waking . . . 
never wilt consent to do” what she "didst abhorr to dream"
(V, 119-121). Inferential knowledge (as is now the case of 
Eve's dreaming) becomes experiential only with consent 
whether deceived or knowing. Such is the tenor of Adam's 
discourse on the soul's faculties, reason and its servants 
(V, 101-102). And thus he presents the corresponding hier­
archical structure of the psychological-cosmological realms. 
But the scale here is static. Reason in the psychological 
realm is chief and must never relinquish its rule to a lesser 
faculty. Twinned with reason is the will (XII, 83-849. 
Reason, then, must be right to insure the right exercise of 
the will. If it is dimmed by passion or prejudice, the 
reason is not right, nor is the order.
Indubitably, the patristic and classical tradition 
stand behind this typically Miltonic view of reason. In his 
earlier poetry, his polemic prose, and now in the major 
poetry, Milton extolls the virtues of reason. As Douglas
Bush says, right reason finds its "greatest exponent" in
23seventeenth-century England in Milton. I have already had 
occasion to relate this concept to Milton's doctrine of
sympathy. Because it "links man with man and man with God
. . . is a faculty implanted by God in all men . . .  as a
guide to truth and conduct," it enables [man] within limits
to understand the purposes of a God who is perfect justice,
o) I
goodness, and love."^^ Man's receptivity, then, must be
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directed towards this channel of perfect justice, goodness 
and love to realize this divine gift. When he turns away 
through pride, self-centeredness or passion, he forfeits the 
directive power of right reason. Alienated from his source 
he, like a branch severed from the tree, withers, and finally 
dies to goodness, justice, truth and freedom. The persistent 
inclinations of both Eve and Adam towards a lesser object, 
uncorrected, are steps away from God.
Eve’s affinity for the lesser good also shows in her 
anxious care for the luxurious growth of her garden. It is 
evident earlier when she leaves the company of Adam and 
Raphael, preferring to hear the divine instructions from 
Adam; "hee, she knew would intermix/ Grateful disgression, 
and solve high dispute/ With conjugal Caresses" (VIII, 5^ - 
56). She rather chooses to spend this time in the garden. 
Most tragically, it is because of insufficient care of the 
garden that she recommends division of labor on the fateful 
day of their temptation and fall (IX, 205-220). Though many 
other circumstances interact, as I see it, to produce the 
end result, the fact still remains that Eve in anxious care 
bends too much of her feelings to lower things and not 
enough to higher claims, as Adam's futile remarks to her be­
fore she departed indicate:
Love not the lowest end of human life 
For not to irksom toile, but to delight 
He made us, and delight to Reason joyn'd.
(IX, 241-2^3)
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What needs  t o  be done t h e i r  " jo y n t  h an d s"  can  p e r fo rm . She, 
t r u s t i n g  u n w ise ly  and to o  much i n  h e r  own s t r e n g t h ,  shows 
more c a re  f o r  h e r  g a rd e n  th a n  f o r  t h e i r  m utua l h a p p in e s s  and 
s a f e t y .  When th e y  le a v e  P a r a d i s e ,  i t  i s  h e r  f lo w e r s  t h a t  
she seems most l o a t h  t o  p a r t  w i th :
0 f l o u r s ,
T hat n e v e r  w i l l  i n  o th e r  C l im a te  grow.
My e a r l y  v i s i t a t i o n ,  and my l a s t  
At Ev’n ,  which I  b red  up w i th  t e n d e r  hand
From th e  f i r s t  O p 'n ing  bud , and gave ye
Names.
(X I, 273- 277)
Adam's f a l l  i s  fo reshadow ed  a l s o  i n  h i s  i n c l i n i n g  
tow ard  a low er b e in g .  Eve. The s t r o n g  bond o f  sym pathy 
u n i t i n g  him and Eve h a s  a l r e a d y  been  i n d i c a t e d .  I  f u r t h e r  
adduce th e  p r e t e r n a t u r a l  in f lu e n c e  E v e 's  p e r s o n  e x e r t e d  on .
him: " . . .  p a s s io n  . . . /  Commotion s t r a n g e  . . . th e
charm o f  B e a u ty 's  p o w e rfu l  g la n c e "  ( V I I I ,  5 3 0 -5 3 3 ) ,  t h i s ,
I  a g r e e ,  i s  s u r e l y  l o v e .  S p e n se r ,  whom M ilto n  c a l l e d  a 
" b e t t e r  t e a c h e r  th a n  S co tus  o r  A q u i n a s p e r h a p s  s t a t e d  the  
R e n a is san c e  i d e a  o f  lo v e  a s  w e l l  a s  any : "Love i s  a
c e l e s t i a l l  h a rm o n ie ,  o f  l i k e l y  h a r t s  . . . which jo y n  t o ­
g e th e r  i n  sw eete  s y m p a th i e , /  To work each  jo y  and t r u e  con­
t e n t "  ("Hymn o f  B e a u t y " ) . S u c h  a s ta te m e n t  p r e c i s e l y  
c h a r a c t e r i z e s  th e  lo v e  o f  Adam and Eve i n  P a r a d i s e .  T h is  
lo v e  i s  good u n t i l  "wisdom" does in d ee d  " lo s e  
d i s c o u n t 'n a n c ' t "  and a l l  " h ig h e r  knowledge" does i n  h e r  
p re s e n c e  " f a l l  d eg raded"  ( V I I I ,  551-555)* When t h i s  i n ­
v e r s i o n  ta k e s  p l a c e ,  Adam's p o s i t i o n  a s  head  i s  c h a l le n g e d .
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order is discredited, vulnerability ensues. Order must be 
restored or destruction is inevitable. In this way Milton 
skillfully employs the traditional Renaissance notion to 
portray the ideal relationship of man to God and of man to 
man. It is theologically, philosophically, and rhetorically 
sound. In his relationship to Eve, I submit, Adam is less 
disciplined, less vigilant, and seems to possess less neces­
sary knowledge— therein lies his vulnerability.
In this passage (VIII, 529-533)5 Milton anticipates 
his statement in IX, 999: Adam "was fondly overcome with
Female charm." I suggest that here Milton is being deliber­
ately ambiguous, perhaps to allow for the traditional impli­
cations of Adam's romantic attachment to Eve as the decisive 
factor in Adam's fall as well as to show cognizance of the 
powerful sympathetic bond implicit in the word "charm," 
quite evident to the seventeenth-century reader. Tillyard^? 
says and Waldock feels that this line is a misfit. Waldock
calls it "a clash . . . between Milton's theory of a matter
28and the matter as he has actually presented it." B.A. 
Wright points out the interesting view to which I earlier 
referred in another connection, that "charm as used here of 
feminine beauty . . . has lost its original force. In 
Milton's time the primary meaning was still 'a magic spell; 
a mysterious, extraordinary or preter-natural power to in­
fluence, subdue, c o n t r o l . '"^9 Such a fact not only helps to 
elucidate Milton's comment, but it also would seem to
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vindicate Milton from the charge that he failed to justify 
its inclusion. Inasmuch as the poet has clearly emphasized 
the sympathetic bond which unites Adam and Eve and the world 
of Eden,'an integral part of which is the element of magical 
charm— most potent where love or greater similitude exists—  
it follows that such a force not carefully disciplined would 
be an important and perhaps decisive element in man’s dis­
obedience. It surely renders him vulnerable.
Professor Sims’s observation on the "semantic sig­
nificance" of the term charm in Milton’s vision of the bliss­
ful Eden in Book IV is also instructive here. He refers to 
Helen Darbishire’s commentary on her sudden awakening to the 
rich suggestiveness of the phrase "charm of the earliest 
birds" (IV, 64-2) when she heard an old country woman use the 
phrase in a similar way. Only then did she recall the Old 
English derivation of charm in cierm which means "buzzing or 
twittering of b i r d s . T h e  linguistic appropriateness of 
charm to describe the Edenic setting. Professor Sims points 
out, is quite singular; for it lends emphasis to the blending 
of the peaceful setting and the soft sounds of the "gentle, 
yielding (even when questioning) dependency of woman at her 
loveliest."31 Thus Milton’s contextual use of the term is 
ever consistent, though the meaning may slightly vary.
Whether Eve’s charm is displayed as a physical quality or 
as the soft twittering of "sweet Converse and Love (IX,
9 0 9), it is a power which exerts a preternatural influence
on one bound to her by the bond of sympathy. Thus this power 
must be kept under gentle submission and must not be allowed 
ascendancy in the conduct of the affairs of Eden for which it 
is ill-suited. It is to be enjoyed, not worshipped. Adam’s 
response indicates that Eve's argument for division of labor 
is certainly not girded by logic. But there is a tragic 
discrepancy between his words and his actions here. Sucji a 
development signifies his abdication of right reason to 
passion. Sympathy can be equally operative in either state.
It is well at this point to review Milton's doc­
trine of sympathy to see how it functions in the crucial 
event of the poem. Sympathy, though instinctual or natural, 
is non-moral. It is not a quality of the soul, for it exists 
throughout the scala naturae. It joins man to man, man to 
God, and man to the lower creatures. It is that operative 
principle which forms the"common bond of all things from the 
highest to the lowest. It is powerful, should not be 
forced, and cannot be commanded. Since Milton holds that 
the amount of sympathy differs among the parts in degree not 
in kind, the relationship and responsibility differ in degree 
not in kind among the parts. In God, the source of all, lies 
perfection. Everything else achieves its measure of per­
fection from this source by its conscious receptivity, as in 
man and those higher in the scale, and by instinct in 
those lower*, in the scale. Only man and his superiors can 
exercise reason and will for only they have a soul.
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Responsibility for guicling the function of sympathy, in the 
psychological realm, rests in the reason and the will. Re­
sponsibility for the lower creatures in Milton’s cosmology 
rests in man; they enjoy his weal or incur his woes. Good­
ness at no time is separable from God. He is the primary 
efficient cause of goodness and man is the proximate cause 
("Christian Doctrine," Works. XVII, 26-27)* So no action 
turned from God is good.
In the crucial scene of the poem the vulnerabilities 
just outlined are set forth in bold relief. (Here the ro­
mantic element is momentous; in the actual Fall, fellow- 
feeling or the sense of oneness is paramount.) The question 
is whether Eve and Adam will divide to better tend the 
garden (a task hardly urgent) or fortify against a common 
enemy whose harm is certain as to fact but not necessarily 
as to time. Together they are strong; it is "hopeless to 
circumvent them join’d" (IX, 260). Apart they are weaker, 
subject to harm (IX, 251-259)* Adam debates noncommittally, 
what seems to me, and as the Lady in Comus showed of chastity 
at the climax of her temptation, an undebatable question.
He weakly defends a just position; he poorly impresses upon 
Eve the profundity of the situation. In the end he gives in 
to her, perhaps out of love and fear of incurring her dis­
pleasure and hence his own, for she is his other self. But 
to be self-centered is to turn from God and to likewise turn 
toward a lower being.
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Adam’s step may find some justification in the feel­
ings, but it can hardly be sanctioned by reason. To be 
ruled by the feelings rather than the rational faculty there­
fore was anathema to the Renaissance belief in order. This 
too was a heritage of the age. Medieval psychology-ethics 
and Christian writers generally place passions in the ap­
petitive part of the soul and to the sensitive appetite 
rather than to the intellectual appetite called the will. 
Considered in themselves as movements of the irrational ap- 
petitites, passions contain no moral good or evil but are 
subject to the command of reason and will.32 They are good 
when controlled by reason, as Adam explained to Eve, and 
evil when not so controlled. This is the substance of 
Raphael's remarks to Adam: "Accuse not Nature, she has don
her part/Do thou but thine" (VIII, 561-562).
Raphael warns Adam that the same "touch" in cattle 
and beasts must not "subdue/ The Soule of man, or the passion 
in him move" (VIII, 579-585). The distinction which Raphael 
makes for Adam is crucial as the course of events develops. 
True love is good; for it "refines/ The thoughts, enlarges 
the heart, hath his seat / In Reason, and is judicious, is 
the scale" by which man ascends the ladder to heavenly love. 
It is not carnality, which even"the beasts share (VIII, 
588-59^). Thus true love must be guided by reason; it in­
heres in the love of God. Such love Adam and Eve enjoy as 
long as their orientations are God-directed. By following
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his lower feelings rather than his reason, Adam abdicates 
his position as leader. As Eve’s ability to make decisions, 
especially where knowledge was lacking (as it is here), has 
been wanting in several instances already pointed out, what 
she needs is guidance, not indulgence. Eve herself later 
says: ’Why didst not thou the Head/ Command me absolutely
not to go . . .?’’ (IX, 1155-56); and this is the essence of 
the Son’s remarks: "Was shee thy God . . . thy guide,/
Superior, or but equal . . ./ She was . . .  to attract thy 
Love, not thy Subjection" (X, 1^5-53). Since reason must 
guide the will, the channels must be kept clear lest it mis­
inform and guide amiss.
Free will is, as we have seen crucial to any human 
act. Since the case of man r e s t s  o n  this faculty, a brief 
look at some of the typical commentary on free will is in­
dicated. Hooker holds that man is free to choose evil from 
good only when he possesses adequate knowledge, when the 
gift of reason is not blurred by custom and/or p a s s i o n . ^3 
Milton would agree with this basic observation. Adam does 
have adequate knowledge to evaluate the choice he is making. 
And Milton would also see it as man’s responsibility to keep 
his gift of reason unsullied by custom and passion. This is 
the crux of Raphael’s remarks. Ursinius, a sixteenth- 
century theologian, is close to Milton’s and the modern view 
of the doctrine of free will. Ursinius sees freedom as the 
individual’s ability to act on its own judgment "in
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accordance with the order congruent with its nature, and to 
enjoy good things suited to it, without prohibition or 
hindrance, and not to sustain defects or burdens not proper 
to its nature."3^ Now if one accepts the terms of Milton's 
cosmology, then Adam does have the capacity to act in harmony 
with order congruent with his nature, and so long as he tends 
towards God, to which his nature inclines, he enjoys bliss 
unlimited. He sustains burdens not proper to his nature 
when he bends towards a lower creature’s will rather than 
towards God. This first happens when he agrees to a division 
of labor, although he knows Eve’s case is faulty. In bending 
his will to hers he becomes more like her and less worthy of 
his role as her guide: Milton signifies this by the epithet,
"domestick Adam" (IX, 318). And finally, ’Go; for thy stay 
not free, absents thee more" (IX, 372) is not only poor 
judgment, but is also a selfish evaluation rather than one in 
harmony with the divine will. No doubt Eve could have been 
persuaded by logic as she had before. Her "native innocence" 
is not sufficient for sole reliance. God had done his part 
by her by placing her in Adam’s charge, not on her own (IX, 
372-37^)* Adam’s act is a departure from the order set for 
him and for Eve. But Adam is here yet a free agent with the 
responsibility to maintain his relationship with God through 
diligence and vigilance in knowledge and virtue. If he 
allows his reason to Inform his will falsely, the original 
fault is still his.
199
Through a gradual and almost imperceptible process, 
Adam has allowed himself to allot to Eve a higher place than 
that destined for her. He has failed to heed Raphael's 
warning (VIII, 562-67). His reasoning power is sufficient 
to withstand sin so long as he lets it be his guide. But as 
one giving-in leads inevitably to another, the first step 
uncorrected is a step from God and toward the Fall. Adam, 
by his giving in thus to Eve, places his responsibility in 
Eve and thus abrogates his responsibility to God. Given the 
circumstances subsequent events, like those of a Greek 
tragedy, are all but inevitable. The breakdown in the 
proper relationship among the elements in Paradise Lost is, 
in short, reflected in the will; no longer does the will of 
man exist in perfect harmony with God's, nor with that of 
each other. Though the bonds of nature are weakened, they 
are not destroyed.
Cut off from her sustaining powers, no longer "hand 
in hand" with her "associate sole," (IX, 227) Eve falls 
victim to the subtle tempter. So:
Her rash hand in evil hour 
Forth reaching to the Fruit, she pluck'd,
she eat.
Earth felt the wound, and Nature from her
seat
Sighing through all her Works gave signs
of woe.
That all was lost.»
(IX, 780-78 )^
Milton's entire account of the effects of the fruit and of 
the act of sin is informed by the doctrine of sympathy.
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Eve’s obeisance to the tree was done in homage to "the 
power/That dwelt within, whose presence had infus'd/ Into 
the sciental sap . . . drink of Gods" (IX, 835-838). But 
more significantly, Adam himself also felt the wound of 
Eve's sin (IX, 84-5-8^ 6). Rushing to meet Eve with a floral 
garland in his hand, he, upon discovery of the cause of his 
misgiving, let the wreath fall to the ground "and all the 
faded Roses shed" (IX, 893), marking the occurrence of the 
first death in Eden— the natural consequence of sin. Now 
that his bond with God has been weakened by his own laxity, 
Adam is now, I suggest, deprived of the sustaining powers 
of God’s goodness. His reason is no longer right and can 
thus misinform his will. Man is insufficient to stand alone. 
The Renaissance view of human nature generally held is set 
forth by Purchas: "The Bodie is derived from earth not the
Sunne, Stares and any part of the Aethereall superior world 
. . . from the lowest and basest of all." But man has a 
soul and through the soul, man receives divine sustenance. 
"Such a Power has the Soule in and over the Bodie; but vol­
untarily admitting, committing such Tyrannie . . . how often 
does the Soul for Sensuall and bodily respects forget [its] 
spirituall N a t u r e . H e n r y  More expressed a similar idea: 
"The Soul by sympathizing too much with the Brutish Body 
becomes brutish herself and loses her Divinity.Without 
the sustaining power of God’s goodness to direct the reason 
which in turn directs the will, the bond of love and
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sympathy is too strong a force to he denied. Deficient in 
the knowledge of the ways of God and man and of human na­
ture, yet equipped with the essential knowledge to obey and 
thus stand, man places himself in a position of having to 
make a choice between God and man. The preliminary acts had 
so dimmed his reason that he no longer has sufficient under­
standing to guide his will rightly.
Adam places himself in an untenable position when he 
bends his will to his feelings, not in full knowledge nor 
perhaps intentionally— but the inevitable consequence is the 
same. Upon discovery of Eve's transgression, he was 
"amaz'd,/ Astonied stood and Blank, while horror chill/Ran 
through his veins" (IX, 889-8 9 1); for he did not wish to 
disobey God's interdiction. But he had placed himself in 
such a position that, as he understands it and also accord­
ing to the terms of Milton's cosmology. Eve's fall is. his fall 
(IX, 906-9 0 7); and her fall is the ruin of nature also (IX, 
94U-9^2) and that of the whole of mankind (IX, ^16).
As I see it, this concept of the sympathetic bond of 
all created things underlies and is the animating principle 
that informs Adam's crucial decision to fix his lot with 
Eve ; and Eve's fall, too, was actuated by her links with 
nature. The concept of sympathy forms a dominant philo­
sophical background for the theme of Paradise Lost. As I 
have already shown, it is evident in every important scene 
involving man and so it is vividly portrayed in the speech '
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made by Adam upon his discovery of Eve's transgression. I 
concur in the view that this speech is the climax of the 
poem and that, as has been asserted by Waldock and Hughes, 
all else in the poem depends upon how this speech is read.
Generally overlooked, underestimated, or, perhaps, 
misread by previous commentators on the Fall, it shows sym­
pathy as a significant motivating factor for the act of 
disobedience by man.
And mee with thee hath ruin'd, for with thee 
Certain my resolution is to Die;
How can I live without thee, how forgo
Thy sweet Converse and Love so dearly join'd.
To live again in these wilde Woods forlorn? 
Should God create another Eve, and I 
Another Rib afford, yet loss of thee 
Would never from my heart; no, no, I feel 
The Link of Nature draw me: Flesh of Flesh,
Bone of my Bone thou art, and from thy state 
Mine never shall be parted, bliss or woe.
So having said, as one from sad dismay 
Recomforted, and after thoughts disturb'd 
Submitting to what seem'd remediless.
Thus in calm mood his Words to Eve he turn'd. 
Bold deed thou hast presum'd, advent'rous 
Eve,
And peril great provok't, who thus hath dar'd 
That sacred Fruit, sacred to abstinence.
Much more to taste it under ban to touch.
But past who can recall, or don undoe?
Not God Omnipotent, nor Fate; yet so 
Perhaps thou shalt not Die, perhaps the Fact 
Is not so hainous now, foretasted Fruit,
Profan'd first by the Serpent, by him first 
Made common and unhallow'd ere our taste;
Nor yet on him found deadly. . . .
Then sidetracked by fallacious reasoning and lack of knowl­
edge, Adam decides that eating of the fruit may not bring 
death, but "proportional ascent" as it did for the serpent.
Or perhaps God will not allow his plan for men to be thus
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thwarted:
Nor can I think that God, Creator wise,
Though threatening, will in earnest so
destroy
Us his prime Creatures, dignifi’d so high.
Set over all his Works, which in our Fall,
For us created, needs with us must faile. 
Dependent made; so God shall uncreate.
Be frustrate, do, undo, and labor loose 
Not well conceiv'd of God, who though his
Power
Creation could repeat, yet would be loath 
Us to abolish, least the Adversary 
Triumph and say; Fickle their State whom God 
Most favors, who can please him long?
Though he struggles with the tragic implications of his act
and briefly digresses on false hopes and possible ways to
avert the dire consequences of his action, he knows his lot
is fixed with that of Eve:
However I with thee have fixt my Lot,
Certain to undergo like doom: if Death 
Consort with thee. Death is to mee as Life;
So forcible within my heart I feel 
The Bond of Nature draw me to my owne.
My own in thee, for what thou art is mine;
Our State cannot be sever'd, we are one.
One Flesh; to loose thee were to loose
myself.
(13^ 908-959)
The overt act of Adam's eating the fruit was a na­
tural consequence of the acts which preceded it, so inter­
related are the parts of their world. This is what Adam 
means by the "bond of nature" (IX, 956), not the 
"uxoriousness" and "gregariousness" which Tillyard and others 
have c i t e d Nor yet "the heroics" which Rajan^? finds im­
plicit in these lines; nor the self-love which Summers' 
commentary c h a r g e s  1^6* it is more' than the love "untouched by
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sensuality" •which Wright^^ and Hanford^^ find— though cer­
tainly that love is present. But as Milton has pointed out 
time and again, there can be no real love where sympathy does 
not exist; and conversely, sympathy is strongest where love 
is strongest. Nor does Adam’s bond mean merely that of sym­
pathy as compassion, which Wolfe indicates by his statement: 
"It was not only the charm of Eve that swayed Adam's judg­
ment; it was a sympathy born of crisis for a fellow human 
in d e s p a i r . "^ 3 Samuel Purchas is closer to Milton’s line of 
thought and expresses the seventeenth-century idea of sym­
pathy as the link of nature : "Such indeed is the sympathie
betwixt the Soule and Bodie, that as Adam and Eve, they take 
part each with the other, though it be in the forbidden 
fruit; both tempting and tempted of each other, living and 
dying t o g e t h e r . T h i s  is the sympathy of actual identifi­
cation, natural, not born of a crisis, so that the fate of 
one is the fate of the other.
Throughout Paradise Lost^-indeed, throughout the 
whole body of his works, Milton has prepared the reader for 
such a dramatic affirmation of man's common bond by his em­
phasis on relationship and responsibility. In every impor­
tant scene in Paradise Lost involving the divine and human 
realms, Milton has emphasized this unity and freedom in God. 
There may exist a bond without God (as is the infernal bond), 
but such a bond cannot be creative, free, or pleasurable. 
Sympathy is the operative principle in any bond. It gains
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its morality by the direction of the conscious will. Here, 
the will having been itself misinformed, misdirects sympathy. 
Thus sympathy becomes the actuating principle which separ­
ates man from God and joins him to his fellow. Under the 
circumstances, the single act accomplishes both results. 
Sympathy is not the cause of man's sin, that lies in the 
will: but it is the irresistible force in the completion of 
the act begun in Adam's turn from God towards Eve. Only at 
the act of Adam is the original sin completed.
Because Adam's rational faculty is dimmed, he sees
the situation remediless (he did not know of God's mercy nor
had he needed it before), but one thing is clear, whatever
the consequences:
So forcible within my heart I feel
The Bond of Nature draw me to my own.
My own in thee, for what thou art is mine:
Our State cannot be sever'd, we are one.
One Flesh; to lose thee were to lose myself.
(IX, 954-959)
Within this speech is the declaration of an existing bond; it 
is internal, natural, forceful, mutual, and magnetic; it is 
a bond which cannot be severed and hence the fate of one is 
the fate of the other. It declares a fusion of the selves, 
so that the self of one includes the self of the other. As 
a result of this there is mutual and complete participation 
in various experiences so that if one suffers or enjoys,
the other is similarly affected. This is true not only be­
cause they love each other, but also because they are in­
dissolubly joined by that mutual bond of amity which unites
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all creation; but the closer the similitude the greater the 
sympathy. Theirs is the archetypal human union. This 
Milton, on sound theological basis, made the cornerstone of 
his divorce tracts. When Adam and Eve fell, by this same 
union all mankind through them fell (IX, 7840. Relevant to 
this, Milton in Tetrachordon describes this human bond as 
"an intimât quality good or evil, through the whole progeny 
of Adam, which like a radical heat, or mortal chilnes joynes 
them or disjoynes them irresistibly" (ÇPW, II, 606). Thus 
the bond lacks a valuative capacity, though its power is ir­
resistible. Like the passions, it receives its morality from 
man's rational faculty.
Marjorie Nicolson's remarks on right reason are in­
structive here: it is "a faculty innate, shared by man with 
God, an infallible judge of right and wrong, which directs 
and orders the will, the instincts and appetites."^^ Thus 
since man has responsibility for maintaining control over his 
reason, any action which ensues as a consequence of rational 
ineptitude cannot be deterministic. This I suggest, frees 
Milton's justification of the ways of God to men from the 
charge of determinism. But the function' of sympathy is 
clear. Upon Adam's partaking of the fruit, "Earth trembl'd 
from her entrails, as again/ In pangs, and nature gave a 
second groan,/ Sky low'r'd, and muttering thunder, some sad 
drops/ Wept at completing of the Mortal Sin original" (IX, 
1000-1004 [italics are mine]). Here the bonds of nature are
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again affirmed, signifying the universal effect of man's 
act. Natiore, according to biblical tradition, reacts again 
in a similar manner upon the completion of Christ's vi­
carious Atonement for the Original Sin (Matthew 27: 51-5^; 
Mark 15: 33-39; Luke 23: 44-^7).
To explain Adam's plight in this manner justifies 
his ways with Eve more than it does with God, to be sure.
But it gives insight into an essential symbiosis between 
man and the universe. Whatever may be said of the delusions 
or fantasies in Adam's logic, the important truth remains 
that the action precipitated by it is real enough and the 
consequences are inevitable. A person frightened by an 
imaginary danger may be affected just as much as by a real 
one. Adam's fall is neither illusion nor projection, nor 
is it a subtle psychical deception— it is a sober reality, 
and so are its consequences.
Only once before had such a strong statement of 
fellow-feeling and self-sacrifice like that by Adam been 
expressed in Paradise Lost. That was in heaven on the oc­
casion of the Son's offering of Himself for the sin of man­
kind (III, 217-265). Though both Adam and the Son, as 
Milton depicts the story, are to an extent uninformed about 
the real nature of death at the time they give themselves, 
the main motivation is sympathy and a feeling of identity 
with the transgressor (III, l4l, 238). For the Son, the 
identity is by anticipation (III, 283, 297, 4lO, 4l1). The
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declaration of each is greeted by praise. Eve praises Adam: 
"0 glorious trial of exceeding love/ Illustrious evidence, 
example high!” (IX, 960-61). The angelic choir praised the 
Son: ”0 unexampl'd love . . .” (111, ^10). It is easy to
see that the vicarious atonement of the Son is superior to 
Adam's self-sacrifice: the first is to bring life and the 
other brought death. The voluntary, redemptive death of the 
Son is an act of pure, immortal love, completely unselfish, 
its cause greater, its agent abler, but most of all because 
it serves to augment the glory of God (III, 297j 280-281; 
269-71; 410-11).
The reaction to man’s Fall is parodied in Hell by 
Sin and Death. They discovered the Fall through sympathy 
with Satan. By the active principle which unites Sin and 
Death to Satan they not only communicate at a distance, as 
did Adam and Eve whose union they parody, but also experi­
ence occult attraction and influence. Sin and Death cannot 
"miss the way, so strongly drawn/ By this new felt attraction 
and instinct” (X, 262-63).
Methinks I feel new strength within me rise,
. . . whatever drawes me on.
Or sympathie, or som connatural force 
Powerful at greatest distance to unite 
With secret amity things of like kinde 
By secretest conveyance. Thou my Shade 
Inseparable must with mee along:
For Death from Sin no power can separate.
(X, 243, 245-251)
Though their bond is destructive, it is nevertheless as
powerful as the human bond:
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For I no sooner in my Heart divin'd,
My Heart, which by a secret harmonie 
Still moves with thine, join'd in connexion
sweet
That thou on Earth hadst prosper'd, which
thy looks
Now also evidence, but straight I felt 
Though distant from thee Worlds between,
yet felt
That I must after thee with this thy Son,
Such fatal consequence unites us three.
(X, 357-36^)
One cannot escape the comparison of this union of Satan,
Sin, and Death with the other unions portrayed in Paradise 
Lost; the union of the Father and the Son (and the Spirit) 
and that of Adam and Eve. As the diabolical sympathy is 
negative, it promises sacrifice neither for love nor for 
salvation, but for destruction. So Satan's fellows greet 
him not with praise, but with hisses (X, 508). But shortly, 
horror fell on them for as they saw Satan turn into a ser­
pent, and they through "horrid sympathiejL. became what they 
saw (X, 53^-^1) and are ever doomed to undergo annual change 
for numbered days (X, 576). Satan's act is a complete in­
version of good; Adam's act is good but misdirected; the 
Son's act only is the perfect example.
But Milton's universe is a universe of order. So 
actions must beget certain reactions. This is part of the 
pattern of God's justice. His ways are immutable, else must 
He "revoke the high Decree/ unchangeable. Eternal" (III, 
126-127).
With the Fall all values invert in due course. 
Through the sympathetic bond of nature all creation incurred
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the blame. Nature sympathetically loses its harmony be­
cause its bond of amity is weakened when man turns from God 
and sets at variance the natural order.
Beasts now with Beast gan war, and Fowle
with Fowle,
And Fish with Fish . . .
. . . Nor stood much in awe 
Of Man, but fled him, or with count'nance
grim
Glar'd on him passing.
(X, 710-71 )^
In gradual decline from its former state, the universal frame 
reflects the discordance of man's sin. Change begets other 
changes (X, 692ff.). The change in the sun's motions is per­
haps most far-reaching in its effects. Milton relates three 
versions of the effect of sin on solar functions;
Some say he bid his angels turne ascanse 
The Poles of Earth twice ten degrees and
more
From the Suns Axle; they with labour push'd 
Oblique the Centric Globe.
(X, 668-671)
But the second is more in harmony with the natural relation­
ship among the parts to their source:
Som say the Sun 
Was bid turn Reines from th' Equinoctial
Rode
Like distant breadth to Taurus with the
Seav'n
Atlantick Sisters, and the Spartan Twins 
Up to the Tropic Crab; thence down amaine.
(X, 671-675)
Still the climactic position and the omission of the prefa­
tory "some say" would seem to indicate Milton's preference
for the third version of the method of solar change. It
I
among the three is most informed by the tradition of
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sympathy, for it makes the change a spontaneous reaction:
At that tasted Fruit 
The Sun, as from Thyestean Banquet, turn'd 
His course intended; else how had the World 
Inhabited, though sinless more then now.
Avoided pinching cold and scorching heate?
(X, 687-691)
Nevertheless, the changes in the solar system produced "like
change on Sea and Land” (X, 693): a perpetual revolution of
hot and cold seasons, irregular planetary motions, storms,
tempests, malignant astral influence. In short, nature now
speaks in a various language— not in her old harmonious
voice (X, 651-719).
But it is to man we turn with keener discernment for
in him lies the cause and the cure. In him "high Winds
worse within/ Began to rise" (IX, 1122-23); for disorder is
reflected in the microcosm as well as the macrocosm. Fierce
passions replaced the rule of reason. Antipathy replaced
sympathy. The "calm region once/ And full of peace, now
tost and turbulent" (IX, 1125-26):
For Understanding rul'd not, and the Will 
Heard not her lore, both in subjection now 
To sensual Appetite, who from beneathe 
Usurping over sovran Reason claimd 
Superior sway.
(IX, 1127-1131 )
There is no harmony within, so this condition is reflected 
in the actions. Charges and countercharges flow. Hatred 
of self is reflected in hatred of the self in others. Em­
braces (IX, 9 9 0) turn to seizures (IX, 1015); love to lust 
(IX, 1013); innocence to guiltie shame (IX, 1058).
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Thus they in mutual accusation spent 
The fruitless hours, but neither self-
condemning,
And of their vain contest appear'd no
end.
When the voice of God was heard to pronounce sentence "Love 
was not in their looks, either to God/ Or to each other"
(X, 111-112); so each shifted responsibility for their sin 
from himself to another.
For Adam:
This woman whom thou mad'st to be my help.
And gav'st me as thy perfet gift, so good.
So fit, so acceptable, so Divine
That from her hand_I could suspect no ill
She gave me of the Tree, and I did eate.
(X, 125-128, 143)
This statement by Adam is indicative of his postlapsarian 
logic. True, Eve was good and fit, as he says, but not to 
be his leader. For turned from God, nothing is good; turned
towards God, all is good. As Milton sees it from his monis­
tic basis, the fault was not in the gift but in its use.
Adam has a keen view of their relationship but not of his 
responsibility to make of this relationship something good. 
Thus God's reply:
Was she made thy guide,
Superior, or but equal, that to her
Thou didst resigne thy Manhood, and the Place
Wherein God set thee above her made of thee.
And for thee.
(X, 146-150)
And Eve says: "The Serpent me beguil'd and I did eate"
(X, 162), again indicating a conscious rejection of a higher 
for a lower being.
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Justice must take its course. They receive their 
just sentence; hut It Is to be justice tempered with mercy 
(X, 59)* Eve, the first to sin, Is also the first to re­
direct herself from herself. Only then can she admit her 
transgression and seek redress.
Between us two let there be peace, both
j oynlng,
As joyn'd In Injuries, one enmltle.
(X, 9 2 k - 9 2 5 )
Since she has sinned against both God and Adam and he against 
only God, she Is willing to bear the whole guilt. Only when 
this step Is taken can they be reunited. Only then can they 
be said to share common guilt or good. So Adam Is moved to 
reconciliation with her by accepting his responsibility that 
"on this head all might be visited" (X, 955)- Now they can 
"strive In offices of Love, how they may lighten/ Each 
others burden . . ." (X, 959-61 ). They can now turn toward 
God "confess and pardon beg" (X, 1088-90). Only when each 
Is willing to accept his responsibility can the right rela­
tion be restored, first between man and man, and then, be­
tween man and God. Prevenlent grace had thus made their 
prayer possible. The Son Intercedes and mercy tempers jus­
tice. They must Incur the penalty for sin, be banished from 
Paradise, but there Is hope of redemption by means of the 
Son. Adam receives sign of his renewed relationship:
. . . Persuasion In me grew
That I was heard with favour; peace returnd
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Home to my Brest, and to my memorle.
His Promise . . .
(XI, 152-55)
By this promise, mankind may repair the ruins occasioned by 
the Fall. Eve, who committed the initial act of disobedience, 
will be an instrument by which this is achieved. "Mother of 
all Mankind" (XI, 159), her daughter Mary, a Second Eve, 
will bear the Second Adam. Thus is the divine-human corre­
lative to be perfected; for this Son will be the highest 
human and the lowest form of the transcendent Deity— a union 
of the human and divine hands in the accomplishment of the
final reparation of the ruins caused by the first sin.
Further effects of their sin reveal themselves, signs
of the irreversibility of the divine decree (XI, l8l). Na­
ture reflects its steady decline from its prelapsarian state: 
day becomes dark and beast pursues beast (XI, 181-207). This 
dissonance is a fitting harbinger of the dire news which Adam 
and Eve presently receive. They must leave Eden. But 
Michael comforts them: God’s
omnipresence fills 
Land, Sea, and Aire, and every Kinde that
lives,
Fomented by his virtual Power and warm’d:
. . . surmise not then 
His presence to these narrow bounds confin’d 
Of Paradise or Eden.
(XI, 335-337, 340-342)
The world then is larger than Eden, and so are 
Eden’s consequences. Adam is shown the future. He beholds 
further.effects of the brokenness the primal parents caused: 
envy, strife, misery, death. He weeps: "Though not of
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woman born; Compassion quell'd/ His best of Man" (XI, ^95- 
^97)* The deformities exhibited in the future man, as Adam 
recognizes, pervert the Maker's image in man— just as had 
the Original Sin. Future sin and the original sin are es­
sentially the same: both break fealty with the Maker:
Thir Maker's Image . . . then
Forsook them, when themselves they
villifi'd
To serve ungovern'd appetite, and
took
His Image whom they serv'd, a brutish
Vice,
Inductive mainly to the sin of Eve.
(XI, 515-519)
Adam is warned of the differences between appearance and 
reality. Men will be misled by a seeming good if they at­
tempt to use pleasure as the standard for true virtue, just 
as the archetypal man was. The desire for power is to be 
the bane of future man just as it was for the original man.
The angel informs Adam that the usurpation of power is a 
perennial destroyer of "concord and the law of nature from 
the Earth" (XII, 25-30).
But man cannot redeem himself. His hope is ful­
filled by the promise made after the Fall: God with man
unites to recure the death wound made by Satan and thus 
bruise the serpent's heel (XII, 3 8 2). But man has a part—  
like the role of the good angels in the heavenly battle, or 
the two-handed engine in Lvcidas— salvation is to be achieved 
"by [the Savior's] works [in thee and thy Seed]" in the human 
race (XII, 390-395). The supreme penalty for man is paid
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on the cross for all who accept him. These he will return 
to gather unto himself (XII, -^60-^ 65) • In the interim, a 
Comforter abides within the believers as a guide and pro­
tector. Through him the elect can endure the brokenness 
that characterizes the world (XII, ^85-520). Through grace 
Adam and his progeny can find a "Paradise within" by learn­
ing true patience, temperance, '%oy with fear and pious sor­
row, equally enur’d by moderation" (XI, 360-36^ -) :
Onely add
Deeds to thy knowledge answerable, add Faith,
Add Vertue, Patience, Temperance, add Love,
By name to come . . . called Charitie, the soul
Of all the rest: then wilt thou not be loath
To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess 
A paradise within thee, happier farr.
(XII, 582-58?)
Thus can Adam be comforted and comfort Eve. So they leave
Paradise united:
They hand in hand with wandring steps and slow. 
Through Eden took their solitary way.
(XII, 6^8-6^9)
The role of the Savior is refined in Paradise
Regain*d. Christ, as Milton had earlier declared, is the
"most perfect Heroe try’d in the heaviest plight/ Of labours
huge and hard, too hard for human wight" (I, 13-1'+? 23). He
portrays the exalted man in unity with the will of God.
Milton, as I have indicated, saw the pattern of Christ’s
life as exemplary to man; for man by submitting himself to
the will of God may to that extent become one with Him.
There were other traditions of Christology available, the
one of Christ as the Suffering Servant, for example. But
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the one of Christ as the Exemplar of humble faith and obedi­
ence seems to have appealed most to Milton. Yet, as Barbara 
Levaiski notes, Milton does not exactly fit into any of the 
"common christological positions," though he incorporated 
views from many
The elements which Milton selected for his view of 
Christ's nature further indicate his sympathetic impulse.
Each element is not only compatible with the poet's doctrine 
of sympathy, but it is also more credible because of such an 
orientation. Milton shares the Arian belief that Christ's 
nature is a fusion of the divine and human into a single 
person at the Incarnation. While the individual natures re­
tain their distinct properties, a single person with what 
seems to be a single understanding and will is formed. The 
process by which this is accomplished is called "emptying" 
of the divine nature.Having biblical sanction, the term 
is variously interpreted. Milton's interpretation lends 
itself to his standard effects and affinities inhering in a 
natural relationship that increases in quality with the as­
sumption of responsibility. Milton's literal acceptance of 
the term emptying is compatible with his views on the Godhead, 
the creation, and his doctrine of sympathy. Moreover his 
view has much to substantiate it biblically and linguisti­
cally. For the first, the matter of growth as indicated in 
Luke 2: 52 is harder to explain for one already divine. That 
Christ could increase in "wisdom and stature and in favor
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with God.and man" favors, then, a literal interpretation of 
"emptying."
Milton also presents Christ as a summation of the 
human rac-e. Such a presentation is evidenced by his sym­
bolistic use of typology. Since typology has its orienta­
tions in the unity and identification of several entities, 
its use is a further indication of Milton's sympathetic im­
pulse. Milton has here a rich tradition on which to draw. 
Origen had earlier "synthesized the various approaches by 
taking the Old Testament figures as types of the total 
reality that is Christ, and therefore as shadowing forth, 
variously, the historical events of his life as related in 
the Gospel, his mystical life in the church as a whole or in
each individual member who has 'put on Christ,' or his
U-8glorious appearance at the end of time." But Milton as 
usual enhances the available tradition. As Mrs. Lewalski 
says, the poet's use of typology is an "important dimension 
in Milton's achievement in the poem. Milton's special ac­
complishment is to make typological allusions part of the 
debate-duel between Christ and Satan and thus to make them 
wholly organic not only to the theme but also to the dra­
matic movement of the poem— Christ's discovery of himself 
and his role through the temptation encounter. Thus the 
idea of sympathy is not only the animating idea of Milton's 
portrait of Christ, but it is also a structural principle.
Paradise Regain'd, as Mrs. Lewalski points out.
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depends on the nature of Christ’s identity for "the substance 
of its dramatic a c t i o n . That the concept of Christ’s 
emptying himself of divinity furnishes the central theme for 
the poem is also significant for Milton's deontology and 
ambiance. Because the Son is at the outset of his career 
emptied of his divine component, he is a fitter exemplar 
for the mere human. The effects of his growing relationship 
with the divine can not only produce the dramatic tension of 
the work, but can also be depicted with the conventional 
ambiance of sympathy, especially the accessions of divine 
power in response to the Savior's growth. Thus the Son 
maintains his relationship through steadfastness and obedi­
ence; and God in turn responds with "divine illumination 
activating the divine" in the correspondent.^^
The classicus locus for the biblical sanction of the 
term "emptying" as a descriptive term for the process of the 
Incarnation is Phillipians 2: 6-8 . . . "Christ Jesus, who 
though he was in the form of God, did not count equality 
with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking 
the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men" 
(RSV). Almost universally, patristic interpretation held 
"Christ’s voluntary renunciation of the glory of God, but 
it did not imply his actual denuding himself of his power 
and his divine attributes; indeed Church Fathers and re­
formers alike held that the Son ’ emptied himself only with 
respect to the hypostatic union, but that he continued to
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exercise his divine power and attributes, outside that
52union, in his eternal subsistence in the Trinity.”
The first example of Milton’s use of préfiguration 
in Paradise Regain*d is that of Christ as the Second Adam. 
Biblical precedence for this type is extensive. Perhaps the 
more usual locations are Phillipians 2:5-11; I Corinthians 
l5:^5“*+9 and Romans 5:1^, 19 (All RSV). The last is 
typical: ”Yet death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over
those whose sins were not like the transgression of Adam, 
who was a type of the one who was to come” (140 and "For by 
one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by one 
man's obedience many will be made righteous” (19). More 
explicitly, I Corinthians 15 sets up a comparison between 
the type and the reality: ”The first Adam became a living
being; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit” (^5)*
"Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we shall 
also bear the image of the man of heaven” (49). From this 
biblical and exegetical tradition one could readily find 
sanction for the typology Milton employed. But in some 
christologies, this Adam-Christ analogy might seem a bit 
nonparallel. Milton's portrait of the Son in Paradise 
Regain'd suggests an eclecticism grounded on biblical au­
thority and exegesis which is credible. I have already 
pointed to Auerbach's study on typology in which he states 
that the "figurai schema permits both poles, the figure and 
the fulfillment to retain characteristics of concrete
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historical reality."53 Figurai realism, then, was approved 
and defended by the Church Fathers, especially Tertullian, 
Jerome, and Augustine,5^
Milton in the induction to Paradise Regain*d sets 
the stage on which the action is to unfold. Christ, through 
His facing and surmounting the temptations to which the 
devil subjects Him, is to be a recapitulation of the major 
heroes of the long line of the human race. Through these 
temptations Christ also comes to understand His own nature 
and to experience the illuminating effects of Els relation­
ship with the Father. Since the Second Adam obeys where the 
First Adam disobeyed, Milton's emphasis is not on the Cruci­
fixion, but on "firm obedience truly tried" (I, 1^). It is 
in &s temptations that Christ most nearly approximates the 
condition of man. It is there also that &  proves His merit 
to give His life as a ransom for the sin of mankind. The 
temptations follow a pattern similar to that of Milton's own 
life: individual, or special to a wider appeal, or the uni­
versal, and then to individual again. Some critics have 
detected at least a bit of aesthetic sympathy of the poet 
for his subject. The fact that Milton had by this time 
settled for his kingdom within is perhaps support for this 
view.
The angle of vision in Paradise Regain'd is indi­
vidual, no longer explicitly corporate as it was in the prose 
and Paradise Lost.. The focus is on the individual man in
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harmony with the divine will. Thus the first temptation 
directed at self-centeredness is well calculated. Satan, 
feeling that the call of hunger might make Christ vulnerable 
suggests that he turn stones into bread. Adding to the 
Gospel accounts of the temptations, Milton uses the further 
temptation of the devil's banquet, the temptation to judge 
good by appearance and pleasure to the individual. The 
second temptation is group oriented; the temptation to rule 
over one's fellow-men. In Milton's deontology such a 
privilege cannot be granted before one is master of himself. 
Even so none of this is Satan's to give. The last is the 
temptation to Godhead. It is the culmination of the ascend­
ing order of the three temptations. So the place is twice 
significant: the pinnacle of the temptations is on the pin­
nacle of the temple. And the outcome is made even more 
strikingly significant by Milton's description of it:
'Tempt not the Lord thy God, He said
and stood.
But Satan smitten with amazement fell.
■ -  (IV, 561-562)
Such a stand not only established Christ's divinity, but it 
marked the beginning of Satan's end as a demonic force in 
the world. The first Adam had been driven out of Eden into 
the wilderness; but Christ here raises Eden in the wilder­
ness. Just as Adam's sins had prefigured all the types of 
later sins, so Christ's obedience points the way to the 
means of triumph over all types of disobedience.
Christ is also a Second Job, He represents a higher
223
patience. Though Satan had tempted Job and failed (I, 1^7)>
he did not learn from his failure. But Christ too is
Of female Seed, far abler to resist 
All his sollicitations, and at length 
All his vast force, and drive him
back to Hell,
Winning by Conquest what the first man
lost
By fallacy supriz'd.
(I, 151-155)
Job was marked in heaven as a just man. Though little known 
on earth he had true fame in heaven (III, 1164-70). Christ 
represents the epitome of what the perfect man Job had ex­
emplified.
Christ also sums up the figures Moses, and Elijah, 
the founder of the Law and the restorer of the Law respec­
tively. Again, Christ is to fulfill them not repeat them.
So he is the proclaimer of the new law which subsumes the 
old.^^ He institutes the rule of love instead of Law.
Mrs. Lewalski notes that the appearance of Moses and Elijah 
at Christ's transfiguration confirms the relation between 
them and C h r i s t . T h a t  the role which Christ plays is 
unique is evident by the new illumination which he receives 
from this encounter with Satan:
God has now sent his living Oracle 
Into the World, to teach his final will,- ■
And sends', his Spirit of Truth henceforth
to dwell
In pious Hearts, an inward Oracle 
To all truth requisite for men to know.
(I, 460-464)
Thus again Milton emphasizes the relationship which the
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Father keeps with all of his sons. He makes known to those 
"engrafted in Christ" through a "comprehension of spiritual 
things . . . all that is necessary for eternal salvation and 
the true happiness of life," he says in Christian Doctrine 
(Works. XVI, 7).
Milton further includes in the typological treatment 
of the Christ of Paradise Regain’d such classical figures as 
Socrates and Hercules, types of ethical knowledge and heroism 
(III, 95-99; IV, 56^-571)• Milton is here paying tribute to 
virtue— even of a pagan— for every man, as Milton had said, 
has a spark of the divine yet remaining in him. But by this 
same stroke Milton also places things in perspective. Just 
as the virtue of Christ is the highest form, as Milton sees 
it, so biblical knowledge takes priority over all other 
learning. No other songs can compare "with Sion's songs, to 
all true tasts excelling,/ Where God is prais'd aright, and 
Godlike men" abide (IV, 3^5ff)* But "moral vertue" signi­
fying the "light of nature not in all quite lost" is worthy 
of praise (IV, 351-355).
As Christ grows in knowledge and proves himself by 
meeting and surmounting his trials, he grows in relationship 
with God. At the beginning of his awareness of his mission, 
signs of his calling manifested themselves within him. His 
"spirit aspired" toward paths not destined for him: "Vic­
torious deeds flamed in my heart, heroic acts, one while/ To 
rescue Israel from the Roman yoke" (I, 15-17). He still
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needed the benefit of study and experience to learn God’s 
will for him. The wilderness provides the recess needed to 
contemplate the will of God. Through each victory over 
temptation he grows in insight. This in turn makes him 
fitter for the next trial and renders him more receptive of 
divine illuminations. His job is to obey God and by so doing 
he maintains his relationship with God and receives the con­
comitant rewards. He cannot accept Satan's gifts for he, 
like the Lady in Comus. must judge the gift by the giver 
(II, 3 2 2). He can renounce all classical learning and all 
wealth and power because nothing is good which does not come 
from God. So the Second Adam through study and diligence 
learned the right relationship, was obedient to it, and thus 
succeeded where the First Adam failed.
Milton in Paradise Regain'd also places the negative 
manifestations of the sympathetic bond of nature in perspec­
tive. He assigns to Satan astrological manipulations, 
portents, presages, omens, oracles, and dream interpreta­
tions that claim the power to predict the future (I, 39^-396). 
Certainly this would seem to be an assessment Milton makes 
on the pseudo-sciences of his age. Milton by the same token 
repudiates any deterministic influence over man and places 
his responsibility for his virtue on his free use of reason 
and will. Only then can man build the kingdom within.
Samson Agonistes. according to widely accepted 
chronology is Milton's last completed work.^? It presents
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as hero a man, not a demigod, who was "chosen" and afterwards 
relapsed from his responsibility as inherent in his relation­
ship with God and thus forfeited it. Cut off from his sus­
taining power, he experienced the gall and wormwood of a 
life without God. Unlike Satan who suggested: "if I was, I 
am; relation stands" (P.R.. IV, 519)? Samson learns that 
dynamic, creative relationship is one's own responsibility. 
Relationship does not stand; it either progresses or retro­
gresses. So when Samson comes to recognize his responsi­
bility for his plight, he is again able to reestablish his 
broken bonds by submitting himself freely to God's will. 
Thereupon he is restored to grace. But like Adam, he must 
pay the penalty for his sins.
Hanford feels that Milton's choice of Samson for a 
subject, beyond any obvious analogies between the two men's 
physical and political conditions, is also the poet's desire 
to show an example of "one who enjoys a direct and special 
relation with the Divine" who because of this relation 
"achieves his triumph before the time of the Redeemer."^® 
Hanford sees in such a gesture proof that Milton felt that 
the "blood of Christ's sacrifice is plainly no necessary 
instrument of salvation; even his example may be dispensed 
with by those who enjoy a direct relation with the Divine."^9 
Whether Hanford is right here or not, then Milton has not 
only broadened his sympathies to include all mankind as 
eligible for the holy community, but he has precisely
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anticipated the direction of twentieth-century radical the­
ology. At the same time he underscores his entire relation- 
ship-responsihility motif. Moreover he indicates the basis 
of his emphasis on Christ as the Exemplar, an exalted man. 
Certainly this view reflects the movement of Milton's own 
faith during the later days. He not only repudiated any de­
nominational ties, but he also divested his religion of any 
externality except the word of God as revealed in the Scrip­
tures and as interpreted by himself.
Samson, however, was "chosen" and the Hebrews did 
look forward to Christ as has already been indicated in the 
discussion on Paradise Regain'd; the prophets themselves were 
types of Christ. Christ's coming, extended the scope of sal­
vation, making it available to all. Milton, I think, has 
even a more inclusive "all" in mind than the traditional 
Christians and Jews.
Samson is, according to Hanford, "the nearest pos­
sible fulfillment in the life of mortal man" of that "'better 
fortitude of patience and heroic martydom,' fulfilled by the 
portrayal of a divine pattern in Paradise Regained. H i s  
trials and conflicts alike reflect the aspirations of the 
divine community and the human frailties which sometimes 
thwart them. But his ability to reassert himself in God is 
the hope of the mortal man. Samson's whole career, as de­
picted by Milton, is a study in the relationship-responsi- 
bility motif inhering in sympathy.
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Though chosen by God "as a person separate of God 
[and], design’d for great exploits" (II, 23-32), Samson re­
pudiated his gifts by his lack of vigilance, diligence, and 
obedience. Though with man there is always the possibility 
of"return, the return must be effected by the use of his 
conscious will. At the opening of Samson, Milton depicts 
the hero as cut off from God’s grace, having severed his re­
lationship by his turn from God to Dalila. He is tangl’d, as 
Milton puts it in Paradise Regain’d, in an amorous net:
Such objects hath the power to soft’n
and tame
Severest temper, smooth the rugged’st
brow.
Enerve, and with voluptuous hope dissolve.
Draw out with credulous desire, and lead 
At will the manliest, resolutest brest.
As the Magnetic hardest iron draws.
(II, 163-168)
Succumbing to this net has been the plight of many a good 
man since Adam, as the tradition goes; for the attraction of 
the net is irresistible unless reason is sovereign. So 
Milton here records the consequences of Samson’s relapse 
from vigilance and obedience. To fall in love and to marry 
is good, Milton held. But to allow it to interfere with 
one’s duty to God is not good. A choice of a mate then must 
be rational; for true love has its seat in reason, as Milton 
reiterated in Paradise Lost. Moreover the mate must be a 
help meet, not a mismatch, as the divorce tracts showed at 
length. Samson in self-pity mourns his plight: enslav'd 
"to grind in Brazen Fetters under task/ with this He^vfn
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gifted strength . . . Eyeless in Gaza" (11. 32-41). Until 
he can come to see his plight as his own responsibility 
both as to cause and cure, he cannot move towards God.
Samson is at the first step in his restoration when 
he comes to blame himself instead of God: "What if all
foretold/ Had been fulfilled but through mine own default/ 
Whom have I to complain of but myself?" (11. 44-46). Such 
a reflection is a gleam of redemption, for it predicts the 
return of Samson’s ability to accept responsibility. But he 
must come to fuller recognition of the circumstances before 
his ultimate redemption. This is achieved in part by the 
temptations proffered him by his succession of visitors.
Each visitor brings him new illumination as is signified by 
his reception of "secret refreshings from above (11. 664- 
666) .
Even out of his deepest agony/be comes to gain 
certain insights. Though physically blind, he has the com­
pensation of "the light in the soul" (1. 92). Samson's com­
ment that the soul is "in every part" (1 . 9 2) has been used 
to support the charge of the Mortalist heresy in Milton. I 
do not think such a use is peculiar to Milton. Genesis 2:8 
"and man became a living soul" is a case in point. Here 
also the poet’s monistic position is evident for he con­
sidered matter to be an extension of spirit. The particular 
frame of reference in which Milton employs this concept of 
soul certainly enhances the basic idea; for it must be
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comforting to a blind person to know that the light of the 
soul cannot be extinguished by injury to a single part. But 
even here Samson has not come to the real insight needed to 
redress himself to God. "He is," as Broadbent says, "valuing 
himself rather than doing anything.
Samson begins to evaluate the cause for his plight. 
Though he sees himself partially to blame, he has a neat 
way of shifting the responsibility. Like Adam, he sees his 
marriage as divinely ordained. Dalila, like Eve to Adam, 
is a divine gift that betrayed him. Samson, of course, ar­
rived at the conclusion that it was the divine will for him 
to marry Dalila by indirection. Of his first marriage, he 
says " . . .  What I motion'd was of God; I knew/ From intimate 
impulse, and therefore urg'd the marriage on" to serve divine 
ends (11. 2 2 2 - 2 2 k ) .  Consequently, after the marriage to 
Timna, a Philistine, proved false, Samson concluded that the 
marriage to Dalila was "lawful from his former act/ And the 
same end" (11. 231-232). Hence the same "divine" inspira­
tion which moved Samson to marry one Philistine moved him to 
marry the other. Perhaps the latter marriage was Samson's 
own will not the divine; certainly the consequences seem to 
indicate this. Even so, at no time is Samson's fate de­
termined; it is, ever subject to his conscious will. Thus 
Samson does come to see that "She was not the prime cause, 
but I my self" (11. 220-236). Samson himself gave her the 
secret which led to his captivity. And he also sees that
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he himself is not entirely to blame for his nation's bondage: 
much of it is due to its own corruption. Likewise had Milton 
conceived the self-enthrallment of England at the Restora­
tion. Therefore, though many are not always able to see it, 
there is moral order in the universal scheme. As the Chorus 
points out: "Just are the ways of God/ And justifiable to
men" (11. 293-29^). Samson must come to this point before 
he can submit his will to the divine will.
Samson is gradually made aware of the divine will by 
the succession of visitors. Manoa, his father, brings home 
the point that Samson's betrayal involves more than simply 
yielding to sensuality: it was a repudiation of God and 
country (11. ^20ff.). Manoa's plan for Samson's restitution, 
not biblical, also represents a departure from the divine 
will to man's will. Patently ironic, he says: "Dagon must
stoop" and in such a manner of discomfort as shall "with 
confusion blank his Worshippers" (11. '+68-'+71). He offers 
to ransom his son (11. ^80ff.). He advises repentance; but 
the instinct of self-preservation mitigates the effect of 
this advice for he also tells Samson to avoid punishment 
(1. 50*+). He epitomizes man's limited view of the ways of 
God with man. God does not require a ransom for pardon; 
rather he requires the death of the apostate will, for the 
will alone brings separation from him.
Samson's response is indicative of this insight: 
pardon, he desires, but no thought of life preservation
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(11. 521-522). Full of the divine instinct he had performed 
some heroic deeds as long as he had preserved his relation. 
But he broke fealty when he became insatiate with hubris, 
the reliance upon self and not upon the source of his 
strength. He thereupon fell from glory into the lascivious 
"lap of a deceitful Concubine" (11. 535-5^0). Neither wine 
nor warriors had been able to so conquer and reduce him 
(11. 521-5^0). Contemplation on his past and present cir­
cumstances enables Samson to move closer to the point of 
reestablishment with his Maker; for in the face of physical 
and mental anguish divine philosophy little avails. Only 
within can he seek to feel:
Some sourse of consolation from above;
Secret refreshings, that repair his
strength 
And fainting spirits uphold.
(11. 663-666)
Such is the way God makes his relationship known to men. 
Because men vary in their receptivity of this human-divine 
bond, some succeed and others fail. Success or failure ob­
tains in proportion to the receptivity of the natural rela­
tionship between God and his creatures, according to 
Milton's deontology. Once the relationship is accepted and 
a relapse in responsibility ensues, the fall is many times 
greater than the elevation (11. 667-686). And:
Causeless suffering 
The punishment of dissolute days . . .
Just or unjust, alike seem miserable.
For oft alike, both come to evil end.
(11. 701-70 )^
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These lines reflect man’s limited vision. God's ways are 
beyond such valuation.
Samson's next visitor is Dalila. Milton's non- 
biblical precedence in making Dalila Samson's wife forces us 
to make further associations between them and the archetypal 
union of Adam and Eve. The first statement that Samson 
utters upon Dalila's approach calls up all the qualities 
that Milton extolled in a wife in his divorce tracts as 
well as in Paradise Lost. Samson summarily rejects Dalila: 
"My wife, my traytress" (1. 725)* The two concepts wife and 
traitress are irréconciliable opposites in Milton's view.
The key here, as in the divorce tracts, is that a mate must 
be a help meet for the spouse: there must be mutual love and 
sympathy, unity of mind and spirit between them. In such a 
case betrayal is impossible. Samson's union to Dalila was 
one of passion rather than of love and sympathy: "over- 
potent charms," as Manoa says (1. *+26). Her betrayal is not 
only against the law of nature which prevents any force of 
sympathy against the correspondent, but it is also against 
the "law of nations" (1. 890). Dalila as Samson's wife be­
came one with his country, thus severing her ties with her 
former country. She broke fealty with her marriage bond 
when she "conceiv'd her spurious first-born— Treason"
(11. 388-3 9 1) and "made him traytor to himself" (1. *+01).
Dalila's love was completely self-centered, which 
true love cannot be. In her opening plea for reconciliation
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(11. 766-818), she mentions some form of 1  at least twenty-
times. The whole weight of her argument is directed towards
what benefits her. She reveals that even her plot to learn
his secrets was motivated by her fears that he would one
day leave her as he had Timna. So she proceeded to learn:
How to endear, and hold thee to me
firmest:
No better way I saw then by importuning 
To learn thy secrets, get into my power 
Thy key of thy strength.
(11. 796-799)
But weakness is no excuse, neither for Samson nor Dalila. 
There is a tinge of selflessness in Dalila's plea of patri­
otism, "the bonds of Civil Duty and of Religion" (11. 834- 
835) as the causes of her betrayal. But this plea is nulli­
fied because her marital bond supercedes such a civic bond. 
This Samson points out to her (11. 885ff.). Both the law 
of nature and the law of nations sanction this precedence.
Dalila then proffers Samson the temptation to sloth­
ful ease and sensuality, a two-pronged hook offering some­
thing both to herself and to him. But Samson's growth over 
his earlier state is evident in his answer to her: "It fits
not; thou and I long since are twain" (1. 929). His recog­
nition that since there can never be a spiritual and mental 
bond between them, they can never really be one in love and 
sympathy. They must therefore be twain in body as in mind 
and spirit. This statement signals his final break with 
Dalila and his triumph over sensuality. She no longer has 
influence over him:
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thy ginns, and toyls;
Thy fair enchanted cup, and warbling
charms
No more on me have power, their force
is null’d.
(11. 932-93^)
Moreover, Samson now realizes the man’s place as the head of 
the ship of matrimony. To enter into this league which 
Dalila proposes would be to surrender his inward freedom; 
for freedom depends on the maintenance of the right relation­
ship among things. Moreover the jail in which he is now im­
prisoned is liberty compared with the bondage to which 
Dalila’s proposition would subject him (11. 9^0-950).
Dalila's hopes vanish when she finds that she no 
longer exercises the preternatural influence on Samson that 
she once did. The fact that Samson refuses to touch her hand 
is significant. The joining of the hands, as I have indi­
cated in my reading of Paradise Lost, is symbolic of unity 
in Milton. Dalila sought by this means to reawaken the old 
affinities between them, thus to ensnare Samson again as she 
had before. But Samson is now in control, and the touch can 
only have the opposite effect. It can only arouse the antip­
athy which Samson now feels for Dalila (11. 952ff.). Only 
at the end is one made aware of the real import of her visit. 
Pretending love and good, she is truly "a manifest Serpent 
by her sting/ Discover'd in the end, till now conceal'd"
(11. 996-9 9 8). Samson’s victory was quite fortunate— though 
the credit is to his growth in resolve, not to chance— for 
Dalila sought only his further ruin through the clever
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stratagems of the Arch-Fiend to whom she is here metaphori­
cally equated.
In a perfect footnote to Milton’s previous state­
ments on the misfit in marriage, the Chorus sums up Dalila 
as a mate: appearing good, soft, modest, demure, meek.
Once joyn’d, the contrary she proves,
a thorn
Intestin, far within defensive arms
A clinging mischief, in his way to
vertue
Adverse and turbulent, or by her
charms
Draws him awry enslav’d.
And the disruption of hierarchy, without or without, in mar­
riage, religion or politics, breeds chaos. So:
With dotage, and his sense deprav’d
To folly and shameful deeds which
ruin ends.
What Pilot so expert but needs must
wreck
Embarqu’d with such a Stears-Mate
at the Helm?
(11. 1035-^5)
Man, says Milton, must pilot the ship of matrimony, or 
certain ruin is inevitable. This is God’s universal law 
(1. 1053). Had Samson maintained the correct relationship 
in his marriage and had Dalila acted according the posi­
tive dictates of the bond of sympathy inherent in her mar­
riage union, the story could not have been a tragedy. Thus 
Milton’s doctrine of sympathy not only enhanced this theme 
based upon the lineaments of the Bible story of Samson, but 
it gave the story its essential meaning as a conscious work 
of art. Further illustrative detail will support this basic
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assumption.
To regain mastery of self, Samson must overcome all 
distracting influences which hamper his relationship to God. 
For sympathy as an effect is an active principle in the uni­
verse which can lead to virtue only in so far as it obtains 
from God and is directed towards him. Hence the necessity 
of right reason as a guide to the choices and actions of the 
conscious being. Samson can make the right decisions now 
because his reason is in control, passions are subdued, and 
true valuation places no responsibility to Dalila and all 
to God.
But Samson is yet not completely recovered. Milton 
again adds to the biblical story the character Harapha, 
Samson's final visitor. The "braggart soldier" or miles 
eloriosus is a challenge to Samson's pride and a stimulus 
to activity. He is an invitation to a final conquest of 
despair. Harapha chides Samson by branding his strength 
spurious. Not a gift of God, as Harapha sees it, Samson's 
strength is the product of diabolic forces: spells
And black enchantments, some magicians
Art
Arm'd thee or charm'd thee strong, which
thou from Heaven
Feignst at thy birth was giv'n thee in
thy hair.
(1 1. 1132-3 8)
But Milton distinguishes between the power which comes 
through sympathy with God and that which derives from human 
manipulations of the natural bond of things. The miraculous
238
quality of the form of the divine sympathy must be accepted
on faith and in obedience, as Samson explains:
I know no Spells, use no forbidden Arts 
My trust is in the living God who gave me 
At my Nativity this strength difus'd 
No less through all my sinews, joints,
and bones.
(11. 1li+0-^5)
So long as Samson kept the "pledge of [his] unviolated vow," 
the strength endured. But when he broke his relationship 
with God, he no longer received the benefits of that rela­
tionship.
Samson reaffirms his faith in God by his answer to 
Harapha's taunt. In a single combat between himself as 
God's representative and Harapha as Dagon's representative, 
Samson vowed that God's side would win (11. 1150-65). But 
Harapha refuses, for he came to flout a weak man not to 
fight a strong one. Seeing that Samson is not as he ex­
pected, Harapha departs. Samson has met this challenge suc­
cessfully. Though the Chorus predicts the life of a patient 
and enduring saint (11. 1287-88) for Samson, his peace lies 
in the complete submission of his will to God's will. His 
ultimate victory will lie in "the magnitude of the mind"
(1. 1279). But he is now in position to receive God's will 
for he has signs of his reestablished relation with God in 
the return of the "consecrated gift of his strength" along 
with his hair (1 1. 13 5*+-56).
Samson discovers the will of God through the bonds 
of sympathy and thus submits himself to it. At first, not
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yet aware of God's purpose for him, he refuses the 
Philistines' invitation to sport. He considered it idola­
trous. But in this gesture he demonstrates his loyalty to 
God, placing it above his own personal safety. To obey 
outwardly to avoid the repercussions of his refusal to obey 
a royal command is just as culpable as to give wholehearted 
commitment. Still this gesture of self-denial is a submis­
sion of self to the divine will and relation is signalled 
by "some rouzing motions” (11. 1381-83), the communication 
of the divine will. Samson then can answer affirmatively
to the second invitation to come to the temple, for he knows
it is the will of God.
Samson must deliver his people by self-sacrifice. He
divines: "This day will be remarkable in my life/ By some
great act, or of my days the last" (11. 1387-89). But by his 
obedience he, like the phoenix, gains new life (11. 1699- 
1709) "Though [his] body dies, [his] fame survives"
(1. 1705)* Samson, then, becomes the agent of the Philis­
tines' destruction and of his own also. Such is the in­
scrutability of the ways of God to man. For the relation­
ship and responsibility of man to God and of man to man must 
always obtain from his relationship with God and this rela­
tionship chastens and refines all other actions and rela­
tions. Samson's act is sacrificial because it is not 
selfishly oriented and because it is in harmony with the 
Divine will (11. 1689-90). The Philistines' self-destruction
2^0
was brought on by their selfishness and greed, their desire 
to use a fellow being (11. 1675-1681) for their own selfish 
ends. The first is good; the second is evil.
Thus Milton in his trinal poem justifies the ways of 
God to man. In Paradise Lost, the circle is complete. 
Paradise Regain'd and Samson Agonistes refine the basic as­
sumptions of Paradise Lost. The message is clear. Sym- 
pathy is the universal principle of unity, operative in di­
vine, human, and infernal realms. God is the source of all 
good. He spreads His divine beneficence to all who receive 
it by their own free will. To enjoy a direct and special 
relation with God involves a conscious submission to His 
will and obedience to it. Disobedience breaks fealty. In 
the divine realm, Satan and his host disobeyed and broke the 
primal union in the universe. All other sin stems directly 
or indirectly from this first. Upon the establishment of 
the human realm, man was placed in a realm of perfect bliss 
and harmony with God. Incumbent upon him was the responsi­
bility to obey and thus make of his world a heaven. Tempted 
to disobey by the diabolic forces, man yielded and thereby 
broke fealty. But God's justice is tempered by mercy. Thus 
through His Son, man by his acceptance of the gift of re­
demption, can again be restored to the harmony lost in Eden. 
He can by virtue and patience achieve a Paradise within and 
finally be reunited with his Maker.
CONCLUSION
The idea of sympathy as a transcendental vision of 
oneness in the universe had not yet felt in Milton’s age the 
hostile effects of scientism it was later to feel. Often 
used widely in secular and religious contexts ranging from 
the most elementary recognition of effects and affinities, 
astral influence, a magic communication of kindred souls, to 
the wider implications of the commerce between this world 
and the other, the idea of sympathy was appropriated as both 
fact and figure. Postulated on the awareness of a common 
primal source, the essence of the concept is the bond among 
created things and the Creator. Therefore the idea came to 
be used more and more in religious contexts by ministers to 
underscore their ethical teaching on man’s relationship to 
God and to his fellowman. As the seventeenth century wore 
on, the doctrine of sympathy became a main weapon in the 
hands of the Puritans and Latitudinarian divines against 
Hobbism and many of the inimical effects of the scientific 
spirit.
This study has demonstrated Milton’s use of the doc­
trine of sympathy in his deontology and ambiance. Appealing 
to the subliminal and personal in Milton, the sympathetic
2^ 1
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impulse lies at the heart of his perception and expression 
of his vision of oneness. Milton's deontology arises from a 
deep sensitivity of his relationship to God and his fellow- 
men. From this relationship he arrives first at an aware­
ness of his responsibility to God; then all other relation­
ships follow proportionately, the closer the relationship 
the greater the responsibility. His so-called heresies, his
blending of the spiritual and the sensible, his theories on
the Godhead and creation, his high moral idealism, his sense
of mission, his antipathy for the slavish regard for tradi­
tion and systems, his peculiar language patterns— all have 
their orientation in the poet's quest for unity among the 
dissimilitudes of existence.
The poem, in Milton's ambiance, early becomes a sym­
bol of the unity, harmony, and proportion which he desired 
in his personal life, in the world as a holy community, and 
in the moral universe he perceived. It embodies the prin­
ciple of relationship among parts to their creator which 
Milton desired between parts of the world and their Creator. 
According to the receptivity of the parts, the Creator 
shapes them to a conscious purpose and plan. So Milton felt 
that an individual, as a consequence of his conscious re­
ceptivity of his relationship to God, strives to make of him­
self a poem, a "composition, and patterns of the best and 
honourablest things." By the same token, he accepts the re­
sponsibility to make of the world a poem, and then, as he is
2^3
called, he writes the perfect poem, or performs his best in 
whatever his endeavor. But he is judged finally according to 
his fitness, not his;performance.
Interrelationship, then, becomes the key to Milton's 
deontology and ambiance. God is the highest good, and all 
other good obtains from the relationship one effects with 
him. Milton's whole intellectual and spiritual energy, I 
suggest, was devoted to an examination and refinement of his 
perception of the common bond of nature. For this he ap­
propriated the traditional doctrine of sympathy and brought 
it to an unparalleled significance as image and principle. 
From his earliest works to his latest he studied the rela­
tionship of man to God, to himself and his kind, and to na­
ture, His keen sensitivity to the sympathetic bond of nature 
animated his love of chastity, his appreciation for the dig­
nity of the individual spirit, his love of liberty, and his 
defense of the just claims of the law of nature in a reason­
able soul. From the first to the last, his desire was to 
regain that primal unity between God and the universe which 
was abrogated by the Fall. And all of his knowledge and 
talents were directed to that end.
Milton's sense of duty led him to become active in 
reform because he had a deep sense of responsibility to God 
and his fellowman to make of the world what it should be.
He lent the whole force of his talents and industry to 
achieve for his country the freedom which he felt the human
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condltion demanded in religion, domestics, and politics.
With the Bible as his guide and the final interpretation of 
the Scriptures the reserved privilege of those "engrafted in 
Christ," he attacked established authority, cherished idols, 
and custom joined with error in any of its guises. Though 
often branded as a heretic or a flout because of his activ­
ities, Milton did not join the hot and dusty fields of con­
troversy for the love of battle. He joined it out of love of 
God and truth.
Milton's vision of unity led him through nature to 
great insight into human nature and God. His study of the 
effects and affinities in nature gave credence to his basic 
assumptions on the relatedness in the universe. And con­
templation on nature again took him back to the notion of the 
primal unity and the effects of the first sin. Milton's na­
ture was sentient. It shared in the affairs of man for both 
weal and woe. Likewise, he believed that nature's proper use 
depends on the quality of the user's relationship to God. 
Nature is an instrument by which man ascends to God, never a 
substitute for man or God. Therefore, the images which 
Milton selected from nature were always informed by this rich 
sense of the relatedness of all in God.
From the quest for individual merit or fitness evi­
dent in the first phase of Milton's work to the test of this 
idealism in the revolutionary activities of the.second,
Milton sought to attain the individual and corporate poem
2^ -5
shaped to the pattern of the best and noblest things re­
vealed by God in His works and in the Scriptures. In the 
last phase, he wrote the perfect poem for which he had spent 
the main part of his life in preparation. Having emerged 
from the world of action with a matured insight, he was no 
longer dedicated to passionate reform of the world. His 
hope now rested in the hope for individual regeneration. He 
now realized that the kingdom without must await the destined 
time for all parts to find their place in the total frame; 
but the ''fit" could even in his earthly sojourn attain the 
kingdom within. This Milton expressed in the trinal poem, 
his last three works, in which he both climaxed and summed 
up his vision of the sympathetic bond of nature. All parts 
of the universe are interrelated. Within the larger whole 
are smaller units related to each other by a common bond.
Each part is separate yet a part of the lÆiole; thus what 
happens in one part affects the whole. And every act has 
divine and eternal reference. Hence sympathy in Milton is 
not only the ideational principle, but it is the structural 
principle as well, informing all parts of his life and his 
art: each part is an integral part of the whole. In the 
midst of barbarous dissonance, he spoke with a harmonious 
voice in tune with the divine.
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■^Seventeenth Centurv Verse and Prose, eds. Helen C. 
White, Ruth Wallerstein, and Ricardo Quintano, 2 Vols. (New 
York, 1952), II, 59-60).
^White, II, 60.
^White, II, 59-60.
^The Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don 
Wolfe (New Haven, 1953-19 66), IV, pt. I, 31 « Hereafter cited 
as CPW with volume and page number listed parenthetically in 
text.
"^ Ronald S. Crane, "Suggestions Toward a Genealogy of 
the 'Man of Feeling,'" ELH. I (December, 193^), 205-211.
Q
The Complete Works of William Shakespeare. Shake­
speare Head Edition (New York, 1938), I, iii, 88-109, 110-112, 
p. 7 2 0,
^Quoted in The Works of George Herbert, ed. F.L.
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Hutchinson (Oxford, 19^1)» P« xliv. Subsequent quotations 
from Herbert's poetry will be taken from this edition; and 
page number will be listed parenthetically in the text, fol­
lowing the title Works.
Mahood, Poetry and Humanism (New Haven, 1950),
p. 96.
 ^^ The Sermons of John Donne, eds. George R. Potter 
and Evelyn Simpson, 10 Vols. (Berkeley, 1953), I, 18^-85. 
Subsequent quotations from Donne’s sermons will be taken from 
this edition unless otherwise stated. Volume and page number 
will be listed parenthetically in the text. Of. II Peter,
1 : 2-8 .
^^Quoted in Victor Harris, All Coherence Gone 
(Chicago, 1949), p. 121. See II Peter 3: 11-13*
"'^Michael Macklem, The Anatomy of the World 
(Minneapolis, 1958), pp. 10-11, 12.
^^ "Anatomie of the World," The Poems of John Donne. 
ed. Sir Herbert Grierson (London, 1933), 11* 205-21^. Sub­
sequent references to Donne's poetry are to this edition; 
and page numbers will be listed parenthetically in the text.
"'^"Sermon XXXVI, Preached Upon Whitsunday," Sermons. 
LXXX (London, I6V0 ), p. 357*
I^Bush, John Milton, p. 82. -
^7john Donne, Letters to Severall Persons of Honour,
ed, Charles E. Merrill (New York, 1910), pp. 25-26,
18Donne, p. 26.
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^^Ross Garner, Henry Vaughan; Experience and Tradi­
tion (Chicago, 1959)5 p. 116.
^^Mahood, p. 272. Miss Mahood does not seem to have 
noticed the preponderance of this idea of correspondence in 
Milton.
^^The Works of Henry Vaughan, ed. L.C. Martin,
2 vols. (Oxford, 191*+) 5 15 13. Subsequent references to 
Vaughan's poetry will be taken from this edition; volume and 
page number will be listed parenthetically in the text.
2^Cf. Mahood, p. 27*+.
23üouglas Bush, John Milton (New York, 19643, p. 27.
NOTES
CHAPTER III
^A.S.P. Woodhouse, The Poet and His Faith (Chicago,
1965), p. 31.
^The Complete Poetical Works of John Milton, ed. 
Douglas Bush (Boston, 1965), p. 9*
The Works of John Milton, ed. Frank Allen Patter­
son, 18 vols. (New York, 1931-1938), I, 231. Hereafter cited 
as Works. Subsequent quotations from Milton's poetry are 
from this edition unless otherwise stated. Volume and line 
number will be cited parenthetically in the text.
^Rosemund Tuve, Images and Themes in Five Poems by 
Milton (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), P* 38.
^Euphues. Ed. Arber, p. -^-56-. Quoted in Milton: 
Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. M.Y. Hughes (New York,
1957), p.
^Bush, Poetical Works. p. 66.
^B.A. Wright, Milton's Paradise Lost (London, 1962),
p. 162.
Q
Leo Spitzer, "Classical and Christian Ideas of 
World Harmony," Traditio. Ill (19^5), 312.
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^Douglas Bush, John Milton (New York, 196*+), p. 37« 
lOj.B. Broadbent, "The Nativity Ode," Frank Kermode, 
The Living Milton (London, I960), p. 21. See "Upon a Circum­
cision," 11. 19-22.
Michael Fixler, Milton and the Kingdoms of God 
(Evanston, 1965), p. 58.
^^Tuve, passim.
^^Woodhouse, p. 97*
"’^ Bush, John Milton, pp. *+9-50.
 ^%on C . Allen, The Harmonious Vision (Baltimore,
I95*f), pp. 35, 36-37.
I^Robert Martin Adams, Ikon: John Milton and the 
Modern Critics (Ithaca, 1955), PP. *+-5.
I^Denis Saurat, Milton: Man and Thinker (New York, 
1925), p. 16.
’^Tuve, pp. 115, 137-38.
^^Tuve, pp. 116, 120.
^*^Woodhouse, p. 98.
21woodhouse, p. 98.
22gee Charles Nauert, Agrippa and the Crisis in 
Renaissance Thought (Urbana, 1965), PP. 23*+-35; Rudolf Allers, 
"Microcosmus," Traditio, II (19*+^ ), 362-63.
^%.G. Madsen, "The Idea of Nature in Milton's 
Poetry," Three Studies in the Renaissance (New Haven, 1958),
p. 216.
2^ 'See Adams, Ikon, p. 11.
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^^Spltzer, ^13. See M-2^ -^ 26. OED also gives the 
following as etymology for temperance ; — Temperance; ad
temperantia - moderation; temperament L. temperamentum—  
moderation. Both temperance and harmony share a common 
etymology.
^^James Holly Hanford, A Milton Handbook (New York, 
1961), p. 169.
Quoted in Hanford, p. 168.
^^Emile Legouis, Histoire de la Littéraire Anglaise 
(Paris, 1933), P* 567- 
Allen, p. 61.
3°Allen, p. 61.
31 John Donne, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions and 
Death's Duell. Abbey Classics Edition (London, N.D.), p. 109-
3^John Milton, p. 61.
33Max Scheler, The Nature of Svmpathv. tr. Peter 
Heath (New Haven, 195^), PP* 96-97*
3*+Scheler, pp. Bff., 7I *
35gcheler, pp. 68-69.
3^Hughes, Poetry and Major Prose, p. 13^+*
37Summarized from Roy Raymond Male, "The Power of 
Sympathy: A Study of Shelley's Moral Ideas" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation. Dept, of English, University of Texas,
1950), pp. 32-3 3 *
3^See Laurens J. Mills, One Soul in Bodies Twain 
(Bloomington, Ind., 1937), P* and passim.
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p.
^°Mills, p. 11.
Allen, p. 65.
^^Allen, p. 65.
Quoted in R.R. Male, "The Power of Sympathy,"
pp. 3^-35.
^^'"Approaches to Lycldas. " Frank Kermode, The Living 
Milton (London, I960), p. 50.
^^See Laura Bowman Zwicky, "Milton's Use of Time: 
Image and Principle" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Dept, 
of English, University of Oklahoma, 1959)? PP- 105-10? and 
passim.
^^The phrase "bottom of the monstrous world" seems 
to underscore the brokenness in the universe by calling at­
tention to the unnaturalness in the lower world actuated by 
instinct in juxtaposition with the unnaturalness in the human 
world caused by nullity of will. Both the monstrous animals 
and the "monstrous" huma.ns act without a will dictated by 
reason.
NOTES
CHAPTER IV
C^omplete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don M.
Wolfe (New Haven, 1953- ), I, 292. Subsequent quotations
from Milton's prose are from this volume unless otherwise 
indicated. Other citations will be listed parentheti­
cally in the text as CPW. with volume and page number.
^The Works of John Milton. 18 vols. ed. Frank Allen 
Patterson (New York, 1931-1938), XVI, pt. I, 21. Hereafter 
this edition will be cited as Works with volume and page 
number listed in text. For poetry, the last number indicates 
line.
3The antiprelatical tracts appeared during the years 
1641-1642. There are five in all: Of Prelatical Episcopacy
(1641); Of Reformation (164l); The Reason of Church Govern­
ment (1642); ^  Apology for Smectymnuus (1642); Animadversions
(1642).
^Arthur Barker, Milton and the Puritan Dilemma 
(Toronto, 1942), p. 65. Having married Mary Powell in May 
or June, 1642, Milton found himself deserted when his bride 
returned to Forest Hill after a month of married life and
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refused to come again to her husband in London at the ap­
pointed time.
^For example, Paul Elmer More and Samuel Johnson.
See note 25 infra.
&Cf. E.M.W. Tillyard, Milton (London, 19^6), 218-
219.
^John S. Diekhoff, Milton's Paradise Lost; A Com­
mentary on the Argument (Nev York, 19^6), p. 1^ 2.
^Henry Ainsworth, The Communion of Saints (Amster­
dam, 16^0), p. 161. Quoted in Merritt Y. Hughes, Ten Per­
spectives on Milton (New Haven, 1965)» PP* 33-3^*
^Hughes, p. 33* 
lOHughes, p. 33*
 ^^ Quoted in Hughes, pp. 33-3’+*
^^The Ethics of Aristotle, ed. Earnest Ehys (New 
York, 1942), pp. 26-27.
I^A.E. Taylor, Platonism and Its Influence (Boston, 
19.24), p. 44.
^^Taylor, p. 4?.
^^Taylor, pp. 57-58.
^^As he says in Christian Doctrine : "Man was made in
the image of God and had the law of nature implanted in him."
Works. X V ,  114-115*
^7gee Douglas Bush, John Milton (New York, 1964),
pp . 83-85*
1^8ee J. Milton French, The Life Records of John
26^
Milton (New Brunswick, 1950), II, 87-91, 96, 105, 123-12^. 
I^Bee ÇPW, II, 137-138.
^^Michael Fixler, Milton and the Kingdoms of God 
(Evanston, 196*+), p. 111.
Fixler, p. 111.
^^Barker, p. 66.
23sarker, p. 66.
2^Earker, p. 6 7.
25sarker, p. 6 7. ’ ~
^^Paul Elmer More, "How to Read Lvcidas." Milton*s 
Lvcidas, ed. C.A. Patrides (New York, 1961), pp. 85, 86.
^^Marjorie H. Nicolson, "Milton and Hobbes," 8P, 
XXII (1926), *f07.
Z^French, II, 236.
Z^French, II, 339.
^Opudolf Allers, "Microcosmus," Traditio, III 
(19*+*+), 3 6 8. The chain idea in its refinements was often 
static, but its mere lineaments admit dynamism.
^^Allers, p. 3 6 8.
NOTES
CHAPTER V
^Lascelles Abercrombie, The Epic, 2 vols. (London, 
1920), II, 69.
^Abercrombie, II, 69.
^Milton's Epic Voice (Cambridge, Mass., 1963),
p . 1^+8.
^W.G. Madsen, "The Idea of Nature in Milton's 
Poetry," Three Studies in the Renaissance (New Haven, 1958), 
p. 23^.
^John Milton's Samson Agonistes, ed. Ralph E. Hone 
(San Francisco, 1966), p. 172.
^George Nitchie, Human Values in Robert Frost 
(Durham, N.C., I960), p. 69.
'^ Nitchie, p. 69.
O
See John MacMurray. Persons in Relation (London, 
1961), p. 13^.
^Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don M. 
Wolfe (New Haven, 1953-), IV, pt. I, U-67. Hereafter cited 
as CPW with volume and page number listed parenthetically 
in the text.
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1^The Works of John Milton, 18 vols., ed. Frank Allen 
Patterson (New York, 1931-1938), II, pt. I, V, 469-^79» 
Subsequent quotations from Milton's poetry are from this 
edition. Book and/or line number will be listed parentheti­
cally in the text.
There are arguments for and against the ex Deo 
theory and so for the ex nihilo (creation out of nothing) 
theory. I feel that the weight of the argument rests on the 
side of the ex Deo as far as Milton is concerned. Woodhouse 
and Adamson influenced me most. Woodhouse in The Poet and 
His Faith (Chicago, 1965), p. 105, says that Milton holds 
that "God is the source of every substance, and includes in 
himself the one primal substance." Adamson, in "Milton and 
the Creation," JEGP, LXI (1962), 756ff., shows that the 
ex Deo theory has a reputable Christian tradition, p. 759 
and passim.
most famous critic of this school is William 
Empson. See his Milton's God (Norfolk, Conn., 1961), passim.
I^Don Wolfe, Milton and the Puritan Revolution (New 
York, 19>+1), p. 344.
l4gee Robert West, Milton and the Aneels (Athens,
Ga., 1955), pp- 150-151, and passim.
 ^^ est, p. 168.
Frye, God, Man, and Satan (Princeton, I960),
pp. 29-3 0.
^7woife, Puritan Revolution, p. 265.
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^^Madsen, p. 236.
9^Edward Reynolds, A Treatise of Passions (London, 
161+0), p. 75.
Quoted in B. Rajan, Paradise Lost and the Seven­
teenth Century Reader (London, 1962), p. 55.
21 Quoted in Madsen, p. 243.
22woodhouse, p. 113.
23Douglas Bush, Paradise Lost in Our Time (Glou­
cester, 1957), p. 37.
oh.
Bush, Paradise, p. 37*
25"Areopagitica," CPW, II, 516.
2&The Complete Poetical Works of Edmund Spenser, eds. 
J.C. Smith and Ernest De Selincourt (London, 1946), p. 592. 
27e .M.W. Tillyard, Milton (London, 1946), p. 263.
28a .J.A. Waldock, Paradise Lost and Its Critics 
(Cambridge, England, 1947), PP. 48-49.
29b .A. Wright, Milton’s Paradise Lost (London, 1962),
p. 162.
3^Quoted in James H. Sims, The Bible in Milton*s 
Epics (Gainesville, 1962), p. 94.
31 Sims, p. 94.
32Etienne Gilson, Moral Values and the Moral Life :
The Ethical Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas (Shoe String, 1961), 
pp. 79-90.
88rîchard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical 
Polity, ed., John Keble (London, 1836), I, ix, 296-297; x.
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302-303.
^^Quoted in R.M. Frye, p. 35*
3^Samuel Purchas, Microcosmus (London, 1619), P* 21.
3%elen C. White, ejt a2., Seventeenth Centurv Verse 
and Prose. 2 vols. (New York, 1952), II,
^^Waldock, p. *+7; Merritt Y. Hughes, John Milton; 
Paradise Lost (New York, 1962), p. xx.
^^Tiiiyard, pp. 262-263.
39Rajan, p. 72.
^^Joseph Summers, "The Voice of the Redeemer in
•Paradise Lost,'" PMLA (December, 1955), 1086. Summers feels
that Adam's words in IX, 900ff. are prompted more by self-
love than by love for Eve.
The moment when he denies his freedom . . .  he loses 
it . . .  . Adam loses himself in a nightmarish realm 
of casuistry and "perhaps" where neither resolutions 
nor motivations have clarity (11. 921-159)« . . . He is 
eccentric and illogical. . . . The passage is moving, 
not because of its nobility, but it recreates the easy 
and "sincere" manner in which man falls victim to his 
ignorance and rhetoric. . . . The statement of identity 
is false. And the final phrase "to loose thee were to 
loose myself," states exactly Adam's paradoxical re­
fusal: he resolves on a half believed self-destruction 
because he fears loss of self.
Summers's remarks completely ignore the doctrine of sympathy
as it functions in the ways of man with man. Consequently
his position is not, as I see it, tenable.
'^"’Wright, p. 176.
^^James H. Hanford, The Poems of John Milton (New 
York, 1953), p. 198.
^3wolfe, Puritan Revolution, p. 3^9-
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^'^Purchas, Microcosnms, p. 226.
^^Marjorle Nlcolson, "Milton and Hobbes," XXIII 
(192 6), 1^ 9.
^^Barbara Lewalski, Milton's Brief Epic (Providence,
1966), pp. 157, and 133ff.
^^Lewalski, pp. 156-158.
^^Lewalski, pp. 168-16 9.
^^Lewalski, pp. I66-I67.
^^Lewalski, p. 133.
^"'lewalski, pp. 1 58-1 59.
^^Lewalski, p. 156.
^^Erich Auerbach, Mimesis, tr. Willard Trask 
(Garden City, 1957), P* 171.
.^^Auerbach, p. 17I.
^^Lewalski, p. 207.
^^Lewalski, p. 207.
57See William Riley Parker, "The Date of Samson 
Agonistes." ed. Ralph E. Hone, John Milton's Samson 
Agonistes (San Francisco, 1966), pp. 2l8ff. There is some 
disagreement as to the date of the beginning of the poem and 
of its stages of development. Although I accept the tradi­
tional chronology, the question of dating does not seriously 
affect my reading in any way.
^^"Samson Agonistes and Milton in Old Age," Hone,
p. 181.
^^Hanford, in Hone, p. I8I.
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^^Hanford, In Hone, p. I8l.
6lj.B. Broadbent, "Milton's Rhetoric," 1£, LVI 
( 1959) ,  228 .
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